

Morning Star Rising:

**Maximising the effectiveness of the
nonviolent struggle in West Papua**

By

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Statement of Authorship

This thesis is my own work containing, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no material published or written by another person except as referred to in the text.

Signed: Jason McLeod

Date: 26th June 2002

Research Ethics Approval

For this thesis entitled, *Morning Star Rising: Maximising the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua*, submitted for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Hons), the research undertaken was approved by a University Ethics Committee, approval number 348/01.

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Date: 26th June 2002

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ABSTRACT

Since 1988 there has been an explicit and continuous nonviolent struggle for self-determination in West Papua that has courageously persisted in the face of repressive action by the Indonesian military. Although the nonviolent struggle in West Papua has achieved modest success under difficult conditions I argue that a strategy of nonviolent action would maximise the effectiveness of the struggle. This thesis advocates one possible strategy based on the work of nonviolent activist and scholar, Robert Burrowes, articulated in his book, *A Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*. In the case of West Papua, I argue that solidarity action inside Indonesia and internationally is essential if a strategy of nonviolence is to be effective. This is because Jakarta does not significantly depend on the consent and cooperation of West Papuans to maintain the occupation, but on the diplomatic, military and economic support of international elite allies. In turn, these elite allies depend on key social groups to carry out their policies in support of Indonesia's occupation. Drawing on the example of Australia as a case study, I show how Jakarta is indirectly dependent on the consent and cooperation of key social groups in Australia who could be compelled or induced to withdraw their support through strategic campaigns of nonviolent action. As a result, despite the monolithic appearance, Indonesian rule in West Papua is vulnerable and subject to removal.

Dedication

*To the people of West Papua
and the living land they are a part of,
in the hope of peace with justice
and
to the people of Indonesia and Australia
who could make all the difference.*

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Acronyms

AMP	<i>Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua</i> – West Papuan University Student Alliance
ADI	Australian Defence Industries – A 50% owned Australian arms company with several offices and manufacturing plants based in Australia. ADI produces weapons, ammunition and defence-related equipment for the ADF and for export.
ADF	Australian Armed Forces
AMWU	Australian Manufacturing Workers Union
BP	Beyond Petroleum
DP	<i>Dewan Papua</i> - The Papuan Council
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EFIC	Export Finance and Insurance Corporation
ELS-HAM	<i>Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia</i> - Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	International Purveying Incorporated
ITF	International Transport Federation
Komnas HAM	National Commission on Human Rights – Indonesia
KOPASSUS	Indonesia’s Special Forces
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> - People’s Consultative Assembly, Indonesia’s national parliament
MUA	Maritime Union of Australia
OPM	<i>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</i> – The Free West Papua Organisation
OPM/TPN	<i>Tentara Papua Nasional</i> – National Papua Army – The armed wing of the OPM
PDP	<i>Presidium Dewan Papua</i> – The Papuan Presidium Council, the executive body for the <i>Dewan Papua</i> (DP)
SKP	<i>Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian</i> - The Office for Justice and Peace in the Diocese of Jayapura, West Papua.
SMA	Scientific Management Associates – An Australian arms company that draws the technical designs for defence related goods.
TNC	Trans-national company
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> – Indonesian National Army

UN	United Nations
UNCEN	The University of Cendrawasihi, Port Numbay/Jayapura
WALHI	Friends of the Earth Indonesia
WESTPANYAT	West Papuan National Youth Awareness Team

A Note on Orthography

The act of naming something is a powerful intervention that invests whatever is named with certain meaning. *West Papua* is the name used by most West Papuans (*Papua Barat* in Bahasa Indonesia, the *lingua franca* in West Papua) and by those in the international community who support self-determination. *West New Guinea* and *Netherlands New Guinea* refers to the Dutch name for West Papua during the period of Dutch colonialism. At the time of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands the territory was known as *West Irian*, particularly by Indonesia, the United States of America and the United Nations. From 1969 up until the fall of Suharto in 1998 the province was called *Irian Jaya*.

Irian Jaya has an interesting double meaning that reflects the historical and ideological importance of West Papua to Indonesia. The name is a combination of *Irian*, an Indonesian acronym that stands for *Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland* (Join the Republic of Indonesia against the Netherlands)¹ and the Indonesian word, *Jaya*, meaning victorious or glorious. *Irian* is also a Biak word (an island off the north coast of West Papua and a language group that stretches from Cendrawasih Bay to the Raja Ampat archipelago, north west of Sorong), that means ‘hot land’ and refers to the mainland of West Papua.² Since 1998 onwards West Papua has often been called *Papua*, in response to West Papuan demands for greater recognition of their distinct cultural identity: a name change supported by the previous Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid and officially endorsed by President Megawati’s administration in January 2002.

West Papua is the name most often used in the text except when referring specifically to Indonesian provincial structures, personnel or policies. In this case, *Papua* or *Irian Jaya* is used depending on the period in history. For the period up until the 1969 transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, *West Irian* is used to describe the Indonesian, United States and the United Nations perspective and *West New Guinea* to describe the colonial Dutch perspective. The eastern half of the island of New Guinea is referred to as *Australian New Guinea* (or Australian administered New Guinea) for the period in recent history up until 1975, when the territory became independent and known as *Papua New Guinea*.

¹ See the ‘History’ section of the *Prevent Conflict Report on West Papua/Irian Jaya*, www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_wpapau_overview.php, Accessed 1st May 2002.

² Nonie Sharp in association with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, North Carlton, Arena Publications, 1994: 19.

Indonesians call the act of self-determination in 1969, *Pepera*, an acronym for *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*, which translates to ‘Determination of the People’s Opinion’. The widely accepted English language translation, *Act of Free Choice*, is used in the text. Indonesian words have all been spelt using the standardised spelling based on the 1972 reform of the Indonesian language.

Methodology and Ethics

Methodology: Praxis

This thesis is a rigorous and passionate piece of academic writing, shaped by committed action as much as by thorough research. It is essentially a work of praxis: a critical reflection of ten years of nonviolent activism and a recommitment to accompanying the people of West Papua. ‘The essence of praxis’, writes community development worker, Jim Ife, ‘is that one is involved in a constant cycle of doing, learning and critical reflection, so that each informs the others and so that the three effectively become one.’³ Nonviolent activism is evaluated with reference to theory. In turn, theory is read in light of action which then re-directs both action and research. Through this process, Ife says, ‘theory and practice are built, at the same time.’⁴

The research is based on the ground-breaking study, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense*, by peace researcher and nonviolent activist, Robert J. Burrowes.⁵ In his book, Burrowes argues that a strategy of nonviolent defence is the most effective way for a population to defend itself from an act of military aggression, even more effective than military defence, precisely because it addresses the systemic causes of violence. Burrowes synthesises the thinking of Mohandas Gandhi and military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, as well as integrating insights from conflict and human needs theory. However, despite the ground-breaking nature of his research, except for a descriptive piece on the Tibetan nonviolent struggle,⁶ as far as I am aware, there has not been anything written applying his theory to an actual conflict situation. This thesis examines Burrowes’ strategic theory and framework in light of the conflict in West Papua.

In writing and researching about the nonviolent struggle in West Papua, however, I have been painfully aware that I have been writing from a position of entitlement. I am advocating a strategy of nonviolence in West Papua but I have never seen my friends or family killed, nor known the corrosive fear of living in the shadow of terror. Who am I to speak of nonviolence when my country has armed and trained the soldiers who terrorise my neighbours and friends? With the privileged accident of birth comes responsibility and the ethical imperative to act.

The research method is based on an analysis of the literature, unstructured interviews and reflection on my own participation in nonviolent activism, as described above. Dialogue between myself, West Papuans and those active in the West Papua solidarity movement have shaped and directed this

³ Jim Ife, *Community Development: Creating community alternatives – vision, analysis and practice*, Melbourne, Longman, 1995: 230.

⁴ Ife, *Community Development*, 230.

⁵ Robert, J. Burrowes., *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*, New York, State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 1996.

⁶ Katherine Kramer and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, *Truth is Our Only Weapon: The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle*, Bangkok, Nonviolence International, 2000.

research.⁷ I am explicit about the purpose of this. My concern is to defend human rights, encourage ecological sustainability, support self-determination and transform the systemic causes of oppression and exploitation in our region to reflect human needs, social justice and sustainability. I believe that how these principles are worked out in practice is a process whereby those most affected should have the most to say, within a framework of social and ecological justice. At a very practical level this thesis has been undertaken with the question: how can Australian nonviolent activists best support the nonviolent struggle in West Papua?⁸

A number of critical methodological limitations need to be acknowledged. I did not travel to West Papua during the research period. However, in addition to personal communication with a diverse range of people from all levels of society, I was fortunate enough to interview ten West Papuan activists and one Indonesian official from the local consulate, as well as participate in a number of seminars with West Papuans and Indonesians (noted in the bibliography). I have been moved by the dignity and humanity of both Indonesians and West Papuans who generously shared their time, insights, stories and friendship. I was privileged to be able to listen to a range of West Papuan perspectives including those from women, students, church leaders, a Muslim, NGO (Non Government Organisation) activists, Presidium members (the executive body of an embryonic West Papuan Parliament) and OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* – Free Papua Organisation) leaders. At the same time I feel like I have barely ‘scratched the surface’. As well as hearing the perspective of other Indonesians in conversation and at seminars, I also had the honour of hearing a first-hand perspective of a representative of the Indonesian government based in Melbourne, Mr. Kamapradipta Isnomo, who generously made time available to meet, and spoke openly about the situation.

Another methodological limitation is language. Whilst I do speak a little *Bahasa Indonesia* it is not yet at the level to conduct interviews or read the literature written in Indonesian. All but one of the interviews were therefore conducted in English. The interview in *Bahasa Indonesia* was a group interview conducted with an interpreter present. Finally, a significant challenge was that there is virtually nothing written about the nonviolent struggle in West Papua. If West Papua has been marginalised in the literature and media, the nonviolent struggle in West Papua has been even further marginalised.

⁷ For a discussion on integrating the means and ends of peace research and transformative and participative methodologies see Abigail Fuller, ‘Towards an Emancipatory Methodology for Peace Research’, *Peace and Change*, 17, pp. 286-295. Whilst the research project was not strictly participatory research in the accepted meaning of the word (due to the constraints imposed by an honours degree), elements of the ethical and methodological dilemmas within participatory research are relevant, particularly the need to make sure the research explicitly benefits the community being researched. For a discussion on the criteria and ethics of participatory research see Budd Hall, ‘Breaking the Monopoly of Knowledge: Research Methods, Participation and Development’, Budd Hall, Arthur Gillete and Rajesh Tandon (eds.), *Creating Knowledge: A Monopoly? Participatory Research in Development*, New Delhi, Society for Participatory Research in Asia, pp. 8-14; Michael Bopp and Naihwo Ahai, *Bougainville: From Talk to Action 1994-1997*, Port Moresby, National Research Institute, 1994; Jeremy Holland and James Blackburn (eds), *Whose Voice? Participatory research and Policy Change*, London, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1998.

⁸ For a discussion on transformative research see for instance, David Deshler and Daniel Selener, ‘Transformative Research: In search of a Definition’, *Convergence*, 24(3), pp. 9-23; Hal Beder, ‘Mapping the Terrain’, *Convergence*, 24(3), pp. 3-8.

Unfortunately, many people in the solidarity movement (including those in academia) have not addressed this, and at times even speak a little disparagingly of the nonviolent struggle or do not acknowledge West Papuans explicit commitment to nonviolence.⁹ I believe, this is for two main reasons. The first reason is related to the historical importance of the OPM/TPN (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka / Tentara Papua Nasional*), the National Papuan Army or military wing of the Free Papua Organisation, to the struggle and the solidarity movements relationship with the OPM/TPN (who for many symbolise the struggle). The media and most popular works written about West Papua emphasise the armed struggle to the exclusion of nonviolent forms of resistance.¹⁰ Most active West Papuans living in exile are also former OPM/TPN freedom fighters. Perhaps the biggest problem, however, is that many solidarity activists are either not committed to, or do not understand the power of nonviolence. The irony, however, is that most people in the West Papua solidarity movement, and potential supporters active in other social movements, regularly engage in and support a variety of nonviolent actions. I hope this thesis may stimulate some discussion and interest in nonviolence in general and the nonviolent struggle in West Papua, in particular. Beyond that, I hope it encourages people to practically support an inspiring and effective struggle that persists in the face of great odds.

My original intention was to develop a nonviolent strategy for West Papua solidarity activists in Australia, in collaboration with West Papuans living in exile and consultation with West Papuans living inside the territory, using a participatory action research process. Fortunately, my supervisor, Gandhian scholar, Dr. Thomas Weber, tactfully suggested that such a project, whilst commendable and compelling, might be beyond the scope of an honours degree. Despite a more modest undertaking there were still a number of ethical dilemmas associated with the research. (Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of these dilemmas is beyond the scope of this thesis). Not least of my concerns was ensuring the safety and security of not only those West Papuans I interviewed, some of whom have since returned to West Papua, but also ensuring the safety and security of their families. This is critical as all are active in the struggle for self-determination, many have spent considerable time in jail, some have been tortured and all have lost family members. As a result, I have removed all identifying comments from interviewees I have quoted unless it is already in the public domain.

At the same time as I was conducting research into West Papua, a PhD student and solidarity activist was also carrying out in-depth interviews with a range of West Papuans who visited Melbourne. Rather than interview people twice, with the verbal consent of the participants (whom I was also able to meet), the PhD student made the transcripts available to me. Whilst not ideal and somewhat unorthodox, I believe that in each case consent was explicitly given. I also cleared this with Dr. John Miller from the

⁹ Evident from personal communication with a range of people over several years.

¹⁰ See for example Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1985; Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, (for *Tapol: The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign*), *West Papua: The Obliteration of A People*, Surrey, Tapol, 1988; Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Malmsbury (Victoria), Kibble Books in association with Arena, 1977.

La Trobe Ethics Committee. Because a number of these West Papuans were only in Melbourne for short periods of time and had busy schedules, this decision was also made out of respect for people's time.

Doing research whilst actively participating in activism in the area of study also brought up a range of dilemmas. One positive aspect was that it gave integrity to the research and helped me bridge what I believe is the false divide between academia and activism; theory and practice. It also resulted in privileged access to information and data I might otherwise not have obtained. On the other hand, it was difficult to ensure that consent was always given. I grappled with these issues as best as I could, keeping in the forefront of mind the question: who does this benefit and what is the information intended for?¹¹

One particular thorny question concerns the desire of large numbers of West Papuans who actively struggle for *merdeka* (freedom), commonly understood as independence from Indonesia. In the thesis I have tried to refrain from using polarising words like independence which often act to close down the space for dialogue with those with differing perspectives. However, the reason I do not refer to independence is neither technical nor pragmatic. Time and time again, West Papuans have said to me that no-one ever asked them what they wanted: Neither when the Dutch were replaced by the U.N. in October 1962, nor during the Dutch, United States and Indonesian governments negotiations over the New York Agreement nor again in 1969 when the U.N. delivered the Act of Free Choice or even recently, when the Special Autonomy Package was designed and implemented. I believe it is not unreasonable to expect that it is up to West Papuans themselves to decide their own destiny in a free and fair manner. If well meaning outsiders like myself speak of West Papuans wanting independence, we run the risk of treating West Papuans as objects again, thereby replicating neo-colonial relations. For this reason, as an outsider, I support West Papuans right to determine their future themselves and describe the resistance as a struggle for self-determination, a right of all people recognised under international law.¹²

When I refer to the occupation of West Papua by Indonesia I am referring to the presence of the Indonesian military and security forces who routinely violate human rights and a system that oppresses and exploit West Papuans, their land and non-human species. This system of rule, comprised of mutually reinforcing political, military, social and economic structures, is controlled by non-Papuans for the benefit of non-Papuans. In essence, I am not referring to Indonesians as people - regional neighbours who I know, love and respect - but a neo-colonial system and the values and relations that sustain and replicate it.

¹¹ Unfortunately there is not the space to adequately unpack these issues. My thinking in this regard was greatly assisted by the following sources: Patrick G. Coy, 'Shared Risks and research dilemmas of a Peace Brigades International Team in Sri Lanka', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, Vol. 30 No. 5, October 2001, pp. 575-606; R. Divinski, A. Hubbard, J.R. Kendrick and J. Noll, 'Social Change as Applied Social Science: Obstacles to integrating the role of activist and academic', *Peace and Change* 19 (1): pp. 3-24; Rebecca Spence, *Promises of Peace: Processes of community participation in building peace in Down District*, PhD dissertation, Armidale (NSW), University of New England, 1999. Other ethical issues marginal to the research process not discussed here due to lack of space concern power relations and dealing with sensitive areas.

¹² Article 1 of both the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR). See also Article 3 of both covenants. Self-determination could include: forms such as the special autonomy package now implemented in Papua; other federal arrangements; a land rights approach that recognises the self-determination of various indigenous groups within West Papua; 'free association'; and independence.

Defining the Scope of the Study

This thesis will not examine horizontal conflict in West Papua; conflict between West Papuans and Indonesians and between West Papuans and West Papuans. Instead I focus on vertical conflict in West Papua; conflict between the Indonesian state and West Papuans. Nor will efforts by West Papuan elites and their allies to lobby for international support for self-determination through forums like the U.N. and the South Pacific Forum be the focus of this study. Whilst a mosaic of methods at all levels in society are needed to create change, this thesis focuses on the role of grassroots activists and organisations. This is for two reasons.

Firstly, I believe that too many political studies focus on elites, relegating much of the activity of civil society to the margins. I believe ordinary people do make a difference and that all problems can be solved using nonviolence. Violence, is symptomatic of a poverty of imagination. Most of all I am interested in supporting the participation of ordinary people to be agents of change and believe nonviolence is an extremely powerful way to create change. Secondly, because of vested interests and the impotence of states and state-centric institutions and processes to address intra-state conflicts like the conflict in West Papua, it is unlikely that the policies of state elites concerning West Papua will be altered to support self-determination by high-level discussion or lobbying alone.

This thesis will not examine principled third-party negotiation.¹³ Whilst this thesis does not discuss principled negotiation (including that by third-parties) I argue that the purpose of nonviolent campaigns is to re-create the conditions for a problem-solving dialogue. Consequently, efforts to re-create the conditions for dialogue supported by third-parties need to be interlinked with a nonviolent strategy. Nor will I examine peacebuilding processes in West Papua,¹⁴ although the nonviolent strategy I argue for, is firmly located within the tradition of peacebuilding.¹⁵

Due to the restrictions of space and the constraints of time I do not attempt a detailed discussion of the various components of the nonviolent strategy including: organisation, leadership, communication, preparations, constructive programme, strategic timeframe, tactics and peacekeeping and evaluation. Whilst some of these components are mentioned in brief, a detailed exploration of each of these vitally important elements in relation to the struggle in West Papua is beyond the scope of this study.

¹³ See for instance, The *West Papua Project*, <http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs> and follow the links to the *West Papua Project*.


¹⁴ See for instance John-Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C, U.S.A, 1997. For an example of peacebuilding in Indonesia see Duane Ruth-Hefflebower, 'Reconciling Injustices – A Process for Indonesia', www.fresno.edu/pacs/docs/millennium.pdf, accessed 1st May 2002; Duane Ruth-Hefflebower, 'Reconciliation Perspective on West Papuan Political and Human Rights Problems', www.fresno.edu/pacs/docs/recpers.pdf, accessed 1st May 2002. *Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian* (Office for Justice and Peace - SKP) is one NGO based in West Papua that is building up their capacity to engage in peacebuilding practice.

¹⁵ Rebecca Spence and Jason McLeod, 'Building The Road As We Walk It: Peacebuilding as principled and revolutionary nonviolent praxis', in *Social Alternatives*, (forthcoming).

This thesis will also not examine how a strategy of nonviolence could be introduced into West Papua: an extremely important factor if any strategy of nonviolence is to be accepted. To develop a process of introducing a strategy of nonviolence into West Papua it would be necessary to fully appreciate the indigenous basis of the nonviolent struggle. Regrettably, such an undertaking is also beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, from my discussions with West Papuans there is widespread interest in strategy and I strongly believe that it is possible to introduce a process for developing a nonviolent strategy so that it is 'owned' by West Papuans themselves as well as a process for socialising the strategy.

What this thesis *does* discuss, is how grassroots nonviolent action inside and outside West Papua can make a difference. More precisely, I introduce a strategic theory of nonviolence and give an overview of a strategic framework that could guide the struggle. Properly understood and implemented, I argue a comprehensive nonviolent strategy may dramatically maximise the effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle in West Papua.

Map of West Papua



The Morning Star in West Papua

The Story of the Morning Star¹⁶

The Biak islanders sing an epic of a woodcarver, a man who embodied great spiritual power named Manarmakeri. Manarmakeri means both 'scabious old man' and 'old man of the star'. Manarmakeri was both the rejected one and at the same time the link between those less than human and the divine. One day, on top of the mountain, Yamnaibori, a spirit from the land of souls spoke to him from a flat stone in his food garden, telling him he was like a flower about to open, ready to begin a long journey. Manarmakeri descended the mountain and travelled to the island of Meok Wundi where he took up the practise of distilling palm wine. One day he discovered his wine had been stolen. Hiding, he caught Kumeseri (also called Sampari), the Morning Star, stealing his wine. Manarmakeri held Sampari and refused to let the Star go. Frightened because of the coming dawn, Sampari offered Manarmakeri the secret of the Morning Star to share with his people. Manarmakeri refused to keep the secrets for his tribe alone and instead sought the gift of peace and renewal for all people. To this Sampari agreed and Manamakeri let the Sampai go. Sampari gave Manarmakeri a manes fruit, one of the tropical fruits of West Papua, fruit, telling him to throw it at the breasts of a young woman when he returned to his village. Manarmakeri did as Sampari said and a young woman, Insokari soon became pregnant. No-one one knew who the father was until Insokari's son, Konori, recognised him. Manarmakeri performed many miracles. He drew a boat in the sand which became real. He burnt his old skin, stood in the fire and was renewed as a young man. Seeing his skin was too light, he stepped back into the fire. This time, his skin was the right shade. Leaving his village Manarmakeri went on another journey. This time he journeyed towards Sorong then overseas to the West – to Europe, to Australia, to the United States. When Manarmakeri left, Biak islanders became poor; but one day Manarmakeri will return to West Papua with others and his return will herald a new age of freedom, peace and justice. Manarmakeri showed the way of peace and renewal to all people of West Papua. For this reason the Morning Star was chosen to be placed upon the flag of West Papua, where it shines today.

The Morning Star Flag

Blue signifies Faith. White signifies Peace. Red signifies courage (Freerk Ch. Kamma, *Koreri: Messianic Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area*, The Hague, Koninklijk Instituut, M. Nijhoff, 1972: 158). The colours are also said to be the Dutch tri-colour reversed; 'a metaphor for the turning round of the existing state of affairs' (Nonie Sharp, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, 54). The Star, 'an indelible imprint of a divine power' represents the story of Manarmakeri and *Kumeseri-Sampari*, the Morning Star. The myth is at once a story of human interactions, the relationship between the human and the divine and a story of liberation and solidarity. It is one of the creation stories that inspire people to participate in the act of what people of the North coast of West Papua call, *koreri* – renewal and transformation.

¹⁶ Adapted from Nonie Sharp in association with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, North Carlton, Arena Publications, 1994: pp. 19-23; 'The Morning Star', West Papua: Survival or Extermination?, *Tok Blong Pasifik* special issue Vol. 55, No. 2, October 2001: 7; Interview with participant 10, 30th October 2000; Interview with participant 01, January 2001.

Introduction

How can the nonviolent struggle in West Papua maximise its effectiveness? Unfortunately, most people struggle to find West Papua on a map, let alone know that since 1988 there has been an explicit nonviolent struggle for self-determination going on. Given the memory of the violence in East Timor we saw erupt on our television screens in September 1999, even fewer would countenance that nonviolence could be effective against the ruthless violence that the Indonesian military is capable of carrying out. Yet, there is a nonviolent struggle in West Papua that has persisted, and against remarkable odds, achieved modest success.

In this thesis I argue that the success enjoyed by nonviolence can be dramatically increased through systematically planning and applying a comprehensive nonviolent strategy. While Jakarta does depend on West Papuans, it is significantly more dependent on popular support inside Indonesia and the diplomatic, military and economic support of international elite allies like Australia. Because of this, an integral component of any strategy is solidarity campaigns, both inside Indonesia and in the societies of Indonesia's elite allies.

The thesis is structured around four chapters organised into two parts. Part one is concerned with the struggle for self-determination inside West Papua, part two with a strategy that might assist that struggle. Both parts are further organised into two chapters each. Chapter one introduces West Papua and examines the causes of the conflict. Chapter two discusses resistance to Indonesian rule with a focus on the nonviolent struggle. Chapter three lays the theoretical foundations of nonviolence and nonviolent strategy and chapter four applies the insights of chapter three. In chapter four, using the example of Australia as a case study, I demonstrate how Indonesia is indirectly dependent on key social groups. I proceed to illustrate how this indirect dependency provides enormous potential for solidarity campaigns that could dramatically assist the struggle inside West Papua.