

## SUMMARY

1. It has been the purpose of the author to check on the integration of the Papuan people into the ranks of the government and as members of democratic councils, during the periods between the erection of Dutch New Guinea as an autonomous government (27-12-'49) and the constitutional Reform of 5-4-'61 when the New-Guinea Council was installed. The preceding period, when Dutch N. G. was only a Residency under Van Eechoud, has also been considered. There are four sections, called after the names of those who wielded authority in those days. Each section has three approaches: factors affecting the development-process of the period; various aspects of that development and, finally, some observations and conclusions.

2. During the Van Eechoud-period, after having been a neglected part of the Dutch East Indies for centuries, Dutch N.G. obtained a natural unity under its own authority for the whole territory. It became a neo-autonomous territory. Van Eechoud designed a political development with the aim admitting the Papuan into the civil service, and attempted to train an élite in the so-called Joka-institute. He emphasized the characteristics of the territory and its people. Also he was called the Father of Papuans. He held that close relations with Indonesia were unsuitable as the Papuan was not emancipated yet. He was the first to enroll Papuans in military service (so far Van Eechoud had been a Conica (commanding officer) in the Neth. Indies Civil Administration) in the police force and especially for such posts as assistant patrol-officer.

A decision of major importance was to raise Hollandia – a place which played a role in World-war II – to be the capital. Van Eechoud organised an administrative governing body that could warrant a strict and intensive rule and designed plans for a swift pacification of the territory. He authorized the first democratic native council, the Kankain Karkara on the isle of Biak, which, however, did not have a properly defined task and finally became only an advisory body in adat-affairs such as dowry etc.

When the Government for Dutch N.G. was established the school-situation – so badly hurt during the war years – was already improving to the extent that there were 531 elementary schools with a total enrolment of 25,883 native pupils and 6 trade-schools among which one training centre

with 20 candidates for junior posts in the civil service, for a population of 267,447 out of the estimated one million inhabitants. In 1949 the first Middle School was opened.

There was political unrest in several places, during the years 1947-49, under the instigation of Indonesians who tried to find support for their own independence movement in Indonesia. This movement issued in the erection of a 'Partei Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian' (Freedom Party of Indonesia and Irian) in Serui, and of a 'Komite Indonesia Merdeka' (Committee for Free Indonesia). These parties were ignored by the vast majority of Papuans under Dutch rule.

On the isle of Biak another party, this time entirely native, was set up; the Suara Rakjat (Voice of the People) which sought to join the U.S.A. This party appeared to be affiliated to the Messiah-movement which had been a nuisance to the Japanese occupation during the war. The liberation by the Allied Forces has been, to a certain extent, the fulfilment of this Salvation-movement.

These political movements had hardly any effect compared with the 'Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea' (Unification Movement) which appeared towards the end of the Van Eechoud-regime and which was against joining Indonesia.

When Drs. Van Waardenburg became governor the situation was politically quiet. The people acknowledged the Netherlands as their true educator.

The expectations for social development ran high on account of the emancipation which had set in after the war.

3. During the Governorship of Van Waardenburg New Guinea changed from a Residency to be a self-governing territory the status of which to be defined later at negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands in 1950. A joint commission of the two countries visited the territory, but negotiations failed.

Mr. Romme, fraction leader of the Katholieke Volkspartij, said in the Tweede Kamer in January 1951 that full authority would be handed over to the Papuans in due time. As from 27.12.50 New Guinea was an autonomous territory but responsible, de iure et de facto, to the Dutch Government. This was clearly stated in the Speech from the Throne on September 16 1952.

Governor Van Waardenburg had his policy guided by suggestions from a newly appointed Education Council and from the Office of native affairs. The Education Council advocated inter alia to promote the use of the Dutch language by Papuans as much as possible.

In this period also there was a remarkable influx of Indo-Europeans from Indonesia. They came as settlers or were employees of the Department of Economical and Technical Services on a one-year-contract basis. This immigration brought with it particular problems. The Government, al-

ready fully engaged by the setting-up of its own organisation, was already faced with such problems as housing and communications.

Government was not very extensive in those days. The population figure of Papuans under Dutch rule (i.e. in the areas opened up) rose from 249,616 in 1950 to only 274,162 in 1952; and the estimated total population figure of one million native inhabitants was now said to be 700,000 only. Papuan officials, qualified or otherwise, numbered 50. As a rule only the lower and semi-medium posts were to the ability of Papuans. There were altogether 2,318 Papuans in government service and they constituted 40% of all government posts. As for private enterprise: the Dutch-New-Guinea Petroleum Company was the biggest employer with a roll of 5,248 unskilled workers.

Autonomous New Guinea had its own constitution providing for a representation of the people, viz. a New Guinea Council. This council was conceived following the tripartite pattern as was used in the Dutch East Indies, according to races. The concept did not materialize, however, owing to the immaturity of the territory its powers were taken over by a Council of departmental heads. Yet, in 1951, three advisory bodies, with appointed members, were created, on the same lines as the original council.

In the educational field there was a decline in the enrolment for elementary schools due to a stricter application of required standards; on the other hand, the number of pupils receiving further education jumped from 804 to 1,215, an increase of as much as 50%. As these latter schools (i.e. for further education) are the feeders of teacher training one understands the importance of this increase in view of the expansion of education on village-school level. Education beyond middle-school level was not available for the Papuan. It is gratifying to see the number of girls attending school. They made up as much as 42,4% of the elementary roll and 20% on the schools for postprimary education.

On a total budget of fl. 28,811,000 the portion allocated to Education amounted to fl. 3,350,000. In the agrarian sector we come upon the Nimborean Community Development Plan, which, by 1954, proved to have been a failure. Dr. Kouwenhoven who was in charge of the project intended to shape Nimborean into a community able to live by its own resources and as such to play its role in a modern world. The project, however, resulted in an unstable situation. The author, who came to Nimborean afterwards, agrees with Dr. Kouwenhoven that the project failed due mainly to the fact that not enough scope had been given to private enterprise in order to encourage better cooperation with the scheme. Nevertheless, new alleys had been opened up along which one could come to further development. The Papuan showed much more interest for social improvement. On the occasion of the visit by the joint-commission in 1950 the people had clearly shown not to be in favour of Indonesia. Their interest went afterwards from the political to the economical sector. Were the expectations high during the regime of Van Eechoud, now there was disappointment. They thought

to have reasons for it: the government-structure as it was; the immigration of Indo-Europeans and their integration in public services; the occupation of land by non-indigenous inhabitants. The G.P.N.G., which was gathering momentum, was politically on the government-side, but somehow diverged from it where social issues were concerned.

4. During the Van Baal-period (1953-58) the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia got worse. In 1956 the territory of N.G. was officially incorporated as Dutch territory. A cabinet, including socialists, made provision for a speeding up of full autonomy. In the same year negotiations with Indonesia, at Geneva, about the R.T.C.-agreements came to a deadlock. For four years Indonesia had brought the conflict in the General Assembly of the U.N.O. but failed to secure the required 2/3 majority. After the last failure Mr. Soebandrio announced to start on 'a different course': in fact he was going to nationalise Dutch properties in Indonesia and to unleash an anti-Netherlands campaign.

1954 had seen minor infiltration in N.G. The Netherlands sought military support from Australia and got a 'Joint Declaration' of 1953 where the Foreign Ministers of the two countries promised mutual support and co-operation. In the Netherlands there was some opposition against the government policy of New Guinea, by the General Synod of 1956 of the Dutch Reformed Church, as worded in its 'Call to Reflection'.

For education Governor Van Baal, an expert on account of his learning and experience, designed a policy of unusual trend, not starting from existing situations. From a keen analysis he argued that a six-years primary schooling was imperative for a proper schooling on western lines and also to prevent the Papuan from taking senseless shortcuts, such as cargocults.

As regards democracy, he definitely stood for collegiate authority as it was his firm conviction that in N.G. there was generally no feudal society.

In the agrarian sector he built on the negative results of the Nimborean Community Development Plan and fostered private enterprise and initiative. An outstanding feature of this period was the 'Werkplan 1954/56', a scheme providing for the construction of a number of basic facilities. Although there were many delays, it was the answer to such acute problems as housing and communications.

In the field of economics there was the construction a haulage-slip, a saw-mill and the laying out of the Koembe-rice estate.

The organisation in general changed not only because of a number of additional new districts (residencies) and General Services, but also on account of a certain decentralisation and the governor's authority gained by it nonetheless.

Great improvements also in the Public Health Service. Here, in their battle against endemic diseases, they switched over from curative to preventive methods. Thus, 123,000 persons received protection against malarial fevers by house-to-house spraying of insecticides.

The Crown contribution to the N.G.-budget jumped from about 18,5 million guilders to a little less than 68,5. During the governorship there was not much opening up of new areas. Of the estimated 700.000 indigenous inhabitants about one half was actually under Dutch rule, while the same figure for 1954 was 274,162.

Where facilities had been laid on there came agglomerations of the kind that called for urbanisation.

The number of unskilled workers which in 1952 amounted to only 7,566 reached a peak totalling 17,236 in 1956. The number of Papuan government assistant-officers showed only a relatively small rise; from 50 to 78. Promotion in the police-force was not provided for.

The advisory councils which came into being under the governorship of Van Waardenburg, proved not to be viable due mainly to the fact that their field of action (a whole district) was not a natural unit.

Governor Van Baal called for councils for townships and minor areas. In these councils the tripartite pattern was followed and their main duty was to advise on eventual new councils with real responsibilities. In several areas, such as Mimika, there were village-councils, equally without much responsibility.

In the educational field an ordinance was issued making different rulings for town-schools and village-schools. Increase of enrolment was negligible except for post-primary schools which had in view a furthering of education in rural areas: they aimed at supplying candidates for training as village school teachers. In 1954 the first junior-secondary school started to operate, but no others followed before 1957.

The failure of the Nimboran Plan led to another scheme: the Blitung-farms-project, where the most was made of personal profit as a stimulating factor for the engaging Papuan farmer. The methods used on these pilot-farms proved to have results similar to those achieved on the isle of Japen, though via different ways; namely a system of cultivating cashcrop, which the population elsewhere would automatically follow. The system consisted in the extensive cultivation of about 3 hectares (about 6 acres) for cashcrop at a rate in proportion to the cultivation of traditional sustenance-crops. The area used for this latter, about a half acre, was after harvesting used for cashcrop.

In the political field an anti-Indonesian attitude was almost general. When Indonesia appointed a shadow-governor in the person of the Sultan of Tidore, the pro-Indonesian Papuans in New-Guinea lost even more of the little support they had. Besides, the proclamation in 1956 of the Province of Irian Barat by the Papua Silas Parare of Seroei, who was in Indonesia, did not meet with the approval of the Indonesian Government.

This was a appropriate atmosphere for an awaking national consciousness. Dutch policy was for speeding up autonomy; Australia and Holland were collaborating in a common development policy in either part of the island; Indonesia was waging politics hostile to the Netherlands.

The G.P.N.G. was no longer much heard of, but in 1957 its role was taken over by a Democratic People's Party which showed nationalistic tendencies and which had a right- and a leftwing. During the next governorship the leftists were going to appear in the form of a Partai Nasional; among it were party-members that had formerly sympathised with the pro-Indonesian idea.

Looking back on the Van Baal-period it appears that more stress had been laid on intensification of government than on extension. In 1957 there were altogether 8,461 government servants of which more than 38% were Papuans, although mostly in the lower and semi-medium ranks.

The problem arising from the immigration of some thousands of Indo-europeans was met with the possibilities of employment created by government or by such enterprises as haulage-slips and saw-mill, which one may consider as part of the economical substructure of the country.

To this economical substructure – which for the Papuan was the beginning of urbanization – Governor Van Baal answered with housing estates in several centres. Also, the Papuan was now becoming world-conscious and siding with modern society, albeit on a rather low level. A national consciousness was developing, expressed vaguely in a political party, the D.P.P., which harboured all kind of elements.

5. During the Platteel-period, from his appointment as governor in April 1958, until the installation of the New-Guinea Council on April 5, 1961, the New Guinea question was conducted by a cabinet where the socialists were not represented. The Government of the Netherlands insisted that the Netherlands should lead the people to full autonomy, in spite of socialist voices advocating that the matter be internationalised. The Speech from the Throne in 1959 spoke of a prospective reform of public right; the speech of 1960 announced the installation of the New Guinea Council. The Minister for Home-Affairs, Mr. Toxopeus, in whose hands the matter was, declined, during a debate in the Tweede Kamer in April, 1960, to fix what he called a 'fatal date' on which to grant full autonomy.

In 1958 Indonesia had started to purchase arms from various countries. Prime Minister Soebandrio gave to several governments the assurance that the New Guinea problem would not be solved by arms. But in 1960 the Dutch Government thought it necessary to send the aircraft carrier, H.M.S. Karel Doorman, to New Guinea on a demonstration tour with flying colours. This was for Indonesia the occasion to cut off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands.

Governor Platteel's first object was a further development of democratization. In 1959 the islands Biak and Noemfoor were united into a community with a council for the whole area; the foundations of the New Guinea Council were laid. During the debate on the budget, in April 1960, the Secretary of State for New Guinea, Mr. Th. H. Bot, explained to the House

that it was intended to have the whole of Dutch New Guinea properly under rule in four years' time.

In education, the target was that 50% of the children of school-age should attend primary schools and 4% postprimary institutions: this showed a marked stress on the forming of an élite. Pressure from the House to come to an overall-plan was readily welcomed by the Government.

The first phase of the Platteel-period was marked by a crisis of a certain disloyalty originating mainly out of the newly encouraged use of the freedom of press and speech, with the result of sometimes sharp criticism. A decline in the activities of the only big company, the Dutch New Guinea Petroleum Co., was also a drawback.

The contribution of the Crown, amounting to 68,5 million guilders in 1957, went up to as much as 81 millions in 1961. The Administration became more effective through a better organisation of the services and through further development of economical substructure.

The Development Fund of the E.E.C. made also funds available to a total amount of 133 million guilders.

The first cacao-export was in 1958, and 52 tons of it were exported in 1960.

The Dept. of Social Services, especially Education and Public Health could boast on good results. Over 200.000 people profited by the malaria-eradication project, and 400.000 people had the benefit of an anti-framboesia campaign.

Dutch rule was now reaching 2/3 of all the inhabitants. The number of unskilled workers increased from 12,554 to 15,910, Government being the biggest employer, Papuans could now be found in all the services of government structure.

The New Guinea Council, installed on April 5, 1961 was not at all the same as conceived by the regulations of 1949: the tripartite feature was dropped; there was universal suffrage. Of the total of 28 members, 16 were elected, the other 12 being appointed members. Of these appointed members two were pending approval and were to represent sections of the population or stand for the interests of certain groups, while the other ten represented those areas where suffrage did not apply due to political immaturity there. The Council had the right of initiative, of amendment, of petition and of interpellation, but not of budget. The elections were held in 14 districts; in two of them the voting was direct, in the others by two removes. 23 out of the 28 seats were taken by Papuans. The percentages of votes cast varied from 53% to 86%. The percentage reached during the elections for the Biak-Noemfoor Community was 80. It was the responsibility of the Council of this Community to run their own domestic affairs and they could dispose of their own funds; hence they could issue regulations and levy taxes.

Education: the stress on primary schools was shifted to secondary education. While there was only one junior-secondary school in 1954, there were four in 1958 and seven in 1961. Three Papuans were studying in Holland for a university degree and seven others were at the Medical School of Port Moresby for training as physicians.

Agriculture: the system of cash-crop cultivation was taken over by the people of the Arfak mountains who migrated spontaneously to the coastal plains to join in with the Warmare project. Something similar happened in the Mimika district, south of the Carstensz-mountains, where the Agimoegah-project was in full swing.

Before the New Guinea Council was a fact, there were quite a number of political parties among which the Partai Nationaal, with a strong support from the islanders of Japen. In contrast with the other parties, as E.P.A.N.G. K.U.E and P.A.R.S.E.P.P., this Party was somewhat politically skilled. At Manokwari there was the P.O.N.G. with the old Johan Ariks as its spiritual father which advocated strongly a union with the Netherlands. P.A.R.S.E.P.P., a youth movement at Manokwari, and PERCHISRA in Radja Ampat were strongest in their anti-Indonesian expressions. All parties were nationalist.

In this period there were altogether 8461 government-posts and 52.5% of them were taken by Papuans; they played an active part in the opening up and the development of new areas.

Just over one half of the percentages fixed as targets for primary education was attained, and not one half for postprimary institutions.

## EPILOGUE

Looking back on the four periods as described above, one sees that during the Van Eeoud-period justice was done to the typical features of the territory by organising an administrative unity. During the Van Waardenburg-period all efforts were concentrated on a governmental structure fit to govern an eventually autonomous country. The influx of Indo-European immigrants upset the Papuan-centred policy. Only during the Van Baal-period the stage of improvisation made room for proper organisation by the creation of basic facilities; this policy was really Papuan-centred. Social services such as education and public health got really going. Speeding up of autonomy, however, was not provided for. The formation of an élite, already chorished by Van Eeoud, was postponed. This was counter-balanced during the Platteel-period. There was full integration of the Papuan in all sectors. When the New-Guinea Council started operating it appeared that there was a national consciousness especially owing to the insistent demands of Indonesia for a transfer of sovereignty.

The Papuan was grateful for development policy such as it had been applied. But for him autonomy was synonymous to independence.

Political consciousness was there; on educational grounds one could say that the ideal of independence was attainable, but economically the claim of Indonesia was an obstacle to further explore the now available opportunities. The adherence to the present government-structure will be the best guarantee for a rapid development of the territory.