

A Discourse on Separatists

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November 2000

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Honours in Asian Studies.

This be me own work 'n all - I didn't copy it from no-one else or nothin'.

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Acknowledgements

Somehow, despite my best intentions, a thesis ended up typed up on my computer, and there are a few people who I should thank for their contributions. Firstly, Amrih Widodo, whose comments on a couple of drafts opened up new directions in my discussion and had me frantically scampering between various libraries tracking down the many sources he suggested. He also generously loaned me Ariel Heryanto's PhD dissertation. Thanks also to Ian Proudfoot, who was my supervisor, and late in the day read a draft of Chapter 3 at little (in fact, no) notice. Thank you also to John Powers, whose course 'Textual Strategies' set this thesis on its way, and to Craig Reynolds, who let me skulk at the back of the room in 'Orientalism and the Study of Asia'. Thanks also to the other people who gave suggestions and pointers at various stages: Jim Fox, Jacqueline Siapno, Paul Tickell for providing a pre-publication copy of his paper, and no doubt others who I will think of just after I print this page off.

But enough of academics. Of my fellow honours students, thanks must go to Ines for inadvertently putting the fear of god up me every time I spoke to her. And of course I must say thankyou to Paul "Shep Shep Sheppo the Shepman" Shepherd for his unique contribution to all of our honours years. And the rest of you as well, for making honours what it has been.

Finally, a big thanks to the people at Mars Confectionary Australia for producing the fine M&Ms range of chocolates. Many a page of this thesis would not have been typed without them.

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Introduction

Following the fall of Soeharto in 1998, many New Order¹ hegemonic discourses have been partially re-evaluated. Activism, previously taboo, has gained wider, if not universal, acceptance; communism, while not yet condoned, has at least become an agenda of public debate, and the armed forces' role in politics is also being challenged, to name several examples. Seemingly in line with this re-evaluation of hegemonic New Order discourses, the Habibie government broached, and then implemented, a referendum in East Timor to settle the question of the territory's place within Indonesia. Prior to this, the status of Aceh as a Military Operations Area (DOM) was revoked. However, despite the referendum in East Timor, similar demands for a referendum in Aceh and Papua have been rejected.

In addition, although the result of the 30 August 1999 ballot in East Timor, conducted against a backdrop of several months of militia violence, was unambiguous, the reaction of the Indonesian public, and perhaps more surprisingly at first glance, of pro-democracy activists, was equivocal. Many felt that East Timor had been separated from Indonesia by means of some sort of foreign trick, or that the Timorese had either been pressured or tricked into voting against far-reaching autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty. Among those who supported the result, some gave the reason that it was better to be rid of the East Timorese, who in any case were a financial burden.

Several opinion poll results, commissioned by the leading weekly news magazine, *Tempo*, serve to illustrate the nature of public opinion.

¹ The Soeharto regime dubbed itself the New Order, and its predecessor, Sukarno's regime, the Old Order. Although value laden, these terms will be familiar to most readers, and so are used in this paper.

Why do you think the majority of East Timorese chose independence?	
Because, the East Timorese wanted to stand alone	29%
Because the Armed Forces have committed many human rights violations	26%
The East Timorese have never wanted to join Indonesia	20%
Because the Indonesian government has acted arbitrarily	20%
Because Indonesia's international diplomacy has failed	17%
Because UNAMET manipulated the pole	15%
Don't know	12%

Source: *Tempo*, 28 (28) 1999, p13.

Why do you agree with East Timor's independence?	
Diplomacy and the armed forces have failed, and it is a waste of state funds	68%
Avoid bloodshed	60%
The East Timorese will be more prosperous	22%
Indonesia illegitimately seized East Timor	18%
Indonesia will gain international sympathy	12%
Other responses	14%

Source: *Tempo*, 27 (19) 1999, p13.

Who is Xanana Gusmao?	
A rebel	47%
A champion of East Timorese independence	22%
A regular criminal	15%
Don't know	16%

Source: *Tempo*, 27 (19) 1999, p13.

Elements of Australian society and the media have attributed these developments in Indonesia to narrow nationalism, direct and immediate manipulation of the population by the government or armed forces, or a lack of commitment to democracy. These explanations are neither accurate nor useful for further analysis. Rather, a better approach is to trace the discursive background to these attitudes. This paper will examine a discourse on separatists (and perhaps more generally separatism), which was the dominant discourse for the entirety of the New Order and at least part of the Old Order (although in no way originating in either of these regimes). This discourse continues to shape the now more plural discourses on separatists in contemporary Indonesia. This discourse on separatists has marked the separatist as separate from the normal Indonesian citizen, and exposed him or her to the technologies of state power. Although it can be considered as part of a project of New Order ideological domination, it does not emanate solely from the state, nor can all statements within this discourse be considered as a calculated manipulation or concealment of some underlying 'real truth'.

This discourse on separatists in itself is built upon and reinforces a discourse of Indonesian national unity, under which the claims to sovereignty of these separatists are senseless. Tickell reminds us that the word 'separatist' itself implicitly recognises the validity of this discourse, as it suggests 'a lesser "part" separating from a greater "whole"². In a study of this length, sufficient treatment of this discourse on national unity

² Paul Tickell, 'Old Language, New Politics: Indonesia/n and its Discontents' in Rethinking Indonesia, Crawford House, forthcoming. Despite the connotations of the word, I will continue to use 'separatist' in this study, for reasons of convenience, as it is the term by which most readers will be familiar with the

is impossible, and it will be assumed in much of the following discussion. However, as a partial correction of this shortcoming, and because this discourse on national unity is frequently presented in detail in source material dealing with separatists, an appendix is devoted to a partial description of this discourse.

This discourse on separatists functioned (and continues to function) in three broad ways. The first, and perhaps most overt, element of the discourse essentialises these separatist movements. They are depicted as the remnants of the movement in an ahistoric manner, and confined to categories familiar to the Indonesian population. During the New Order, the most common categories were those of the 'security disturbing mob' (GPK), communist, and foreign pawn. The second function of this discourse operates on separatists themselves, in a normative depiction of separatists as mistaken, misguided or misled. This normative depiction (the norm is, of course, the citizen who considers him or herself an Indonesian) allows the mobilisation of corrective technologies against separatism, such as 'territorial operations' and '*pembinaan*' (loosely - guidance). A third, more insidious aspect of this discourse disallows the political motives of separatist movements, and often implies that the separatists are spoilt or out of touch with reality. This third aspect is often present even where the author rejects the more overt, essentialist and normative aspect of the discourse.

Why is the depiction of separatists discursive? A satisfactory definition of discourse might be 'a group of statements determined by rules and conventions that determine what

movements considered. To understand Tickell's point, we may consider why these movements are typically not referred to as nationalist movements, for example.

is included or excluded³. Within this discourse, certain claims count as true, while others cannot be considered. The discourse is not merely a constraint upon thought and writing, but also enables the production of certain types of texts and statements.

Clearly, the group of statements on separatism expressed within Indonesia has been determined by rules. Certain figures, such as civilian officials and military officers, have authority to make statements. Sensible statements within this group of statements do not contradict the principle that these territories are part of Indonesia, nor is it possible to consider the validity of claims for an independent state made by separatists, nor even in certain cases that separatists make these claims. There is also a consistency among this group of statements - they refer to each other, although this does not mean that contradictory or inconsistent statements do not occur in the discourse. The truths of the discourse should not uniformly be thought of as concealments of reality. In his discussion of state terrorism, Heryanto employs the notion of 'simulacra', borrowed from Baudrillard, which are 'the powerful signs that precede the "real" and conceal nothing, or in the words of Jameson "the identical copy for which no original has ever existed".⁴ This notion of simulacra is also useful to consider elements within the discourse on separatists.

At this point, I must also stress the historicity of the discourse. Although I talk about *a* or *the* discourse on separatists, I do not contend that this discourse is unchanging. It retains certain fairly constant, recognisable elements - its effectiveness relies in part upon this -

³ Craig Reynolds, 'Orientalism and the Study of Asia', Lecture 1, Faculty of Asian Studies, 2000.

however, its form and content change in relation with the context in which and upon which it operates. This change need not be continuous or constant; a later section of this study will discuss the discontinuities enabled by Soeharto's resignation.

Chapter 1 examines the anti-separatist discourse during a period roughly equating to the rule of the New Order government. This chapter aims to describe not only what the discourse was, but how it operated upon separatists, and in what ways it was a both a constraint upon thought and action, as well as a basis for the production of knowledge. Chapter 2 will investigate the question of textual authority, and of why this discourse has persisted. It will also examine counter-hegemonic discourses on separatists. Chapter 3 discusses the discourse on separatists as it is manifested in the post-Soeharto era. The aim is to identify both continuities and discontinuities between it and the discourse on separatists during the Soeharto period, as well as to question how this new discourse operates.

In the examination of this discourse on separatists, I will employ elements of Said's conceptions of the interrelation of power and knowledge as elaborated in Orientalism⁵. I do not propose to transpose intact Said's description of a British and French discourse on the Islamic Orient to the clearly separate and non-identical Indonesian discourse on separatists. As Minear has demonstrated, elements of Said's causality may break down

⁴ Ariel Heryanto, Discourse and State-Terrorism: a case study of political trials in new order indonesia 1989-1990, Doctoral Thesis, Monash University, Australia, 1993, p245.

⁵ Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin, London, 1995.

outside of the specific discursive formation that he examines⁶. However, the parallels in content of elements of the discourse and separatism and the discourse that Said describes are such that Said's study provides useful insights, particularly on the effects of the discourse and on its resilience. Arguably, the relation between Jakarta and East Timor, Aceh and Papua⁷ is not entirely dissimilar to European colonial domination over its 'Orient'. The discussion of normative depictions also draws upon Foucault's notions of normative technologies to examine how this discourse individualises separatists.

After these initial notes on methodology, a clarification of the precise subject matter and sources for this study is in order. In modern Indonesian history, there have been a number of separatist movements, however I have chosen to deal with only three of the most 'recent' examples. These are the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) in Papua, Fretilin in East Timor and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh.

The Free Papua Organisation (OPM - *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) commenced action in 1963. The name OPM was given to it by the Indonesian government, but the movement itself has adopted it⁸. It has carried out armed resistance to Indonesian rule since this time, although some authors caution against conceiving of it as a 'solid' organisation⁹. The OPM also incorporates various activists acting outside Indonesia, and uses the Morning Star (*Bintang Kejora*) as its flag. The OPM gained international attention in

⁶ Richard H. Minear 'Orientalism and the Study of Japan', *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXIX (3) 1980, pp507 - 517.

⁷ Papua is variously mentioned in the texts considered as 'Papua Barat' (West Papua), 'Irian Barat' (West Irian), 'Irian Jaya' and 'Papua'. Its Indonesian name was recently changed to Papua, and for reasons of convenience alone, I use the term 'Papua' to refer to the landmass west of Papua New Guinea.

⁸ John RG Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1993, p100.

⁹ Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, *Integrasi Politik di Indonesia*, PT Gramedia, Jakarta, 1989, p108.

1995 when it kidnapped a research team for 130 days, eventually killing the two Indonesian males in the group¹⁰.

Fretilin was originally known as *Associacao Social Democrata Timorese* (ASDT - Association of Timorese Social Democrats) and was formed in 1974 in the context of Portuguese decolonisation. Prior to Indonesian intervention in East Timor, Fretilin controlled much of the territory. However, it quickly suffered military losses: Carey notes that between 1977-9, 79% of Fretilin Central Committee were killed, 80% of the troops of the military wing, Falantil, were lost along with 90% of their weapons, all bases were destroyed and all lines of communication were cut, both within East Timor and with the outside world¹¹. In response to this, in 1981 Fretilin switched to guerilla tactics¹². The movement has undergone various organisational changes, through the formation of CNRM as a broader front of pro-independence forces, and in April 1998, through the formation of CNRT, also a front for pro-independence forces¹³. Like the OPM, Fretilin also campaigns through foreign-based activists; the East Timorese lobby has been the most active and effective of the three movements considered.

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM - Free Aceh Movement) declared 'Acheh-Sumatran' independence in 1976, although some Indonesian sources note that it was only sporadically active for the next ten years. A leading, but controversial, figure within the

¹⁰ For an account of this incident by one of the Indonesian hostages, see Adinda Arimbi Saraswati, (as told to Rizal, Ray and Pane, Nina) *Sandera: 130 Hari Terperangkap di Mapnduma*, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1997.

¹¹ Peter Carey 'Introduction' in Carey, Bentley (ed) *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1995, p6-7.

¹² *Ibid*, p7.

movement is Hasan Tiro, who left Aceh in 1979, although in exile the movement has split into two factions, the other of which is led by Dr. Husaini Hasan. The Indonesian government declared Aceh a Military Operations Area (DOM - *Daerah Operasi Militer*) in 1988, a status that was revoked only after Soeharto's resignation. Many Indonesian sources on GAM classify the movement into several stages: the first being its activities prior to the implementation of DOM status (one text splits this period itself into two stages), and then a latter stage after DOM was enacted. The movement includes a military wing, AGAM.

Each of these movements incorporates various sections with different functions and names, and also comprises different factions that may operate under different names. However, again for reasons of convenience, and particularly because the precise form of these movements is of only incidental importance to this study, I will refer to them as Fretilin, OPM and GAM throughout the text.

The discourse on separatists has weakened or undermined the activities of these movements. In discussing this discourse, I am aiming to provide a partial background to current attitudes to separatists, rather than advocating an idealised view of these movements or unequivocal support of them. Some authors have complained that too much attention is paid to GAM in particular, despite the presence of many other political actors in Aceh. However, to attempt to maintain a sharp focus in a short paper such as this, I will attempt to limit the discussion to the three movements described above.

¹³ *Solid*, 'Xanana Gusmao: Timor Leste Akan Menjadi Bangsa Tanpa Angkatan Bersenjata', [<http://www.solidamor.org/solid/frame/interview.htm>].

I have used several types of source material for this study. My main criteria are that the source must be in Indonesian, and have been circulated or available within Indonesia. My first category of sources is books and research reports published on these movements. These include almanacs, anecdotal works and memoirs, and academic research. Most of the available books were either published from the early 1990s onwards, or in the 1970s. As this study attempts to trace the historicity of this discourse, the dearth of books published during the 1980s has made necessary extensive use of Indonesian media sources. Even were the chronological distribution of books roughly even, I would still have made extensive use of newspaper and magazine sources. However, for reasons of availability of indexes, my use of media sources is limited largely to the 1980s and the 1990s. I acknowledge that the use of these varying sources may introduce a distortion into the sense of historicity of the discourse, however I do not feel that this distortion is excessive.

I have not confined myself to one newspaper or magazine, for several reasons. Firstly, to attain an adequate coverage it was necessary to consider articles from several Indonesian dailies. Also, although I do not claim that all Indonesian national newspapers are the same, the style of coverage of separatist movements, particularly during the New Order, created similarities that may not hold in general for the remaining content. It was only very rarely that an article on a separatist movement referred to an action on the part of the separatist movement, or includes field observations of a journalist. Far more frequent were two types of articles: opinion pieces which directly quote cabinet ministers, the

governor of the relevant province, or military officers; and accounts of court proceedings. There was very little stylistic difference between newspapers in presenting these official statements, while ensuing editorials often simply rehashed statements issued by officials.

The sources for this thesis have overwhelmingly been written by Indonesians for an Indonesian (as opposed to specifically Acehnese, Papuan or East Timorese) audience. A study of discourses on separatists in each of the three territories considered, and what counted and counts as true about separatists in these territories themselves warrants a separate study, and is not considered in this paper.

Finally, a few disclaimers are required. This study addresses a body of texts, and makes assertions on the way these texts operate. However, I am conscious that this is not an exhaustive sample; the availability of sources has been further limited by the absence of opportunity for fieldwork. I have suggested patterns within the sources considered, which are of course generalisations. I can only assert that the possible inaccuracies in specific instances are a necessary price for the general conclusions drawn.

Chapter 1: The Discourse on Separatists During the New Order

In this chapter, I intend to trace the development of the dominant discourse on separatists in Indonesia during a period roughly corresponding to the rule of the Soeharto government, and highlight both the ways in which the statements within this discourse have been altered and elaborated, and the way in which the discourse has operated.

As a starting point for this discussion, I will examine some of the early reports on the initial activities of the Free Papua Organisation (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* - hereafter OPM). I do not of course contend that this is in any way an origin of this discourse, it is merely a convenient point relatively early in the New Order regime from which to commence our examination.

As mentioned in the introduction, examination of a discourse on separatists is itself based upon the acceptance of a discourse of Indonesian national unity. Space constraints preclude discussion of this discourse in this chapter, however, I will refer to it in the following discussion and those readers wanting a typical, early example of an element of this discourse should consult *Buatlah Irian Barat Satu Zamrud Yang Indah*¹⁴. Under the truth claims of this discourse of national unity, it is normal for the people of Papua, Aceh and East Timor to consider themselves citizens of Indonesia. The place of these territories within Indonesia is natural, final and an unquestionable fact. The discourse on separatists thus is an example of how the dominant regime of truth deals with resistance to its truth

¹⁴ *Buatlah Irian Barat Satu Zamrud yang Indah: kumpulan amanat-amanat dan pidato-pidato penting khusus mengenai Irian Barat, 1 Mei 1963-1 Mei 1964*, Departemen Penerangan RI, Jakarta, 1964.

claims. As an initial example of the discourse on separatists itself, I have chosen *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*¹⁵, a military history of the Cenderawasih Military Command.

After contextualising Papua within the Indonesian discourse of national unity, by tracing its history to the Mataram period and giving an account of Papuan resistance to Dutch rule, the text then outlines the history of the Military Command, separated into the periods of each respective commander. The account of the OPM is placed under the heading '*Keamanan*' - Security. This is only possible within the framework of the discourse on Indonesian national unity, where unchallenged control exerted by Indonesian troops is 'secure', whereas the activities of the OPM constitute '*gangguan keamanan*' (security disturbances), or are '*subversip dengan aspek politis separatis*' (subversive with a separatist political aspect)¹⁶.

The illegitimacy of the OPM is further emphasised by representing their activities as a direct threat to national unity.

However subsequently this "legacy" caused several of Indonesia's finest sons to perish on the field of battle defending the State founded on the 17 August 1945 Proclamation from the destabilising actions of the rebel Free Papua Organisation.¹⁷

Although they were in a most difficult position, for the sake of the wholeness and firmness of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which has been struggled for with the blood

¹⁵ *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, Dinas Sejarah Militer Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih, Irian Jaya, 1971.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p107.

and souls of heroes from throughout the archipelago, KODAM XVII/CENDERAWASIH had no choice but to act. Because if the mob were allowed to act freely, it would endanger the position of the Republic of Indonesia and have a detrimental influence on the Act of Free Choice, which was to be implemented in 1969.¹⁸

The legitimacy of the OPM is further undermined in a subtle manner through the choice of vocabulary by which they are described. Whereas Indonesian soldiers '*berjuang*' (struggle¹⁹), members of the OPM '*bertualang di dalam hutan*'²⁰ (adventure in the jungle). Furthermore, they are '*pemberontak*' (rebels), a clear indicator of the dominance of the Indonesian conception of national unity within this account. In addition to '*pemberontak*', the OPM are frequently described as '*gerombolan*' (mob), a negative term that is later refined to '*Gerombolan/Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*'²¹ (Security Disturbing Mob/Movement). This tag will be discussed in the following section on familiar categories.

This account of the OPM is clear on the aim of the movement, 'to realise their goal of forming an Independent Papua State separate from the Republic of Indonesia'²². However, while it does not question the aim, it depicts the motives of the separatists in

¹⁷ Ibid, p107. [*Tetapi ternyata kemudian dari "harta pusaka" inilah yang menyebabkan beberapa orang putera terbaik Indonesia gugur di medan juang membela Negara Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dari rongrongan kaum pemberontak Organisasi Papua Merdeka.*]

¹⁸ Ibid, p140. [*Walaupun dalam keadaan yang serba sulit, demi utuh dan tegaknya Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang telah diperjuangkan dengan tetesan darah dan nyawa para pahlawan, yang tersebar di seluruh tanah air, mau tidak mau KODAM XVII/CENDERAWASIH harus bertindak. Karena apabila gerombolan ini dibiarkan dengan bebas beraksi, akan membahayakan kedudukan Republik Indonesia dan membawa pengaruh buruk terhadap PEPERA yang akan dilaksanakan dalam tahun 1969.*]

¹⁹ A positive word within the Indonesian context; for example, '*perjuangan kemerdekaan*' - struggle for independence.

²⁰ Ibid, p132.

²¹ In *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, GPL (*Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*) is also used, see for example pp242-3.

such a manner as to reinforce the validity of the truth claims of Indonesian national unity. In outlining the five causes of the OPM rebellion, the text lists 'psychological aspects', which means that:

In general, a people with minimal education, or moreover with no education at all, have insufficient ability to think critically. This is experienced by the majority of Papuans. This results in a personality that is more easily influenced.

They [the Papuans] are more greatly influenced by emotion (feelings) than by critical and healthy thinking. As such, when they face a problem, they do not think for long, but immediately act on the basis of emotion...²³

Two further causes of the revolt are 'ideological aspects', which the text explains means that people in Papua imagine the OPM in the context of a '*Gerakan Manseren Manggundi*'²⁴, a mystical movement that emerges to create an ideal society, and 'political aspects', which is described as the aspiration of various societal figures to obtain prominent positions for themselves in the Papua State promised by the Dutch²⁵. It is hard to escape the impression of an uneducated populace exploited by self-serving leaders who promote a Dutch puppet state by exploiting popular mystical beliefs²⁶.

²² Ibid, p126. [*merealisir tujuannya membentuk Negara Papua Merdeka lepas dari Republik Indonesia*]

²³ Ibid, p124. [*Pada umumnya rakyat yang pendidikannya kurang, apalagi tidak mempunyai pendidikan sama sekali, kurang mampu untuk berpikir kritis. Hal ini dialami oleh sebagian besar rakyat Irian Barat. Keadaan ini mengakibatkan kepribadian yang lebih mudah dipengaruhi.*]

Mereka lebih banyak dipengaruhi oleh emosi (perasaan) daripada pikiran yang kritis dan sehat. Oleh karena itu, jika mereka menghadapi suatu persoalan, mereka tidak berpikir panjang, tetapi segera bertindak atas dorongan emosi....]

²⁴ Ibid, p125.

²⁵ Ibid, p123.

²⁶ Although, these leaders may themselves be Dutch puppets; see *ibid*, p138. This will be discussed further in the following section on familiar categories.

The impression of mistakenness through lack of education is further enforced by the use of the phrase '*menjadi sadar*' (become aware) for those members of the OPM who surrender.

With the support of intelligence and territorial operations, many rebels became aware, surrendered and returned to their homelands after months of adventuring in the jungle.²⁷

This process of becoming aware increasingly functions in a normative manner as the discourse is elaborated throughout the New Order. That is to say, the separatists are contrasted with the normal, Indonesian '*penduduk*' or '*rakyat*' ('inhabitants' and 'people' respectively). However, in *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, this dichotomy is still ambiguous. On the one hand, '*rakyat*' are a passive object of OPM incitations, 'The OPM ... incites the people to hate the Republic of Indonesia and all newcomers. As such the people are ripened to rebel.'²⁸ On the other hand, the phrase '*orang rakyat pengikut gerombolan*'²⁹ (people who are adherents to the mob) provides a closer link between the people and the OPM than a dichotomy would suggest.

A final device of this depiction of the OPM is to deny the movement anything but the most fleeting of heydays. In the first command period, 'separatist' activities are 'still sporadic and limited to actions by individuals'³⁰. By the second period, despite frequently

²⁷ Ibid, p132. [*Dengan dukungan operasi intelligence dan territorial ini pula, banyak pemberontak yang menjadi sadar, menyerahkan diri dan kembali ke kampung halamannya setelah berbulan-bulan bertualang di dalam hutan.*] See also ibid, p151. Consider particularly the concept of '*pembinaan*' (guidance).

²⁸ Ibid, p124. [*OPM ... menghasut rakyat agar membenci Republik Indonesia dan semua pendatang. Dengan demikian rakyat dimatangkan untuk memberontak.*]

²⁹ Ibid, p145.

³⁰ Ibid, p107. [*masih sporadis dan terbatas pada tindakan-tindakan perorangan*]

(or perhaps always)³¹ claiming to be outnumbered by the *gerombolan* that they face, the Indonesian military are by year's end 'pursuing the remnants of the mob, which have dispersed and fled into jungle that is difficult to penetrate'³². The same is true of the next command period. The main task of the operation against the OPM is to 'smash the mob under the leadership of Ferry Awom, which numbers around 14000 people with around 1000 assorted firearms...'³³. However, by the third quarter of the year, after capturing only 39 weapons and 60 prisoners, killing 73 people and receiving the surrender of 3,539 people, the military is again dealing with 'its remnants, of which many are still at large in the jungle'³⁴. This despite 961 of 1000 weapons still being at large, and 10028 of 14000 members still at large, by military estimates.

Thus, the OPM is depicted as a small group, of whom only the remnants are ever present, which is foreign to Papua (the metaphor of a virus is later used for East Timor). The depiction of the OPM reinterprets the organisation's demands in terms of lack of education and self-serving leaders, and has a strong normative element, namely that of individual separatists 'becoming aware' of their mistakenness and returning to their homeland.

The next context in which the discourse of anti-separatism was applied is that of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. As a starting point to examine this discourse I

³¹ For example, '*Walaupun dengan tenaga yang jauh tidak seimbang prajurit-prajurit kita memberikan perlawanan yang gigih sesuai dengan kemampuan yang ada.*' Ibid, p128.

³² Ibid, p133. [*mengejar sisa-sisa gerombolan yang telah menyebar melarikan diri ke hutan-hutan yang sulit ditembus.*]

³³ Ibid, p141. [*menghancurkan gerombolan dibawah pimpinan Ferry Awom yang berkekuatan lebih kurang 14,000 orang dengan lebih kurang 1,000 pucuk senjata api campuran....*]

³⁴ Ibid, p145. [*sisa-sisanya yang masih banyak berkeliaran di hutan...*]. See also ibid, p151.

have chosen *Integrasi*³⁵, an almanac published shortly after the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. This text is firmly situated within the dominant discourse on East Timor³⁶. *Integrasi* is an attempt to comprehensively define the context within which the integration of East Timor into Indonesia should be viewed; it compiles a history of the territory and includes many documents and legislation connected to the integration process. Much of its content is identical to commentary on these topics in other texts within this discourse.

In East Timor, the subject of the anti-separatist discourse is Fretilin (*Frente Revolucionario de Leste Timor*), a party formed to campaign for an independent East Timor following decolonisation by Portugal. The depiction of Fretilin in *Integrasi* differs in several ways from that of the OPM discussed above.

The most striking difference is the repetitive representation of Fretilin as communists. In *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, the separation between G30S/PKI³⁷ and the OPM is made explicit³⁸. In contrast, the imperative that Fretilin must be labelled communist is clear; within *Integrasi* Fretilin is linked to at least the PKI³⁹, Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and Movement for the Renovation of the Party of the Proletarian (MRPP)⁴⁰,

³⁵ Soekanto, *Integrasi*, Yayasan Parikesit, Jakarta, 1976.

³⁶ Although not published by a government department, this text includes a preface from both Yoga Soegomo (then Head of the State Intelligence Coordination Body (Bakin)) and Ali Murtopo (a central New Order figure, who started as one of President Soeharto's 'personal assistants'. He was Deputy head of Bakin at the time).

³⁷ G30S/PKI (*Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia*) - One of the tags used by the New Order to denote an abortive coup, which they blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party. Soeharto eventually assumed the presidency in the aftermath of this 'coup'.

³⁸ See *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, p133.

³⁹ Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p227.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p171.

the Viet Cong⁴¹, the Soviet Union⁴², China⁴³, Cuba⁴⁴ and Maoism⁴⁵. Their communism is also manifest in their stance on religion; 'They said that religion was the creation of lying priests⁴⁶'. Moreover, Fretilin's communism may not be readily apparent, even to Fretilin members, but is visible to the expert eye of the state:

The Fretilin delegates always tried to avoid and cover-up their communism, but their organisation's arrangement and system as well as their tactics clearly indicated that Fretilin is communist, or at the least guided by communists⁴⁷.

The validity or otherwise of these claims aside (what is important is that these claims count(ed) as true within Indonesia, and the effect that the repetitive mention of communism had within the Indonesian context), the depiction of Fretilin as communist creates a strategic reason for Indonesian intervention, which was not required in Papua. The effect on the acceptability of Fretilin itself is also obvious within the Indonesian context, and will be discussed in more detail below.

Another difference that also provides a strategic necessity for Indonesian intervention is the description of Fretilin's military power. Indonesian troops first entered East Timor in late 1975 as part of '*pasukan gabungan*' (joint forces) at the 'request' of UDT and

⁴¹ Ibid, p227.

⁴² Ibid, p296.

⁴³ Ibid, p677.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p677.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p93-4, 171.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p172. [*Dikatakan bahwa agama adalah buatan pastor-pastor yang bohong.*]

⁴⁷ Ibid, p145. [*fihak team utusan Fretilin selalu berusaha mengelakkan dan menutup-nutupi kekomunisannya, tetapi susunan dan sistim organisasinya serta taktik-taktik perjuangannya jelas menunjukkan bahwa Fretilin adalah komunis atau setidaknya tidaknya dibina oleh komunis.*]

Apodeti, two pro-Indonesia parties⁴⁸. For this intervention to be necessary, Fretilin of course had to have military power.

However, *Integrasi* depicts this power as deriving from support from Portugal and communist regimes⁴⁹. This power is used to impose their will on the people, as they know that they cannot succeed through political means.

Conversely, UDT and Fretilin calculated that their struggle to win the referendum would be onerous, moreover they had no hope [of winning], and thus they directed their movements more towards the assemblage of physical force.⁵⁰

As Fretilin is increasingly driven back by the joint forces, we are told, their military operations increasingly turn to terror within Indonesian territory. This again is the GPK element of the discourse. In *Integrasi*, '*gerombolan pengacau*' - (chaotic mob) is the precise term employed. Although frequent examples are given of Fretilin atrocities, use of the phrase is almost exclusively limited to a four page section⁵¹ describing incursions into Indonesian territory. The effect of this section is two-fold: the use of '*gerombolan pengacau*' is on the one hand suggests that Fretilin has at this early stage degenerated into little more than a ragged mob (indeed the text asserts that their behaviour is 'understandable', in the light of their hopeless position); it also serves to stir anger against Fretilin, as their atrocities are committed against helpless, local Indonesian people.

⁴⁸ Initially UDT supported integration with Portugal, but after a falling out with Fretilin, supported integration with Indonesia instead.

⁴⁹ See, for example, *ibid* p205.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p221. [*Sebaliknya, UDT dan Fretilin yang juga mempunyai perhitungan bakal beratnya perjuangan untuk memenangkan referendum, bahkan tidak mempunyai harapan, maka mereka lebih mengarahkan gerakan-gerakannya pada penyusunan kekuatan fisik.*]

Thus Fretilin's moment of ascendancy was fleeting: 'Because at that time, what they called "The Democratic Republic of East Timor" in actuality had almost no territory under its control. Moreover, in practice there were no more people supporting it who needed to be administered'⁵² The lack of support from the people is in fact depicted as a dichotomy between Fretilin and '*rakyat*', far more so than was the case with the OPM above.

People asked, how could it be, that they [Fretilin] wanted to struggle for independence for the People, when just one year ago, they were still the henchmen of the oppressive Portuguese regime which terrorised and oppressed the people.⁵³

This quote is also indicative of another aspect of the depiction of these separatists, namely that of foreign puppets. Again, this will be discussed in more detail below.

Thus in *Integrasi*, we see many of the same elements present within *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, but with several modifications/elaborations. The dichotomy between '*rakyat*' and Fretilin is more pronounced; communism has been introduced, and foreign intervention within the movement is more immediate. The heyday of Fretilin is also

⁵¹ Ibid, pp216-219

⁵² Ibid, p279. [*Sebab saat itu apa yang dinamakan "Republik Demokrasi Timor Timur" sebenarnya sudah hampir tidak mempunyai wilayah kekuasaan. Bahkan rakyat sebagai pendukungnya yang perlu diurus itupun praktis juga sudah tidak ada lagi.*]

⁵³ Ibid, p176. [*Orang bertanya, bagaimana bisa jadi, mereka hendak memperjuangkan kemerdekaan bagi Rakyat, baru satu tahun yang lalu, masih jadi kakitangan rezim penindas Portugal yang menteror dan menindas rakyat.*] This more pronounced dichotomy may be related to the differing contexts, rather than a sign of the strengthening of normative elements of the discourse.

slightly longer in the account, thereby creating a strategic justification for Indonesian military intervention.

The above provides two good examples of elements of the dominant discourse on separatists, as it was constituted in the early to mid 1970s. However, our primary concern is not merely what constituted this discourse, but rather how the discourse and the power relations implicit in it operated within Indonesian society. That is to say, how it operated upon what it was possible to think about separatists, and, concomitantly, what it was possible for separatists to do. The depictions of separatists functions in three broad categories. Firstly, these depictions essentialise the movements that they depict - they deny the movements a heyday and categorise them according to familiar labels such as GPK, communist and foreign pawns. The depictions are also 'dividing practices'⁵⁴ - they create a normative opposition between Indonesian citizens and separatists. In the context of the discourse on separatists, this division between the normal citizen and the separatist is not necessarily permanent; there is the possibility that separatists can be rehabilitated by means of state expertise and '*pembinaan*' (guidance). Thirdly, the depictions deny the separatists a voice, and in so doing, define their aims in non-political terms as well as undermining their conviction to their cause.

Normative Depictions

In *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa* and *Integrasi*, we saw how a dichotomy was established between '*rakyat*', who felt that they were a part of Indonesia, and members of the OPM and Fretilin, who did not. In Papua, the representation of the norm is

strengthened by a 'plebiscite', and in East Timor an 'appeal' for integration, each of which involved only a small number of people⁵⁵.

These depictions then emphasised that it was the OPM and Fretilin who were mistaken, in the first instance, through the use of the phrase '*menjadi sadar*' (become aware). The idea of mistakenness, of straying from the norm, is clearly apparent in another element of the discourse roughly contemporary with *Integrasi*, namely President Soeharto's independence day speech following the 1976 integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Apart from some fairly predictable comments about the East Timorese freeing themselves and expressing their desire to be a part of Indonesia 'again', the president also made this 'appeal':

I also appeal to those who strayed under the influence of the evil urgings of that group that calls itself Fretilin to return to the true path together with their fellow people and recommence an orderly and normal life.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Dreyfus and Rabinow (eds), *The Foucault Reader*, Pantheon, New York, 1984, p8.

⁵⁵ In 1969 an "Act of Free Choice" (Pepera) was held in Papua, involving 1022 handpicked delegates, who voted unanimously to remain a part of Indonesia (Susan Browne, *Irian Jaya: 30 years of Indonesian Control*, Working Paper 107, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1999, p2)(Since 1963, Papua had come under Indonesian administration, following a short period under UN administration.). There were widespread allegations of duress. The appeal for integration with Indonesia was formulated by the 'East Timor People's Representative Council, which consisted of 30 non-elected people chosen from pro-Indonesia parties, in an open session on 31 May 1976. (Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p601-2). No such process has taken place in Aceh, which was in any case a part of Indonesia at the declaration of independence in 1945, however, there too the normal citizen is depicted as being in favour of the Indonesian government. The key evidence presented of Aceh's commitment to Indonesia is that the province provided the first aeroplane - Seulawah I - for the Republic during the fight against the Dutch in 1949.

⁵⁶ Soeharto, *Amanat Kenegaraan: kumpulan pidato kenegaraan di depan Sidang Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 1967-1985*, Inti Idayu Press, Jakarta, 1985, p207. [*Saya juga menyerukan kepada mereka yang sesat karena terpengaruh oleh bujukan jahat dari apa yang menamakan dirinya Fretilin untuk kembali ke jalan yang benar dan bersama-sama dengan saudara-saudaranya yang lain memulai kehidupan yang tertib dan normal kembali.*]

A distinct element of the normative depiction is the impression that, overarching the binary opposition of normal people and deviant separatists, the expert eye of the state can identify the facts of the situation as they really are. This is evident in the 'appeal' of then Commander of the Armed Forces General Benny Moerdani.

Fellow people of East Timor, you have suffered enough for centuries under colonisation by another nation, why do you now take misguided steps that add to your suffering. The way that you have undertaken, adventuring in the jungle and the mountains, only causes suffering for your fellow East Timorese. Your way could see you fall within the grasp of external powers....⁵⁷⁵⁸

This impression is reinforced by statements that depict separatists as willfully reconciling themselves with the state's truth. 'Becoming aware' was an early example of this; 13 years later, this account of separatists in Papua and East Timor functions in the same manner.

Many of the people involved in these Security Disturbing Movements have received sentences ... They receive their sentences well without appealing.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *Merdeka*, 'Seruan Pangab kepada Warga Timtim yang Masih Bercokol di Hutan: Lupakan Keinginan untuk Mendirikan Negara Baru', 3 July 1984, p1. [Saudara-saudara masyarakat Timor Timur telah cukup menderita selama berabad-abad di bawah penjajahan bangsa lain, mengapa mengambil langkah-langkah yang sesat dan menambah penderitaan. Cara yang saudara tempuh dengan bertualang di hutan dan di gunung hanya menghasilkan penderitaan bagi saudara-saudara sendiri. Cara yang saudara tempuh juga dapat menyeret saudara jatuh kepada pelukan kekuatan luar....]

⁵⁸ Consider also, 'We, being rich with exeprience, truly comprehend a situation of this sort.' (*Kompas*, '190 Pengungsi Irja Kembali' (Editorial), 19 November 1984, p4) and 'Indonesia has sufficient experience to differentiate between a genuine independence movement and a false one...' (*Berita Buana*, 'Fretilin Bukan Gerakan Kemerdekaan Sejati', 19 October 1982, p7).

⁵⁹ *Berita Buana*, 'Menlu Mochtar: Tidak ada Lagi Gerakan Politik di Irja dan Timtim, yang Ada Cuma GPK' 8 September 1984, p1.[Orang-orang yang terlibat Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan ini bahkan sudah banyak menerima hukuman ... Mereka menerima hukuman mereka dengan baik tanpa naik banding]

Inappropriate strategies of development are another reason proffered for separatist activity. The people are thus not opposed to Indonesia, but have yet to appreciate its benefits, which would be apparent to any normal person once these mistakes have been corrected. The need for correction extends to education; young people may be against integration because they have not been taught about it in school.

Some people think that these young people do not fully understand integration, because they have not been taught about it at school.⁶⁰

The need for treatment of these deviations (unemployment, lack of education) is further emphasised by the use of a medical metaphor to describe activities of resistance. Then Commander of the Armed Forces Try Sutrisno describes resistance in East Timor as a 'virus'⁶¹; Lopes da Cruz, a member of the Supreme Advisory Council, asserts it is caused by 'trauma'⁶²; another article written by two researchers specifies the cause as 'wounds'⁶³ from the 1975 civil war in East Timor. Each of metaphors defines resistance to integration as an unnatural imposter upon the body of East Timorese, which must be healed in order for the success of development:

It is this trauma that must be healed, to allow the success of development⁶⁴.

⁶⁰ *Tempo*, 'Mengapa Bom Waktu Itu Meledak', 21 (40) 1991, p30. [Ada yang berpendapat bahwa mereka adalah anak-anak muda yang kurang mengerti arti integrasi, karena hal itu tak pernah diajarkan pada mereka di sekolah.]

⁶¹ *Tempo*, 'Virus Itu Sudah Terjadi', 21 (39) 1991, pp24-25.

⁶² *Tempo*, 'Antara Trauma dan Kecemberuan', 21 (39) 1991, p39.

⁶³ *Tempo*, 'Saudara Kita Orang Timtim', 21 (40) 1991, p33.

⁶⁴ *Tempo*, 'Antara Trauma dan Kecemberuan', 21 (39) 1991, p39. [Trauma inilah yang mesti disembuhkan, agar pembangunan bisa sukses.]

Even if there are still groups that oppose integration, in actuality a more crucial problem is how to remove the 'wounds' arising from politic turmoil in past times Because, it will be impossible for the East Timorese to develop their territory well and calmly as long as there exist threats that may cause new wounds⁶⁵.

The need for correction raises the question of who must carry out this correction. An underlying assumption of the discourse on separatists is that the Indonesian authorities are responsible for this task, as of course these territories are under Indonesian sovereignty. Djopari makes reference to one of the tasks at hand in his list of suggestions to combat the problem of the OPM.

Research into the 'struggle [for independence] history' in Papua needs to be undertaken, the results of which could then selectively be crystallised in teaching materials about the History of the Struggle of the Indonesian Nation and taught nationally.⁶⁶

Two further devices of the state are development and '*pembinaan*' (guidance). These will be discussed in chapter 2.

A final aspect of this normative discourse relates to then President Soeharto's appeal some 15 years earlier for those Timorese who opposed integration to 'return to the correct path'. Many, it is asserted, have 'repented' and now support the Indonesian government⁶⁷;

⁶⁵ *Tempo*, 'Saudara Kita Orang Timtim', 21 (40) 1991, p33. [Sekalipun masih ada kelompok atau golongan yang anti-integrasi, permasalahan yang lebih krusial sebenarnya adalah bagaimana menghilangkan 'luka-luka' yang muncul sebagai akibat pergolakan politik di masa lalu ... Karena, tidak mungkin masyarakat Timor Timur dapat membangun daerahnya dengan baik dan tenang sementara ada ancaman-ancaman yang memungkinkan munculnya luka-luka baru.]

⁶⁶ John RG Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, p169. [perlu dilakukan suatu penelitian 'sejarah perjuangan' di Irian Jaya yang kemudian secara selektif hasilnya dikristalisasikan dalam bahan pelajaran Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia dan diajarkan secara nasional.]

⁶⁷ *Tempo*, 'Antara Trauma dan Kecemberuan' 21 (39) 1991, p29.

as well we have considered the case of Papuans 'becoming aware'. A more interesting example though, is an interview presented shortly after the Santa Cruz massacre with a Fretilin commander who had been captured and was now under the guidance of ABRI:

Maukalo is still under ABRI's 'guidance'. This second grade dropout from a Portu High School, who aspired to become a priest, has been under guidance for six months so far. 'For people like Maukalo, it takes a least a year to achieve results,' remarked an officer in Dili⁶⁸.

The same reasoning is apparent in the case of Aceh. In June 1991, *Kompas* published an article detailing the hand-over of 77 GPK members to the Governor of Sumatra to be '*dimasyarakatkan kembali*' (resocialised'). Apart from reporting that several of these people 'regretted their involvement in the Aceh GPK', the article explains

After they were processed through a strict and in depth investigation, it turned out that their level [of separatism] was not too severe. In addition, continued the Regional Military Commander, by way of an 'intelligent spirit', they could still be guided and directed to the true path in accordance with Islam and Pancasila teachings.⁶⁹

Opposition to integration with Indonesia is a correctable mistake; it may take time for the Indonesian state to 'guide' the misled separatist about the validity of Indonesian rule, however they are prepared and able to do so. The ability to guide holds true not only for

⁶⁸ *Tempo*, 'Sosok Seorang (Bekas) Fretilin', 21 (43) 1991, p16. [Maukalo memang masih dalam 'binaan' ABRI. Jebolan kelas dua SMP Portu yang bercita-cita menjadi pastor ini baru enam bulan dibina. Sedangkan, 'Untuk orang seperti Maukalo, paling tidak setahun baru ada hasilnya,' ujar seorang perwira di Dili.]

⁶⁹ Fikar W. Eda et al (eds), *Aceh Menggugat*, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999, p63. [Setelah diproses melalui penyelidikan yang ketat dan mendalam, ternyata kadarnya tidak terlalu berat. Di samping itu, demikian Pangdam, menurut "nurani intelijen" mereka masih bisa dibina dan diarahkan ke jalan benar sesuai ajaran Islam dan Pancasila] See also *ibid*, p71, p152.

the general populace who are incited by the remnants of opposition, but also the truly deviant individual, who, like Maukalo, is one of those who 'incites'.

Essentialised Movements

Said quotes Abdel Malek's characterisation of the Orientalized Orient, to expose the essentialist aspect of Orientalism:

According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both "historical," since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, "the object" of study, within its inalienable and non-evolutive specificity....⁷⁰

This essence may take the form of a general category; where it does, this category then functions as a constraint upon thought about the essentialised object, and thus, by extension, a constraint upon the possible actions of the object.

For the general category in advance offers the specific instance a limited terrain in which to operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him....⁷¹

This, I will contend, is a useful analogy (with minor modification) for the way in which separatist movements are essentialised within the New Order discourse. These movements are depicted as at once historical, since their time of action is in the past, and ahistorical, since at all times it is maintained that only the remnants remain. Beyond this,

⁷⁰ Said, Orientalism, p97.

⁷¹ Ibid, p102.

there are several familiar categories with which these movements are identified. Although the constitution of these categories themselves is fairly constant, they are not applied in an unchanging manner. Although in almost all cases one or all of these familiar categories is applied, which of them is most prominent depends on the political context.

Apart from the three categories that are discussed below, there are two further aspects of essentialist depictions that warrant attention. The first is the links that are established between other separatist movements and those movements considered. The three movements that we are examining are by no means the first movements to challenge Indonesian authority. Prior to the period considered, three examples of movements that challenged Indonesian national unity were the South Maluku Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan* - RMS) movement, the Abode of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* - DI/TII)⁷² and the PRRI-Permesta. In several instances within the discourse on separatism, similarities or links between these movements are established⁷³. This effectively places the contemporary movements within a familiar category of revolt, and more pertinently, within a category of revolts that have been 'dealt with'⁷⁴. The implications are obvious.

⁷² Although Anderson asserts that Darul Islam did not rebel to challenge national unity, but rather to have the policies that sparked the revolt revoked (Benedict Anderson, 'Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future', *Indonesia*, 67 1999, p4).

⁷³ For examples of these comparisons and linkages see *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, p146, which compares the guerilla tactics of the OPM to other 'mobs'; *Integrasi*, p329-330, which links Fretilin with RMS; John Rg Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1993, p146, which links the Opm to RMS, PKI and Fretilin; *Gatra*, 'Kelly Kwalik', (11) 1996, p21, which compares the OPM to RMS; Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, *Integrasi Politik di Indonesia*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1989, p80; *Forum Keadilan*, 'Serambi Mekah Sudah Tercemar', 21 April 1997, reproduced in Fikar W. Eda et al, *Aceh Menggugat*, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999, p24, which compares GAM to DI/TII.

⁷⁴ Consider particularly: 'If before, in the time of DI/TII, which enjoyed such great support from the people, we were still able to put them down, then surely now we can put down [the rebellion of] these GPK who have very little support...' [*Forum Keadilan*, 21 April 1997, reproduced in Fikar W. Eda et al, *Aceh Menggugat*, p24]

Previously we saw how *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa* and *Integrasi* denied the OPM and Fretilin their heydays, by constantly referring to them as 'sisa-sisa' - remnants. The use of this phrase is constant throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, there are also statements that these separatist movements have ended interspersed throughout the discourse.

Previously, General Moerdani, while in Papua, stated that the separatist movement that calls itself the Free Papua Movement (OPM) is a big zero in military terms.⁷⁵

There ceased to be Security Disturbing Movements in East Timor under the leadership of Brigadier General Theo Syafei as Operational Implementation Commander.⁷⁶

The same effect was achieved in Aceh by maintaining that there was no link between the GPK of the early 1990s and the earlier *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* and DI/TII. The contemporary movement is evaluated as 'purely criminal'⁷⁷. In other media reporting on Aceh, the impression is instead propagated that the remnants of GAM remain, but are not active. *Kompas* reports on GAM in 1991 fall into two categories: most often a story about members of GAM being prosecuted and receiving their sentences, or an official talking of

⁷⁵ *Merdeka*, 'Seruan Pangab kepada Warga Timtim yang Masih Bercokol di Hutan: Lupakan Keinginan untuk Mendirikan Negara Baru', 3 July 1984, p1. [Sebelumnya, Jenderal Moerdani ketika berada di Irian Jaya menyatakan bahwa gerakan separatis yang menamakan dirinya Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) adalah nol besar dari segi militer.]

⁷⁶ Hendro Subroto, *Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur*, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1996, p240. [Gerakan-gerakan Pengacau Keamanan di Timor Timur, berakhir di bawah kepemimpinan Brigadier Jenderal TNI Theo Syafei sebagai Pangkolakop (Panglima Komando Pelaksana Operasi).] See also Isma Sawitri et al, *Simak dan Selamatkan Aceh*, Panitia Peduli Aceh, Jakarta, 1999, p13, which states that GAM was declared 'put down' in early 1992.

⁷⁷ See, for example *Tempo*, 'GPK Aceh: King, Ganja & Teror', 20 (18) 1990, p25.

effective ways to put down GPK Aceh. There is rarely a report on any activity on the part of GAM itself, but rather the reports are of what is being done about GAM⁷⁸.

The familiar categories with which these movements are identified are as follows.

a) GPK

GPK is an Indonesian acronym which translates to 'security disturbing mob', or 'security disturbing movement' ('*gerombolan pengacau keamanan*' or '*gerakan pengacau keamanan*', but more commonly used as an acronym). Against the centrality of 'order' (*ketertiban*) to the New Order ideals⁷⁹, the tag of GPK depicts a group as striking at the core of the state.

The term does not seem to date to the earliest accounts, but rather gained currency throughout the 1980s and perhaps late 1970s. *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa* uses GPL (*Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*); *Integrasi* uses simply '*gerombolan pengacau*'. By the 1990s, GPK is integral to official language⁸⁰.

On a superficial level, GPK discredits the movements that it describes. In *Integrasi*, as mentioned above, '*gerombolan pengacau*' is used in a four page block to indicate the degeneration of Fretilin into a ragged mob; this implication of a violent mob is also

⁷⁸ Not only are the movements reduced to remnants and non-active, they are also in a state of crisis. The use of '*terjepit*' (squeezed) or '*semakin terjepit*' (increasingly squeezed) to describe their situation is common.

⁷⁹ Virginia Hooker, 'New Order Language in Context', in Hooker (ed), *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p277.

⁸⁰ Consider, for example the report of the National Fact-Finding Commission into the Santa Cruz Massacre released in December 1991 - although it presents a vastly contradictory death toll to that previously

evident in a 1984 report on the PNG claims that Indonesian troops had violated PNG territory:

In addition, Foreign Minister Mochtar also said that it was inconceivable that the army would burn the people's houses and plantations.⁸¹

Inconceivable that the military would do this, but by implication, highly conceivable that the OPM is burning down houses and torching fields.

As mentioned, through the 1980s and 1990s, GPK increasingly becomes the predominant tag for these separatist movements. Sometimes it is used in isolation, ie 'GPK', other times we see compounds such as 'GPK/Fretilin', 'GPK/OPM' or 'GPK Aceh'. This functions in two ways: it depoliticises and the movements, and increasingly becomes a dehumanising tag to legitimise the mobilisation of state violence against these movements. The timing of this transition is perhaps not coincidental: in 1989 Aceh was declared a Military Operations Area and military repression of GAM was intensified⁸²; in the early 1990s under Theo Syafei ABRI adopted a more combatative approach against the Fretilin guerrillas in East Timor.

maintained by the government, the report exclusively uses the term 'GPK/Fretilin'. See *Kompas*, 'Kepala Negara Sampaikan Belasungkawa: Korban Insiden Dili Sekitar 50 Orang Tewas', 27 December 1991, p1.

⁸¹ *Merdeka*, 'Seruan Pangab kepada Warga Timtim yang Masih Bercokol di Hutan: Lupakan Keinginan untuk Mendirikan Negara Baru', 3 July 1984, p1. [Selain itu Menlu Mochtar juga mengatakan sebagai kurang masuk akal kalau ada tentara membakari pondok dan tanaman milik penduduk.]

⁸² *Potensi Disintegrasi Aceh Dari Wilayah Republik Indonesia: Transkrip Diskusi Internal Lesperssi (3 Agustus 1999)*, Lesperssi, Jakarta, 1999, p2.

GPK depoliticises these movements in two related ways. The first relates simply to the term GPK - security disturbing mob. GPK is used for other, non-separatist movements and individuals who are engaged in activities vastly different from that of the three movements considered. GPK by definition disturb security, their actions are not political:

Yesterday, Friday, Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja stressed that in Papua and East Timor there are no longer political movements. All there is are GPK (Security Disturbing Movements).⁸³

No distinction is made between separatist movements and other movements; GPK also denies these movements their context by eliminating distinctions between the separatist movements. Although it is sometimes used in compound form, eg GPK/Fretilin, quite frequently only GPK is used. If the reader did not observe the place names, many of the reports on Fretilin, OPM and GAM are entirely interchangeable.

As resistance became endemic, GPK also became a dehumanising tag that legitimises the use of state violence. van Langenberg links this shift to the 'mysterious killings' of alleged criminals after 1982⁸⁴. Indeed the increasing prevalence of GPK is accompanied by a depiction of separatists in criminal terms⁸⁵. A dichotomy is established between GPK and '*penduduk*' (literally, 'inhabitants'), with the former being a deserving target of state

⁸³ *Berita Buana*, 'Menlu Mochtar: Tidak ada lagi gerakan politik di Irija dan Timtim, yang ada cuma GPK' 8 September 1984, p1. [*Jumat siang kemarin Menlu Kusumaatmadja menegaskan bahwa di Irian Jaya dan Timor Timur tidak ada lagi gerakan politik. Yang ada cuma GPK, (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan).*]

⁸⁴ Michael van Langenberg, 'Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords Approach', *RIMA*, 20 (2) 1986, p13. Following disquiet over rising urban crime, a series of state-sponsored killings were conducted, with the corpses of alleged criminals often being left in public places as an example. At the time, the government denied involvement in what were dubbed 'Petrus' ('*Penembakan Misterius*' = 'Mysterious Shootings'), however Soeharto took credit for them in a later autobiography.

⁸⁵ See section on motives later in this chapter.

violence. Official comment on the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor in 1991 is instructive on this point:

But what glasses should we be looking at it through. They [the deceased] were Fretilin. If for example you were marching under a flag apart from the Indonesian one, what would you expect? (*interview with Rudolf Samuel Warouw, Operational Command Officer, the top military officer in East Timor at the time*)⁸⁶

'Apart from followers of the security disturbing movement, normal inhabitants were also amongst the victims,' said the Governor of East Timor⁸⁷.

Here we have a military official defending his actions, and a civilian governor criticising the massacre. However, both are confined to a regime of truth under which GPK are not inhabitants, and deserve to be shot⁸⁸.

The same distinction was made four years later in Papua, following an incident where the Indonesian military opened fire on a crowd of people who had raised an OPM flag. The sole enterprise of the local military commander's comments on the incident is to establish that those fired upon were GPK; this then is legitimisation in itself.

⁸⁶ *Tempo*, "'Tanggung Jawab Saya": Wawancara dengan Warouw', 21 (42) 1991, p39. [Tapi harus dilihat dari kaca mata mana. Mereka itu Fretilin. Kalau misalnya anda berjalan di bawah salah satu bendera yang bukan Merah Putih, bagaimana?]

⁸⁷ *Tempo*, 'Belasungkawa di Santa Cruz' 21 (39) 1991, p24. ['Selain pengikut gerakan pengacau keamanan, penduduk biasa juga iktu jadi korban,' kata Gubernur Timtim itu.]

⁸⁸ In the late 1990s, the term 'teroris' (terrorist) is also used. See *Gatra* 'Laporan Utama' 25 October 1997, pp25-36 and Fikar Eda et al (eds) *Aceh Menggugat*, pp28-33. This clearly also legitimates the use of state violence and criminalises the movements.

If [you mean] shooting of GPK (security disturbing mob), then yes, that happened. I acknowledge that. But they were really GPK. They raised the OPM flag you know, so yes we shot them.⁸⁹

After we checked, it turned out those who were shot were really GPK. I validate their actions [his troops]. If it were inhabitants that were shot, then I would take action against my soldiers who were at fault.⁹⁰

The use of GPK also highlights an interesting point about the manner in which the discourse is propagated. In the introduction, I mentioned that during the latter period of Soeharto's rule, the media frequently reported statements of prominent officials and military officers verbatim as news items. As an example, much of the reporting on Aceh in 1991 consists of either court reports or quotes of military officials about effective strategies to eliminate GAM. The differing vocabulary of these two types of report is striking. The military officials' comments use GPK almost exclusively, while the court reports rarely use GPK, but frequently use GAM or AM (*Aceh Merdeka*). The court reports, are of course, written by journalists⁹¹.

The infiltration of military style into published material is also evident in *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*. This text in several sections gives a chronological account of

⁸⁹ *Forum Keadilan*, 'Pangdam Trikora, Mayjen I Ketut Wirhdana "Saya Akui, Penembakan untuk GPK Memang Ada"' (Interview), (11) 1995, p15. [Kalau penembakan terhadap GPK (gerombolan pengacau keamanan) memang ada. Saya akui itu. Tapi itu benar-benar GPK. Wong, mereka naikin bendera OPM, ya kita tembak.]

⁹⁰ Ibid. [Setelah kita cek, yang ditembak benar-benar GPK. Tindakan mereka [anak buahnya] saya benarkan. Andaikata yang ditembak penduduk, akan saya tindak anak buah yang salah.]

⁹¹ Compare, for example, *Kompas*, 'Panglima Aceh Merdeka Diadili di PN Lhokseumawe', 25 May 1991 with *Kompas*, 'Ketua Bakorstanasda Sumbagut: Penanganan Masalah GPK Aceh, Harus Melalui Pendekatan Ipoleksosbud', 14 May 1991, p11. But lest this trend be considered absolute, see *Kompas*, 'Lagi, Penghubung GPK Aceh di Medan Dituntut 15 Tahun', 31 May 1991, p5.

OPM activities. The author uses a combination of military history and foreign activists sources. Where working from military sources, the author uses the derogatory vocabulary item '*gerombolan*', but when using foreign sources he uses the more neutral '*TNP*' (*Tentara Nasional Papua* - National Papua Army) or '*pasukan OPM*' (OPM troops). The transition is sudden and absolute⁹².

This link between military statements and sources on the one hand and vocabulary items on the other is also evident when we consider where GPK appears in the early 1990s. Its use in media is predominant, however a number of texts published in the early 1990s make scant use of it⁹³.

b) Komunis

The Soeharto regime was born out of an abortive coup blamed by his government on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was followed by an army sponsored slaughter of anywhere up to a million supposed PKI sympathisers. From this time, communism and the PKI have been artfully used by the Indonesian government to ward off dissent and emphasise the need for state supervision of all spheres of life. Kuntjoro-Jakti, quoted in van Langenberg, well describes the role that the PKI plays in the state's regime of truth:

⁹² The first instance is pp110-112, which is sourced from military history, but then pp114-123 do not use '*gerombolan*' at all. The second instance is pp156-159. The best example is the last two paragraphs on p159. Footnote no. 21 marks the end of the use of military sources, and in the very next sentence we see, '*Selama ini berita tentang jumlah TNP atau militer OPM...*'. All page references to John RG Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, 1993.

⁹³ See *Hari-hari Akhir Timor Portugis, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Integrasi Politik di Indonesia, Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur*, although the final work was published as late as 1996. For an example of the use of GPK in a book, see *Sandera, 130 Hari Terperangkap di Mapnduma*.

Even more, the invidious, pervasive evil of the PKI is emphasised by referring to the underground party as an OTB (*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk*). Thus, citizens had to be ever vigilant and dependent upon the state for continuous protection. The danger is not easily identified.⁹⁴

As mentioned above, *Integrasi* goes to great lengths to establish that Fretilin is communist. Moreover, Fretilin's communism may not be readily apparent, even to Fretilin members, but is visible to the expert eye of the state:

The Fretilin delegates always tried to avoid and cover-up their communism, but their organisation's arrangement and system as well as their tactics clearly indicated that Fretilin is communist, or at the least guided by communists⁹⁵.

Communism continues to appear frequently in depictions of Fretilin throughout the 1980s⁹⁶, although interestingly, in media reports on the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, I have found only one brief reference to communism⁹⁷. In these reports, '*komunis*' has been replaced by 'GPK'. This distinction disappears in books on East Timor published in the 1990s, however, when '*komunis*' is again frequently highlighted⁹⁸. At this point, I must stress again that the point in question is not the validity or otherwise of these

⁹⁴ Michael van Langenberg, 'Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords Approach', p16.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p145. [*fihak team utusan Fretilin selalu berusaha mengelakkan dan menutup-nutupi kekomunisannya, tetapi susunan dan sistim organisasinya serta taktik-taktik perjuangannya jelas menunjukkan bahwa Fretilin adalah komunis atau setidaknya tidaknya dibina oleh komunis.*]

⁹⁶ See for example *Integrasi Timor Timur*, Jakarta, 1982 - a published transcript of an interview and press conference with former Australian PM Gough Whitlam translated into Indonesian, with the interview helpfully entitled '*Fretilin adalah Komunis dan Kelompok Separatisme*' (Fretilin are Communists and a Separatist Group); *Berita Buana*, '*Masalah Timor Timur*' (Editorial), 27 November 1981, p2.

⁹⁷ *Tempo*, '*Sosok Seorang (Bekas) Fretilin*', 21 (43) 1991, p16. In this interview with a captured Fretilin member, one of the questions asks if he is communist.

⁹⁸ The difference is that these books typically provide an account of events in the 1970s, whereas media reports focus more on contemporary events.

statements⁹⁹, but rather the effect that the repetitive mention of 'komunis' had within the Indonesian context.

In contrast, early reports on the OPM do not mention communism. *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, as mentioned above, even makes an explicit distinction between communists and the OPM¹⁰⁰. However, in later histories and media reports on the OPM, links between the OPM and communist countries as well as leftists are mentioned¹⁰¹. Aceh is also tied to communist interference in some accounts:

It is not impossible that it was China itself who wanted to disrupt the anticommunist New Order government, and to this end they used our imbecilic regional leaders. It could be that Hasan Tiro himself is an international communist ringleader.¹⁰²

However, in considering the use of communism as a device in the depiction of separatists, it is not sufficient to highlight examples of the use of the tags 'komunis', 'PKI' and 'OTB'. A style of writing and vocabulary can be readily linked with the latent communist threat in Indonesia. These communists 'menyusup' (infiltrate), 'menghasut' (incite), engage in 'agitasi' (agitation) and 'memanfaatkan situasi' (exploit the situation), requiring the population to remain 'waspada' (vigilant), particularly as communism may

⁹⁹ Xanana Gusmao stated in 1999 that Fretilin originally based its struggle on Marxist-Leninist ideology, within a revolutionary context, but soon dumped this basis. *Xanana Gusmao: Timor Leste Akan Menjadi Bangsa Tanpa Angkatan Bersenjata* [<http://www.solidamor.org/content/solid/frame/interview.htm>].

¹⁰⁰ *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, p133.

¹⁰¹ See Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, p135, 136, 138, which links the OPM to Marxist academics and describes the new generation of OPM members as neo-Marxist; p141-2, 144, 168, which link the OPM to communist countries.

¹⁰² Hasan Saleh, *Mengapa Aceh Bergolak*, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta, 1992, p374. [*Bukan tidak mungkin RRC sendirilah yang ingin mengacaukan Pemerintah Orde Baru yang antikomunis itu, dan untuk itu digunakan parra pemimpin daerah kita yang telah bebal otaknya sebagai alat! Jangan-jangan Hasan Tiro sendiri merupakan gembong komunis internasional.*]

exist in the form of *Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk* (Organisations Without Form)¹⁰³. Similar vocabulary was used to describe separatist movements, for instance:

"The important thing is that the people remain calm, and vigilant against the incitations of the remnants of the Fretilin GPK."¹⁰⁴

It frequently occurs that inhabitants who have been infiltrated by the mob are in a difficult position.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ For a good example of this vocabulary usage and a partial discussion of the implications of the use of the tag OTB, see *Gatra* 28 October 1995, pp17-31.

¹⁰⁴ *Tempo*, 'Virus itu Sudah Terjadi', 21 (39) 1991, p24. ["Yang penting sekarang masyarakat tetap tenang. Waspada terhadap hasutan sisa-sisa GPK Fretilin itu."]

¹⁰⁵ *Kompas*, '190 Pengungsi Irja Kembali', 1984, p4 (Editorial). [Sering terjadi, penduduk yang disusupi gerombolan berada pada posisi terjepit]

c) Foreign Pawns

Following the withdrawal of the Japanese in 1945, the Dutch, who had withdrawn from Indonesia in the face of the Japanese advance, attempted to re-assert their rule by a policy of divide and rule. They set up a series of puppet states, mainly on outer islands, in the attempt to form a federation. However this policy succeeded only in closing the ranks of the nationalist movement¹⁰⁶. This has left many Indonesians with a deep-seated suspicion of foreign conspiracy.

The contrast between Indonesia and the rest of the world was elaborated during the New Order with the frequent use of 'Indonesianising' adjectives as qualifiers of otherwise universal terms, for example '*Demokrasi Pancasila*'. This practice has also extended to questioning Western application of terms such as human rights (HAM), which are presented as merely a pretext to interfere in '*masalah intern*' or '*masalah dalam negeri Indonesia*' (internal affairs)¹⁰⁷.

This suspicion of foreign interference is extensively employed in the discourse on separatism. This is particularly true of the earliest text considered, *Buatlah Irian Barat Satu Zamrud yang Indah*.

III. Simultaneously, [the desire is stated to] burn the Puppet Flag of West Papua, and initiatives and regulations concerning the name WEST PAPUA, FLAG OF WEST PAPUA,

¹⁰⁶ J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1964, p134.

¹⁰⁷ For a good discussion of the interplay of the New Order's essentialist construction of the Indonesian nation in the context of the human rights debate, see Ariel Heryanto, '*Perlawanan dalam Kepatuhan?*', *Kalam*, (3) 1994, pp10-23.

NATIONAL ANTHEM HAI MY LAND OF PAPUA, because all of them are creations of the colonial Dutch and to date have served as tools of provocation and disintegration.¹⁰⁸

This is continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s by describing the OPM as a 'time bomb' left by the Dutch, by way of implanting a Papua nationalism before ceding the territory to Indonesia. Some texts also suggest that the OPM received support from foreign missionaries.¹⁰⁹

Apart from linking Fretilin to foreign communism, *Integrasi* also asserts that both Fretilin and UDT, a party that at first supported autonomy under Portuguese rule, are being manipulated by interests that seek to establish neo-colonial rule over East Timor. In contrast, Apodeti, who support integration with Indonesia, are depicted as being free from foreign influence.

They [Fretilin and UDT] formed a coalition because they were brought together by other interests which were manipulating them.¹¹⁰

All the moreso, because of the reality that the Apodeti activists were indigenous East Timorese. As such, compared to other parties, many of whose leaders were white, or of mixed blood, Apodeti easily obtained the support of the people¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ *Buatlah Irian Barat Satu Zamrud yang Indah*, 1964, p293. [III Serentak pula telah membakar Bendera Boneka Papua Barat, dan inisiatif ordonansi tentang nama PAPUA BARAT, BENDERA PAPUA BARAT, LAGU KEBANGSAAN HAI TANAHKU PAPUA, karena kesemuanya ini adalah ciptaan Belanda kolonial dan hingga kini merupakan alat provokasi dan pemecah-belah.]

¹⁰⁹ For example, Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, *Integrasi Politik di Indonesia*, PT Gramedia, Jakarta, 1989, p98.

¹¹⁰ Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p170. [Mereka koalisi karena sengaja dikoaliskan oleh kepentingan lain yang memperalatnya]

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p221. [Lebih-lebih lagi, karena kenyataan bahwa pejuang-pejuang Apodeti justru orang-orang pribumi Timor-Timur. Dengan demikian maka dibandingkan dengan partai-partai lainnya yang pimpinan-

The extent to which the regime of truth that it is natural for East Timor to be part of Indonesia prevails is well demonstrated by this point of foreign, behind the scenes involvement in the East Timorese political parties. While discussing the results of a meeting in London between the Portuguese and Indonesian governments, Soekanto records the following section of the Portuguese delegations summary of the discussion:

The Portuguese delegation, in relation to the above:

- a. Grant the Indonesian Government freedom to *increase* their guidance of Apodeti in a covert, discrete manner.¹¹² (my emphasis)

A similar statement to that of *Integrasi* is an account of Indonesia's efforts at the United Nations:

Indonesia stressed before the UN General Assembly that those who call themselves Fretilin are not a genuine separatist movement representing the people of East Timor, but rather are the beloved collaborators of the Portuguese colonial regime.¹¹³

Foreign interference is also suspected in Aceh. In the previous section, we saw how one author insinuated that Hasan Tiro may be an international communist ringleader; non-communist interference is also alluded to.

pimpinannya banyak orang-orang berkulit putih, atau golongan Indo, Apodeti mudah mendapatkan kepercayaan dari rakyat ...]

¹¹² Ibid, p139. [*Delegasi Portugal sehubungan dengan hal tersebut di atas:*

a. Memberikan kebebasan kepada Pemerintah Indonesia untuk meningkatkan pembinaan Apodeti secara tertutup dan tidak menyolok.]

¹¹³ *Berita Buana*, 'Fretilin Bukan Gerakan Kemerdekaan Sejati', 19 October 1982, p7. [*Indonesia menegaskan kepada Majelis Umum PBB bahwa yang menyebut dirinya Fretilin bukanlah gerakan*

You know, it's not just Aceh that is tumultuous, other areas are as well. This is actually the desire of foreign countries. When upheaval occurs, our country's development is automatically influenced.¹¹⁴

Neo-colonialism eventually declines in relevance, and in reporting on the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre it is no longer mentioned. There are still suggestions of foreign '*rekayasa*' (loosely 'engineering'), such as Armed Forces Commander Try Sutrisno's suggestion that five foreign nationals may have been involved¹¹⁵, and the official Antara news agency's report of the suspected involvement of Community Aid Abroad in engineering the incident¹¹⁶. However, the depiction as foreign puppets is most pronounced in terms of the international community's over-developed sensitivity to human rights¹¹⁷. This distorts their perception of the issue, and accounts for the anomalous reports in the foreign media¹¹⁸.

Besides that, they use the issue of human rights, which is currently very saleable. When ABRI troops pursue Kelly Kwalik's group, which is known to be vicious, by chance excesses

kemerdekaan sejati mewakili rakyat Timor Timur, melainkan hanyalah kolaborator tersayang rejim kolonial Portugal.]

¹¹⁴ *Forum Keadilan*, 21 April 1997, reproduced in Fikar W. Eda et al, *Aceh Menggugat*, p27. [*Lho, bukan Aceh saja yang bergolak, daerah lain juga. Ini sebenarnya keinginan dari negara-negara luar. Dengan adanya pergolakan, otomatis pembangunan di negara kita akan terpengaruh.*]

¹¹⁵ *Kompas*, 'Pangab di DPR: ABRI Terpaksa Menembak sebagai Upaya Bela Diri', 28 November 1991, p1.

¹¹⁶ *Kompas*, 'Sekjen PBB Mungkin Kirim Misi Penyelidik', 2 December 1991, p1.

¹¹⁷ See *Tempo*, 'Belasungkawa di Santa Cruz' 21 (39) 1991, p24.

¹¹⁸ By 1999, this develops into a notion of an international conspiracy to misrepresent. See for example *Gatra*, 'Menggugat Kenetralan Wasit', (42) 4 September 1999, p67.

have occurred. The ABRI troops - in this difficult field - it seems have committed a number of errors in operational procedure.¹¹⁹

The undermining of human rights as a legitimate area of concern is also important to head off the possible effect of cooperation between separatist movements and new social movements, which are increasingly a strength in international activism.

The five foreign nationals Try Sutrisno was referring to in the context of the Santa Cruz massacre were journalists, and this is also used in several instances as a new form of the foreign puppet depiction. Writing about the Santa Cruz incident 6 years later, Hendro Subroto claims that it was a case of entrapment of the Indonesian military set up by collaboration between the demonstrators and foreign journalists. He cites a similar incident at Victorville in the United States, before claiming:

In the 12 November incident in Dili, foreign journalists entered Dili under the guise of tourists, acted as hidden cameramen, and the demonstrators incited the [security] force to beat them, as in the Victorville incident.¹²⁰

A similar claim is that of a military officer in Papua that flag raisings were being conducted especially for outsiders.

¹¹⁹ *Gatra*, 'Teror OPM', (10) 1996, p21. [Selain itu, mereka menggunakan isu HAM yang lagi laku keras. Ketika pasukan ABRI memburu kelompok Kelly Kwalik yang terkenal ganas, kebetulan terjadi ekses. Pasukan ABRI - di medan yang berat itu - rupanya melakukan sejumlah kesalahan prosedur operasi.]

¹²⁰ Hendro Subroto, *Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur*, p235. [Dalam Peristiwa 12 November di Dili, wartawan asing yang masuk ke Dili berkedok sebagai wisatawan, bertindak sebagai juru kamera

Usually they raise the flag, then are photographed by an outsider, then the photograph is distributed overseas. If they raise the flag in the middle of the jungle, we let them alone. But the photo is exploited for those purposes.¹²¹

These allegations of foreign interference, and of protests being staged for a foreign audience, draw into question the purity of these movements and their motives. The question of motives will now be discussed in detail.

Motives

Above we saw how GPK functioned to depoliticise the movements to which it was applied. A second way in which these movements are depoliticised is the representation of their motives for separatism. Several motives for separatism are presented, none of them political. Put differently, a constant assertion of this discourse on separatists is that separatists, fundamentally, are not motivated by a desire to secede from Indonesia, but employ this demand to achieve other ends, or as a reaction to feelings of frustration and injustice.

In re-interpreting, or perhaps better, re-presenting the motives of separatism, separatists themselves are not widely quoted nor generally referred to. This is truer of media reports than of published books. The exact manner in which separatist voices are incorporated into the discourse will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

tersembunyi, dan para demonstran memancing para petugas untuk melakukan pukulan, seperti dalam peristiwa Victorville.]

¹²¹ *Forum Keadilan*, 'Pangdam Trikora, Mayjen I Ketut Wiradhana "Saya Akui, Penembakan untuk GPK Memang Ada"' (Interview), (11) 1995, p15. [*Biasanya menaikkan bendera, terus dipotret orang luar, lalu fotonya disiarkan di luar negeri. Kalau mereka menaikkan bendera di tengah hutan, kita biarkan saja. Tapi ini fotonya memang diperalat untuk itu.*]

The following passage is long, but provides an excellent example of how this discourse strips separatists of the possibility of genuine separatist intent:

Indeed, we could ask whether a society that 'rebels' against the centre (Jakarta) can immediately be labelled a disintegrative society?

It cannot be immediately considered that these rebels lack what Renan calls 'supreme solidarity'. It could be that they have 'rebelled' on account of reasons that are in no way connected to the problem of disintegration. For instance, they may be dissatisfied with a government policy. Alternatively, a group in society may act 'strangely', because they experience injustice, or even an imbalance perpetrated by a more dominant societal group.

It is natural if a societal group that was previously 'spoilt' with various concessions, subsequently protests when their privileges run out. They are 'engrossed' in enjoying their privileges without realising that these privileges come with a time limit. Here, those to blame are the givers of the privileges. The giver did not prepare them to realise that there was a time limit. Or, rather, in actuality they needn't have been given anything, so as to avoid them becoming hooked on their privileges.

If this is what they feel, then *in truth they are only protesting matters that in their view should not be the way they are. They do not desire secession, let alone to form their own country.* It's just that, if their dissatisfaction accumulates over a period of years, it is not impossible that their orientation will change.

As such, what is it that our brothers from the eastern extreme want? Occasionally the OPM's (Free Papua Organisation) voice is still heard. What voice is it and whose is it? What mission does it proclaim?

*Based on reading materials, it turns out that what they want is 'Make your brothers here feel that they also own a stake of the Republic of Indonesia.'*¹²² [my emphasis]

The italicised sections emphasise to the reader that there is no need to address the demands for secession, as this is not what the separatist really wants. Indeed, the author continues, a page later, to sum up that "So, the problem in Papua is how to increase the welfare of society in a more even manner."¹²³ To back up his transposition of separatist claims from the political to the specifically economic, the author cites two sentences written in 1945, and conversations with two to three Papuans; apart from this he refers to 'reading materials', without providing an example or even reference to the reader¹²⁴.

¹²² M. Hamdan Basyar, 'Kesimpulan dan Saran' in *Penelitian Kesadaran Kebangsaan: Wilayah Irian Jaya*, LIPI, Jakarta, 1992, pp104-105. [*Memang, bisa dipertanyakan juga, apakah suatu masyarakat yang 'membangkang' terhadap pusat (Jakarta) dapat langsung dicap sebagai masyarakat yang disintegratif?*

Para pembangkang tidak dapat langsung dianggap tidak mempunyai apa yang disebut Renan sebagai 'solidaritas luhur'. Bisa saja mereka 'membangkang' karena alasan yang tidak ada hubungannya sekali dengan masalah disintegratif. Misalnya, mereka tidak puas terhadap suatu kebijaksanaan pemerintah. Atau, suatu kelompok masyarakat bertindak 'aneh-aneh', karena merasakan ketidakadilan, maupun ketimpangan yang dilakukan oleh kelompok masyarakat yang lebih dominan.

Adalah wajar bila ada sekelompok masyarakat yang tadinya 'dimanjakan' dengan berbagai kemudahan, kemudian protes setelah masa itu habis. Mereka 'terlanjur' menikmati kemudahan tanpa menyadari bahwa hal itu terbatas pada waktu tertentu. Di sini yang perlu disalahkan adalah pemberi kemudahan tersebut. Sang pemberi tidak mempersiapkan mereka untuk menyadari adanya batas waktu. Atau malahan, sebenarnya mereka tidak usah diberikan apapun untuk menghindari keterlenuaan dalam kemudahan.

Jika yang dirasakan demikian, maka sesungguhnya mereka hanya memprotes hal-hal yang menurut pandangannya seharusnya tidak pantas ada. Mereka tidak menghendaki pemisahan, apalagi membentuk negara sendiri. Hanya saja, jika perasaan ketidakpuasan terakumulasi sampai sekian tahun, maka tidak tertutup kemungkinan timbulnya perubahan orientasi mereka.

Selanjutnya, sebenarnya saudara kita di ujung timur itu menginginkan apa? Suara OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) kadang-kadang masih terdengar. Itu suara apa dan suara siapa? Misa apa yang dikumandangkan itu?

Berdasarkan temuan bacaan, ternyata yang diinginkan adalah 'Jadikan saudara-saudaramu di sini merasa turut memiliki Republik ini'.]

¹²³ Ibid, p106. [*Jadi, masalah di Irian Jaya adalah bagaimana mensejahterakan masyarakat secara lebih merata.*]

¹²⁴ Although in fairness to the author, he does realise the shortcomings of the lack of fieldwork in his research; see page iii. However, after noting this limitation, he nevertheless proceeds unimpeded in his conclusions.

An economic rationale is also promoted following the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre. The majority of people are not against integration, it is asserted; those who protest are frustrated by the economic backwardness of the capital. This allows the remnants of the GPK to incite them to take part in demonstrations.

In the end, these thousands of unemployed people can be extremely easily incited to find fault with integration. They are a time bomb that can be ignited and exploded at any time¹²⁵.

This economic factor explains why separatism is prevalent in Dili, rather than rural areas, the discourse continues. In these rural areas, the military's development activities, termed 'territorial operations' (*operasi territorial*) have made separatism unviable.

They carry out their activities in the city, whispering in people's ears. Why? Because in the villages their message isn't wanted. It has been thwarted by our territorial operation.¹²⁶

A similar device depicts the separatists as spoilt, or perhaps unaware that the difficulties that they face are commonplace. One example is this editorial following the departure to seek political exile in the Netherlands of four people from Papua.

Indeed what are called the remnants of the "Free Papua Organisation" still remain. Examined more objectively, the stronger motive in several cases in Papua, perhaps including the case of these four people, is not political, but say, a social motive.

¹²⁵ *Tempo*, 'Mengapa Bom Waktu itu Meledak', 21 (40) 1991, p31. [Aakhirnya, ribuan penganggur itu amat mudah dihasut untuk menyalahkan integrasi. Mereka menjadi bom waktu yang tiap saat siap disulut untuk meledak.]

There is a particular sensitivity, with the result that disappointments large or small, which also affect fellow Indonesians in other places, are all expressed politically, or made into political issues.¹²⁷

A further depoliticised motive proffered within the discourse is that of criminal intent. This is more broadly linked to the criminalisation of dissent in Indonesia. In a related manner, media articles on Aceh repeatedly question whether the rebellion in this territory is separatist, or in fact motivated by personal gain. Dissent is also readily criminalised by emphasising that separatism violates the fundamental tenets of the state, and is thus subversive.

A number of incidents of terror, intimidation and destruction that the GPK have carried out since last May have turned out to not be part of a political movement as widely suspected. "In the end, it was concluded that they are a pure criminal group, that is, a group that merely engages in criminal actions," said Brigadier General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, head of the ABRI Information Centre.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ *Tempo*, 'Virus Itu Sudah Terjadi...', 21 (39) 1991, p24-25. [*Mereka melakukan kegiatan di kota, kasak-kusuk. Kenapa? Karena di hutan dan desa-desa sudah tak laku. Sudah terlindas oleh operasi teritorial kita.*]

¹²⁷ *Kompas*, 'Minta Tiket ke Belanda' (Editorial) 15 March 1984, p4. [*Memang masih ada yang disebut sisa-sisa "Organisasi Papua Merdeka". Diteliti lebih obyektif, yang lebih kuat pada berbagai kasus di Irian Jaya termasuk barangkali peristiwa empat orang di atas, bukanlah motif politik, melainkan sebutlah, motif sosial.*]

"Ada kepekaan khusus, sehingga sesuatu kekecewaan besar atau kecil yang menimpa juga sesama orang Indonesia di tempat-tempat lain, serta-merta dinyatakan secara politik, atau dijadikan isu politik."

¹²⁸ *Tempo*, 'GPK Aceh: King, Ganja & Teror', 20 (18) 1990, p22. [*Sejumlah teror, intimidasi dan pengacauan yang dilakukan GPK sejak Mei lalu ternyata bukan gerakan politis seperti banyak diduga. "Akhirnya disimpulkan bahwa mereka adalah kelompok kriminal murni, artinya, kelompok yang semata-mata melakukan tindak kriminal," kata Brigjen. Nurhadi Purwosaputro, Kepala Pusat Penerangan ABRI.] See also Fikar Eda et al (eds) *Aceh Menggugat*, p36, p56, p149; *Tempo*, 'Aceh Menarik Rambut', 20 (21) 1990, p35.*

He continued, in actuality the GPK did not have pure political motives. Many of them joined for personal interests.¹²⁹

Another way in which motives are expressed in a non-political manner relates to that of religion, in particular systems of belief besides Islam¹³⁰. *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa* states that Papuans perceive the OPM in terms of a 'Gerakan Manseren Manggundi'¹³¹; Djopari, also writing about the OPM outlines the influence of 'cargo cults' and Christianity on the OPM and the way it is perceived¹³², although he cautions against interpreting the public's response to the OPM solely in these terms¹³³. This links to a more general point about the deployment of Islam in the discourse on separatists. Unfortunately, this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

A final example of the pervasiveness of this discourse is provided by a comment written by the respected Indonesian intellectual, Arief Budiman, again following the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre. After denouncing elements of the discourse described above (normative labels [by this he means GPK], always referring to separatists as existing only in small numbers etc), he then moves on to possible solutions to the continuing conflict.

¹²⁹ *Aceh Menggugat*, p37. [Lanjutnya, sebenarnya GPK tidak lagi bermotif politik murni. Banyak di antara mereka yang bergabung karena kepentingan pribadi.]

¹³⁰ East Timor is majority Catholic, as a result of Portuguese colonialism; there are also many Christians in Papua.

¹³¹ *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, p125

¹³² Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, pp101,102,147.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p147.

From several East Timorese living in Java whom I know, I have observed that after living here for a few years, their stance on Indonesia is quite positive. To them I say that injustice is faced not only by East Timorese, but also by the common people in Java and other areas.¹³⁴

* * * * *

By way of a short summary of what we have discussed so far, it may be useful then to consider what effect these depictions have had on the separatist during the New Order. The separatist has presented a challenge to the truth claims of the Indonesian state about national unity. However, when challenges are posed to this discourse, as they are by separatist activity, then a body of texts may be mobilised to decode the separatists' anomalous activity according to familiar, known categories. The first function of these texts is the normative depictions that reflect the individualising power of the state: they are 'dividing practices' that stigmatise the separatist as a deviant from the norm. Once isolated, the separatist is then susceptible to representation in terms of the familiar categories described above. This in turn places the separatist in a 'limited terrain'. This discredits the separatists, as in the case of foreign pawns; it makes corrective action necessary; or, in extreme cases, it makes it necessary for the state to confine or destroy the separatists, as in the case of GPK and communists. Even where these hostile familiar categories and normative devices do not occur, the discourse of national unity still pervades the depiction of separatists and undermines their motives, allowing re-

¹³⁴ Arief Budiman, 'Timtim: Berpikir Dingin Mencari Alternatif', *Editor*, 5 (11) 1991, p26-27. [Dari beberapa orang Timtim di Jawa yang saya kenal, saya melihat, setelah hidup beberapa tahun di sini, sikap mereka cukup positif terhadap bangsa Indonesia. Kepada mereka saya katakan, bahwa ketidakadilan tidak hanya dihadapi penduduk Timtim. Tapi juga oleh rakyat jelata di Pulau Jawa dan di wilayah-wilayah lain.]

interpretation or re-presentation in non-political terms. In this way the discourse speaks for the separatists.

This does not deal with the historicity of the discourse. Media reports in particular occur in particular concentration after incidents of resistance, such as the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and the kidnapping of a number of Indonesians and foreign nationals in 1995 by the OPM. As separatism becomes more endemic, devices such as GPK, and the strong dichotomy between '*rakyat*' and 'GPK' associated with it, occur more frequently. Endemic separatism also becomes a cause for re-appraisal, not of the validity of Indonesian sovereignty, but of the nation-building and development strategies applied. As time progresses, the discourse must increasingly deal with contradictory international reports on separatist activity; this also effects the constitution of the discourse, such as through the changing form of the tag of foreign pawns.

However, the above discussion does not address the two-fold problem of why this discourse was credible, how it was propagated, and the matter of power to represent. We will now take up these problems in the following chapter.

Chapter 2: Distance, Development and Resistance

Foucault advises the historian to 'seek in the discourse not its laws of construction, as do structuralist methods, but its conditions of existence.'¹³⁵ This chapter then attempts to trace some of the specific historical conditions within which the discourse on separatists during the New Order was propagated, as well as examining how the discourse was propagated and how it dealt with resistance.

In its authoritarian rule, the New Order regime exercised coercion not solely through physical force, but also through a project of ideological domination. In order to exercise this domination, the regime had to be able to restrict freedom of expression. To this end, the regime maintained a Department of Information, as well as several clandestine, non-constitutional bodies, such as Bakorstanas and its precursor Komkamtib¹³⁶. However, this domination should not be conceived of as uniformly efficient and without contradictions.

The majority of sources for this thesis are print media and other materials published within Indonesia, such as books and pamphlets. As such, this section will trace the controls exercised on these sectors as part of this ideological domination, as well as examining other, essentially internal constraints upon media content.

After a brief period of relative openness at the outset of the New Order regime's rule, the press came under increasingly strict control. One of the main mechanisms of control

¹³⁵ Alec McHoul & Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer*, Melbourne University Press, Malaysia, 1993, p49.

¹³⁶ The National Coordinating Body for the Maintenance of Stability (Bakorstanas - *Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*) was formed in 1998 to replace the Operational Command for

was the licensing system, or SIUPP (*Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers* - Press Enterprise Operational License - prior to 1982 SIT - *Surat Izin Terbit*). Without a SIUPP no press material could legally be published. Only a very small number of SIUPP were issued during the New Order - with a particularly small number being issued in later years - and each SIUPP could be revoked at any time. Fear of revocation of the SIUPP created a 'management of fear' in press enterprises, 'which in turn produced a journalism of fear'¹³⁷. In this way, one of the most effective mechanisms of control upon the media was not exercised in a direct manner by the government, but by journalists upon their fellow journalists¹³⁸.

Of course, within this climate of restriction, many media still attempted to maintain as independent a stance as was possible, as is evidenced by the forced closure or suspension of various publications¹³⁹. Luwarso explains that one tactic that the press used was that of euphemism¹⁴⁰. Ajidarma also explains how he felt able to report certain occurrences provided he provided phrases such as '*alat provokasi*' [tool of provocation] and '*orang tertentu*' [certain people] to incorporate his report within the government position¹⁴¹. However, remembering the role that some Indonesian journalists played in 'controlling'

the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib - *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*). Each body was a vehicle for the military to target dissidents in an extra-judicial fashion.

¹³⁷ Seno Gumira Ajidarma (Lingard trans.), *Eyewitness*, EET Imprint, Potts Point, 1995, p24.

¹³⁸ Lukas Luwarso, *Peran Media Membangun Civil Society*, unpublished paper, 1998. This control was exercised through the state sponsored Press Council and Indonesian Association of Journalists (PWI), which was the sole legal journalists' body during the New Order. At the time he wrote the paper Luwarso was chairperson of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI).

¹³⁹ In 1994, three weekly magazines, *Tempo*, *Detik* and *Editor* were forced to close by the government; prior to this, several papers were closed individually during the 1980s, including the major daily Sinar Harapan, while further rounds of bannings took place in 1974 and 1978. See David Hill, *The Press in 'New Order' Indonesia: Entering the 1990s*, Working Paper no 1, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Western Australia, 1991, p5-6.

¹⁴⁰ Luwarso, *Peran Media Membangun Civil Society*.

¹⁴¹ Seno Gumira Ajidarma, *Eyewitness*, p9.

their colleagues, the notion of a critical press under difficult conditions needs considerable qualification. Luwarso identifies a role played by the mainstream media in prolonging the rule of Soeharto's regime:

The shackled Indonesia press and its journalists also played a large role in internalising the regime's slogans without attempting to critically interpret them. Slogans such as: latent danger of communism, stability for the sake of development, ABRI as dynamisator are examples of the regime's slogans that the press broadcast, which society then had to swallow as the truth¹⁴².

It is not difficult to see how this then supported the propagation of the labels that we have discussed.

Another characteristic of the New Order press that supported the discourse on separatists was its use of sources, which Luwarso refers to as 'talking news'¹⁴³. This was the practice of recording faithfully the statements of officials, transcribing them and then writing them as a news item. This practice clearly gave officials unfettered access to the media, and provided a version of events for the media to comply to¹⁴⁴. A combination of this

¹⁴² Luwarso, *Peran Media Membangun Civil Society*, 1998. [*Pers dan wartawan Indonesia yang terbelenggu juga berperan besar dalam menginternalisasikan slogan-slogan rezim tanpa mencoba menelaah secara kritis. Slogan-slogan seperti: bahaya laten komunis, stabilitas demi pembangunan, ABRI sebagai dinamisator, adalah contoh slogan-slogan rezim yang disebarkan oleh pers dan harus ditelan oleh masyarakat sebagai kebenaran.*]

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ One article published after the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili contained a backhanded message that newspapers could not be expected to contradict the government line, as the Head of the Indonesian Association of Journalists (PWI - a government sponsored body to control journalists) declared that: the national press has the right to publish field observations, outside the official government clarification, as long as it considers beforehand whether or not its reports are beneficial to the nation.

[*pers nasional berhak menulis laporan temuan di lapangan, di luar keterangan resmi pemerintah, asalkan sebelum disajikan dipertimbangkan apakah laporannya menguntungkan kehidupan bangsa atau tidak.*]

tendency, along with overt government restrictions on who could be quoted, and the simple inability of the Indonesian press to meet with separatist figures, all contributed to separatist voices making only ritualised appearances in the media¹⁴⁵.

More generally, this trend is evident in other published material. Chapter 1 briefly touched upon the re-interpretation of separatists' motives, demands and reactions without reference to them. A typical example is as follows:

When I showed this documentary film to Australian journalists in Darwin, the Fretilin group in Australia were confused like a man with his beard on fire. This was because the Australian television media broadcasted sections of the film that provided facts that conflicted with the picture of East Timor that Fretilin had for years provided.¹⁴⁶

In some respects, the exclusion of separatist voices from this discourse on separatism could be considered as a simple mechanism of silencing statements that would undermine the truth claims of the discourse. However, the discourse also discredits possible dissenting voices in advance, in a strikingly similar way to colonial discourses of the

Kompas 'Instruksi Presiden Soeharto tentang Insiden Timtim: Penanganan Dilakukan dengan Cermat dan Dikoordinasikan Sebaik-baiknya', 18 November 1991, p1.

¹⁴⁵ For example, shortly after Xanana Gusmao was captured on 21 November 1992, he appeared on Indonesian television apologising for his actions, appealing to fellow Fretilin members to surrender and take part in the development process, and stating that Indonesia owned East Timor and East Timor owned Indonesia (*Kompas*, 'Timor Timur Milik Indonesia: Indonesia Milik Timor Timur', 2 December 1992, p1). Another example of a ritualised appearance is Maukalo, who is interviewed in *Tempo* almost as a specimen, as an example of how a separatist thinks (*Tempo*, 'Sosok Seorang (Bekas) Fretilin', 21 (43) 21 December 1991, p16. Also see Syamsuddin Haris and M. Riefki Muna, 'Dilema Penyelesaian Kasus Timor Timur' in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?, kasus Aceh, Riau, Irian Jaya dan Timor Timur*, Erlangga, Jakarta, 1999, p261, for an explanation of government tactics in appropriating token separatists.

¹⁴⁶ Hendro Subroto, *Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur*, p239. [Ketika film dokumenter itu saya putar di depan wartawan Australia di Darwin, kubu Fretilin di Australia kebingungan seperti seorang yang sedang kebakaran jenggot. Hal ini disebabkan media TV di Australia menyebarkan cuplikan film yang memberikan fakta yang bertentangan dengan gambaran Timor Timur yang diberikan oleh Fretilin sejak bertahun-tahun.]

'Oriental'¹⁴⁷. This may result in these opinions not being sought, as they can only be dismissed as lies, or confirming what is already known:

But don't imagine it's the same in East Timor as it is in Java. Because there it's still chaotic. Information is confused and incoherent and sometimes people say anything at all. They look quite straightforward but they're not. In Java, ordinary people can be believed but apparently they can't there. Maybe because it's to do with anti-integration attitudes.¹⁴⁸

Beyond the level of sources, control could also be directly exercised upon who and what was published. In 1997, Stanley estimated that over 2000 titles may have been banned during the New Order¹⁴⁹. In 1989, a 'clearing house' was established to make recommendations to the Attorney General, who under legislation initiated by Sukarno, could criminalise the possession of certain books¹⁵⁰. A brief examination of the authors of the books I have used as source materials is revealing of the climate of publishing: Soekanto was a staff researcher at CSIS¹⁵¹; E.M. Tomodok was the Indonesian Consul to Portuguese Timor from 1972-1976; Hasan Saleh did participate in the DI/TII rebellion, but then rejoined the Indonesian army for six years before retiring to Java; Hendro Subroto was a TVRI (Indonesian Government-owned television channel) journalist who was one of only a few Indonesian journalists chosen to cover East Timor with the 'joint forces'; several other books were written by government departments, military units or by

¹⁴⁷ cf quotation of Cromer in Said, *Orientalism*, p38.

¹⁴⁸ Explanation of the Chair of the Commission of National Investigators, M. Djaelini LLB, quoted in Seno Gumira Ajidarma, *Eyewitness*, p15.

¹⁴⁹ Adi Prasetjo (Stanley), 'Orde Baru 31 Tahun, 2000 Judul Buku Dibredelel', *Tempo Interaktif*, 29 January 1996, cited in HRW, *Academic Freedom In Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers*, Chapter V, [<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/indonesia2/>].

¹⁵⁰ HRW, *Academic Freedom In Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers*, [<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/indonesia2/>].

military officers¹⁵², but particularly none by any one involved in any of the movements under consideration.

Of course, not all published material is as closely affiliated to official sources as the above list. Two of the books considered were written by academics, namely *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka* and *Integrasi Politik*. These two books highlight the productive character of power. Their relation to the ideological control of the New Order lies in the questions and assumptions that form the basis of the study. Both are written from the viewpoint of strengthening or consolidating Indonesian national integration; Djopari includes several suggestions to eradicate the OPM's ideology.¹⁵³

In any case, where control was not exercised over authors, a work could be censored for 'inverting facts' and thus 'leading the public astray'¹⁵⁴. A HRW report notes that this criterion was made explicit in the case of an account of the 1950s Permesta revolt, which was censored because it conflicted with the official account of history in *Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan TNI AD*¹⁵⁵.

The above discussion details some of the constraints upon freedom of expression that facilitated the production of the discourse on separatism during the New Order. However,

¹⁵¹ A think tank formed in 1971 and closely aligned to sections of the regime.

¹⁵² For example, Samsuddin, *Pergolakan di Perbatasan*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1995.

¹⁵³ Both books contain suggestions that the authors also perceive other ways in which their studies might be phrased, however, the fact remains that within the context that they were written in, other studies may not have been possible.

¹⁵⁴ HRW, *Academic Freedom In Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers*, Chapter V. [<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/indonesia2/>].

this is far from a complete picture of the historic conditions that supported the discourse's existence. Another factor that warrants discussion is distance, and the related topic of the power to represent.

Said provides an interesting starting point for this discussion. In Orientalism, Said likens Orientalism to the confinement of the whole East on the theatrical stage of the Orient. The stage refers to the enclosed space of the field of Orientalism; the stage is theatrical as 'the idea of representation is a theatrical one'¹⁵⁶. An essential component of this metaphor of the theatrical stage is the distance between Europe and the Orient. Most Europeans will had contact with the Orient only through the Orientalist representations of it, and thus these representations persisted largely unchallenged. Indeed, Said posits, the representation "acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes."¹⁵⁷

East Timor, Aceh and Papua are themselves distant from much of Indonesia, and most Indonesians have no link with these territories in any way. Indeed, the catchphrase '*Dari Sabang Sampai Merauke*' (From Sabang (in Aceh) to Merauke (in Papua)) was coined by 'Indonesia's nationalists long before they themselves had set foot in Papua'¹⁵⁸. For many years after East Timor was integrated with Indonesia, the province was closed to arrivals from other parts of the country. This in itself creates great potential for the Indonesian government to represent the province according to its interests. As a result of geographic

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Said, Orientalism, p63.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p93.

isolation, much of the available history is necessarily from military or other governmental archives (particularly for East Timor and Papua)¹⁵⁹, and hence it is liable to infuse subsequent histories with a certain bias. This factor is not confined merely to the writing of histories in book form; as mentioned above, comments by officials were frequently reported as news.

In addition, and more importantly for the public perception, the structure of Indonesian television news reporting reinforces the government's dominant position in determining the representation of these territories. In Indonesia, although four private television channels operate in addition to the government owned TVRI, these private channels cannot afford to maintain permanent bureaus in all but a few of Indonesia's major cities. As such, it is common practice in the event of a newsworthy incident to rely heavily upon TVRI archival footage as the image component of the news story. When access to the site of the occurrence is restricted, this archival footage may be the only available image component for several days or longer, despite the story receiving significant airtime on news bulletins¹⁶⁰. This at once functions to restrict the broadcast of images that may be graphically at odds with the commentary of the news bulletin, and underlines the power of the Indonesian government to represent the East Timorese, Acehnese and Papuans in what is essentially an unchanging manner, thus fixing their essence.

¹⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1991 (2nd edition), p176. As Anderson notes, a few hundred Indonesian nationalists were detained in Papua.

¹⁵⁹ Ironically, the prevalence of military history sources is probably related to the activities of the movements in question, which were met with military force by the Indonesian regime.

¹⁶⁰ For instance, when conflicts between Christian and Muslim mobs commenced in January 1999 in Ambon, television channels had great difficulty getting their reporters to the island. For at least a week after the violence commenced, descriptions of the violence would be backset to TVRI archival footage of

In addition to this geographical distance, although perhaps not completely removed from it, there was an ideological distance between the particularly Indonesian audience of this discourse and the othered peoples of these territories. This will be discussed in the following section on development.

Thusfar we have discussed some of the authoritarian conditions and other factors that afforded the regime a power to represent separatists. This discursive domination also enabled a particular type of writing about separatists by those not affiliated to the regime. However, this discursive domination cannot be viewed as uniformly efficient, calculated and as a deliberate project of concealment and misrepresentation. Heryanto, discussing the role of the communist threat in New Order hegemony, highlights the 'messy' nature of authoritarianism, and cautions against a clear cut delimitation of the subject and object of power¹⁶¹. His prime example is a comment by a former head of Indonesia's intelligence service (Bakin), Sutopo Yuwono:

The funny thing about the world of intelligence is the technique of psy-war [psychological warfare]. As intelligence officers, we make up issues, and we disseminate them in the press, radio or television. We treat them as if they are real. When they are already widespread, usually people will talk about them and they tend to add to and exaggerate the issues. Finally, the issues will come back [to the intelligence bodies] in reports. What is so funny is that these

peaceful street scenes: women selling produce in markets, motorcycles going by on New Order built roads and so forth.

¹⁶¹ Ariel Heryanto, 'Where communism never dies', *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 2 (2) 1999, p156.

reports incline us to believe that these issues are real, hahaha. In fact, we get terrified and begin to think, 'what if these issues are real?' Hahaha.¹⁶²

The regime may initially engage in psy-war, however, they cannot readily control the effects that these simulacra, or images that precede the real, may have, even upon themselves. Heryanto continues:

the Communist threat was not, or not primarily and immediately, an easy instrument of political deception and manipulation on the part of state officials to repress opposition or to enhance power and promote vested interests. These statements, narratives and practices occasionally claim a life of their own, quite independent of the speaking subjects' material interests.¹⁶³

Particularly as the New Order regime progressed, the discourse on separatists may have taken on a life of its own, even to the agents of the regime. This is particularly likely considering that this discourse fit well with other dominant discourses of the regime. The following section will now discuss the way in which one of these discourses - that of development - played in supporting the existence of the discourse on separatists.

Development

Plethora authors have noted the centrality of development (*pembangunan*) to the New Order regime's conception of itself¹⁶⁴. President Soeharto was named Father of

¹⁶² *Jakarta-Jakarta*, 'Sutopo Yuwono', 5-11 June 1993, cited in Heryanto, 'Where communism never dies', p155-6.

¹⁶³ Ariel Heryanto, 'Where communism never dies', p157.

¹⁶⁴ See for example Heryanto, 'The Development of "Development"', *Indonesia*, 46 1988, p11-24; Hooker, 'New Order Language in Context' in Hooker (ed) *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia*, Oxford

Development, the New Order also called itself the Development Order, all cabinets during the New Order regime have been called Development Cabinets¹⁶⁵. Heryanto writes:

Pembangunan, which since the beginning of its history in Indonesia ... has been linked to the concept of "modernisation", not only works at renovating the life of society, but also opposes, rejects and eradicates (on a small or large scale, openly or not) anything which is considered "traditional" or "anti-modernisation".¹⁶⁶

This renovation of the life of society provides for an essential role for state instruments of power to maintain the prerequisites of development - stability and order¹⁶⁷.

This discourse of development supports the existence of the discourse on separatists. In their susceptibility to representation, these territories also become the objectified subjects of Indonesian knowledge and guidance. This is particularly evident for Papua and East Timor. The distinction between 'real'¹⁶⁸ parts of Indonesia and territories within Indonesia upon which development is exercised is symptomatic of the form of nationalism that Anderson highlights as dominant in New Order Indonesia¹⁶⁹. Under this nationalism,

University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993; van Langenberg, 'Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords Approach', *RIMA*, 20 (2) 1986, p1-47.

¹⁶⁵ Heryanto, 'The Development of "Development"', p11.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p22.

¹⁶⁷ van Langenberg, 'Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords Approach', p19.

¹⁶⁸ On the point of a power relation between 'real' Indonesians (Anderson's term) and East Timorese, consider the comments of an East Timorese about his conversations with East Timorese students studying in Indonesian universities, quoted by Anderson:

He told me that what really enrages East Timorese students is that they are always being told how ungrateful they are. 'Look at all we have done for you! Where is your gratitude?' is what they hear day in day out from deans, professors, fellow students and so forth.' [Benedict Anderson, 'Imagining East Timor', *Arena magazine*, April-May 1993, p25.]

¹⁶⁹ Benedict Anderson, 'Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future', *Indonesia* 67 1999, pp1-11.

Indonesia is viewed not as a common project, but as an inheritance, which can thus be possessed and must be preserved¹⁷⁰. In the context of the centralised state of the New Order, Anderson continues, the Acehnese in Aceh and Papuans in Papua become an inconvenience, rather than people to be negotiated with or to join in a common project¹⁷¹. This others the people of these provinces. It is beyond question that Indonesians, who develop, must exercise their power to develop upon East Timor and Papua, who need to be developed¹⁷². This othering has also made it possible to kill people in these territories for the sake of the Indonesian nation, as discussed in the context of normative depictions in Chapter 1.

The integration of East Timor and Papua presented two challenges to Indonesia: to develop these 'backward' provinces; and to secure (or consolidate) their political allegiance to Indonesia. Repeated reference is made to the former of these two challenges. President Soeharto made special mention of this challenge as it applied to East Timor in his 1976 Independence Day Address¹⁷³. However no statement expresses the manner in which the Indonesian elite perceived their role than this comment by a member of the Indonesian delegation that visited East Timor prior to the ratification of integration:

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p4.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p4-5.

¹⁷² And by implication, are incapable of developing themselves.

¹⁷³ But our foreign and internal challenge is not finished. Internally, a task of development awaits in East Timor, which at the moment is backward as a result of a long period of colonisation. [*Tetapi tugas kita ke dalam dan ke luar belum berakhir di sini. Ke dalam, tugas pembangunan telah menunggu di Timor Timur yang saat ini dalam keadaan terbelakang karena penjajahan yang panjang.*] (Soeharto, *Amanat kenegaraan : kumpulan pidato kenegaraan di depan Sidang Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 1967 - 1985*, Inti Idayu Press, Jakarta, 1985, p207.

'I am not an agricultural expert. But the land in East Timor looks barren. It contains a lot of calcium. As such, you could perhaps grow teak, pine, acacia and other crops - perhaps corn. Also it would be best to construct an irrigation system like in Taiwan. That is by constructing a reservoir on top of a mountain to store rain water, which can then be channeled as necessary. Also we should get Indonesian volunteers in here,' said Imron Rosyadi, touching upon the plans for development that he had already started to visualise. Whereas, his impressions on life in East Timor were as follows: 'To see the East Timorese people makes me ask myself, "What is it that people here live for?" It is as if they do not have an aim in life. They are like objects. The meaning of life is just to live. As such, after integration, everything will have to be started afresh from ABC, in all fields of development. It will be incredibly burdensome. But no matter how burdensome it is, we must bear it for the sake of humanity.'^{174/175}

When resistance became endemic, it was development that was highlighted as the area requiring improvement. Several sources highlight inappropriate strategies of development as the cause of disquiet in these territories; Djopari suggests that the Indonesian

¹⁷⁴ Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p683. [*Saya bukan ahli pertanian. Tapi tanah di Timor Timur memang tampak tandus. Banyak mengandung kapur. Karenanya, yang bisa ditumbuhkan di sana mungkin pohonjati, pinus, accasia dan palawija seperti jagung. Selain itu sistem irigasi sebaiknya dibuat seperti di Taiwan. Yaitu dibuat waduk di atas gunung untuk menampung air hujan, kemudian secara terencana dialirkan seperlunya. Tenaga Butsi supaya dikerahkan juga ke sana,' demikian Imron Rosyadi menyinggung tentang perencanaan pembangunan yang sudah mulai dipikirkannya. Sedangkan kesannya mengenai kehidupan di sana, diungkapkan sbb: 'Melihat penduduk Timor Timur, saya bertanya dalam hati. Orang di sana sebenarnya hidup untuk apa? Seolah-olah mereka tidak mempunyai tujuan hidup. Seperti barang saja. Artinya hidup sekedar untuk hidup. Sebab itu, setelah integrasi nanti, seluruhnya harus dimulai dari ABC lagi, di semua bidang pembangunan. Sungguh berat. Tetapi betapapun beratnya harus kita pikul demi perikemanusiaan'.]*

¹⁷⁵ The similarity to Lord Cromer's comments on Britain's 'obligation' to Egypt some 60 years earlier, as quoted in Said, *Orientalism*, p37 is too striking to pass by:

But it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race, without any reference to any real or supposed advantage which may accrue to England as a nation.

government appeal to Papuans not through common colonial experience but through the promise of development:

An appropriate theme that the people of Papua would accept is that of 'left-behindness' or a theme of 'backwardness', as these are themes that really match up with the real situation and experiences in Papua.¹⁷⁶

The implications for separatists are manifold. It has left them exposed to accusations of being ungrateful, or of being unaware that the problems of which they complain are commonplace. The relation of development places all East Timorese and Papuans in a position of permanent inferiority; the implications for separatists, who are portrayed as destructive deviants from the process of development, are even more serious¹⁷⁷. As mentioned above, development seeks to eradicate any elements opposed to modernisation. This creates a further implication of the frequent use of '*sis*a-*sis*a' (remnants) (see Chapter 1) in reference to separatist movements¹⁷⁸. These separatists, marginalised by this discourse of development, are the remnants of a pre-modern, non-rational state of affairs, and as such are to be swept away.

The primacy of development, and the imperative for this development to be carried out by Indonesia, in turn allows for a physical presence to be established in these territories in the form of the deployment of a legion of development experts. This was achieved under

¹⁷⁶ Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, p161. [*Tema yang tepat dan dapat diterima oleh orang Irian Jaya adalah tema 'ketertinggalan' atau tema 'keterbelakangan' karena tema ini benar-benar tepat dengan pengalaman dan keadaan nyata di Irian Jaya.*]

¹⁷⁷ The factor of destructive, anti-development activities applies equally to separatists in Aceh. Aceh does not fit well with much of the preceding discussion of development. Aceh became part of Indonesia at the nation's inception in 1945.

the guise of a 'territorial operation' from ABRI. This territorial operation 'provides guidance to local inhabitants, from teaching to planting rice to providing charitable labour.'¹⁷⁹ Importantly, the promotion of the territorial operation allows ABRI to maintain a greater presence in these territories, without jeopardising the claim that only very few separatists remain¹⁸⁰. Through this guidance, the allegiance of the local inhabitants is gained¹⁸¹, thwarting the separatists:

They carry out their activities in the city, whispering in people's ears. Why? Because in the villages their message isn't wanted. It has been thwarted by our territorial operation.¹⁸²

Where the territorial operation has not had success - in the cities - this is not cause to question the regime of truth, but rather to gain more knowledge to determine how the operation may be made to succeed:

knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.¹⁸³

Challenges

¹⁷⁸ Thanks to Amrih Widodo for suggesting this point.

¹⁷⁹ *Tempo*, 'Letupan Kecil di Gudang Isu', 21 (37) 1991, p29. [melakukan bimbingan pada penduduk setempat, mulai dari mengajar menanam padi sampai kerja bakti.]

¹⁸⁰ See for example *Kompas*, 'Kekuatan OPM tidak Berarti', 7 January 1999, where a military commander is asked whether troops will be withdrawn from Papua: "If I withdrew them, who would help society, for example teaching and undertaking other governmental tasks?" ["Kalau saya tarik, siapa yang akan membantu masyarakat, misalnya mengajar dan melaksanakan tugas pemerintahan lainnya."]

¹⁸¹ Cf Said, *Orientalism*, p37.

¹⁸² *Tempo*, 'Virus itu Sudah Terjadi', 21 (39) 1991, p24-25. [Mereka melakukan kegiatan di kota, kasak-kusuk. Kenapa? Karena di hutan dan desa-desa sudah tak laku. Sudah terlindas oleh operasi teritorial kita.]

¹⁸³ Said, *Orientalism*, p36.

Although many historical conditions supported the dominance of this discourse on separatists, it should not be imagined that the discourse was uniform, monolithic and unchallenged. Dissent had to be conducted from a position of weakness in a heavily skewed power relation, but was possible. Challenges to the dominant discourse could take two forms: statements that subvert the dominant discourse itself, and action on the part of separatists in a fashion that would inevitably be covered by the media. Both these forms of dissent are influenced by a particularity to this discourse on separatists, in contrast to many other areas of dissent, many of these challenges come from the audience, and particularly not the target, of the discourse¹⁸⁴.

Unfortunately, for a paper compiled without the opportunity to conduct fieldwork, much of the dissenting material produced under conditions of state surveillance is necessarily ephemeral, and thus rarely becomes a part of Australian library resources. Leaflets, seminars and demonstrations are thus difficult to trace and discuss. Also, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how the discourse on separatists may have been reinterpreted in private discussions, beyond the gaze of state surveillance. However, some instances of challenges to the dominant discourse on separatists can still be traced.

The problem of separatist movements does not seem to have been of central concern to activists prior to the 1990s. The problem is not mentioned in the published court defence speeches of student activists from 1978¹⁸⁵: ASIET¹⁸⁶ and *Kompas*¹⁸⁷ suggest that the first

¹⁸⁴ This, I believe, reduces the relevance of Heryanto's suggestion of hyper-obedience as one of the main forms of subversion of New Order hegemonic discourse. See Ariel Heryanto, 'Where Communism Never Dies', p163-166.

¹⁸⁵ See for example, Heri Akhmadi, *Mendobrak Belunggu Penindasan Rakyat Indonesia*, LBH & KPM-DM-ITB, 1979; Lukman Hakim, *Kudengar Indonesia Memanggil*, BKS-PMI, Jakarta, 1980. Some

instance of a joint demonstration involving East Timorese and Indonesians occurred on 7 December 1995, despite earlier supportive statements by some pro-democracy groups. However, such demonstrations did not pose a significant challenge to the dominant discourse, as those involved had no access to the media reporting of their actions.

Dissent could also be conducted through email lists and web sites such as *Tempo Interaktif*. A number of interviews with Xanana Gusmao were published on email groups such as *Kabar dari Pijar* during the 1990s. Caution should be exercised in considering the impact of such challenges to the discourse. Public internet access points only became available in Indonesia in 1996, and estimated usage of the internet in the late stages of the Soeharto regime is only about 50,000 to 100,000 people¹⁸⁸. Hill and Sen correctly note that 'the definition of the internet in Indonesia as a political medium has been determined ... by the political agency of a section of Indonesian society'¹⁸⁹. On the whole, the internet circulates political information only to those who are already challenging the dominant discourse. Usage of the internet surged after the July 1996 riots in Jakarta, when it was presumed that the national media was concealing information¹⁹⁰; there was no equivalent incident concerning separatists to arouse interest between 1996 and 1998.

Another category of challenge to the discourse on separatism is that of cultural criticism.

Hooker and Dick write:

activists in the 1990s, however, did make mention of East Timor in their defense speeches. See Siswowardjo (ed) *Xanana Gusmao: Timor Leste Merdeka Indonesia Bebas*, Solidamor, 1999, pxi.

¹⁸⁶ ASIET, *Fighting Together -Indonesians and East Timorese Join in Struggle* [www.asiet.org.au]

¹⁸⁷ *Kompas*, 'Lagi, Aksi Loncat Pagar 116 Pemuda Timor Timur', 8 December 1995, p1.

¹⁸⁸ Krishna Sen and David Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p194, 199.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p211.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p201.

So long as debate or comment which is critical of New Order policies is seen to be presented in a cultural context, it is permitted. When it extends into an area regarded as political, however, it is censored.¹⁹¹

One example of a culturally phrased challenge to the discourse on separatism is the *Saksi Mata* (Eyewitness) collection of short stories written by Seno Gumira Ajidarma. This set of short stories, written during a period when Ajidarma was suspended from editing the weekly *Jakarta Jakarta* magazine, serve to undermine many of the truth claims of the discourse on separatism. However, this intervention can not be considered unequivocally as a challenge to the discourse, as Clark writes:

'Salazar' is ambivalent towards colonialism, and even goes so far as to implicitly encourage the Timorese to accept Indonesian rule as a part of a peaceful process of resolution. It is at this point that the problematics of Seno's position with regard to East Timor is most contradictory, As an Indonesian writing 'on behalf of' the Timorese, Seno poses a crucial question: is he writing for a Timorese audience or an Indonesian audience? Either way, whilst not unsympathetic towards the Timorese spirit of resistance, and the ongoing tragedy in East Timor, in its exhortation for a more acquiescent approach to Indonesian rule in East Timor, 'Salazar' treads a fine line between post-colonial and colonial literature.¹⁹²

The second form of challenge mentioned above was actions of the part of separatists themselves. Two prominent examples, that attracted international and Indonesian

¹⁹¹ Virginia Hooker & Howard Dick, 'Introduction' in Hooker ed, *Society and Culture in New Order Indonesia*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p5.

¹⁹² Marshall Clark, *Imaging East Timor: Post-Colonialism and Identity in the Short Stories of Seno Gumira Ajidarma*, Unpublished Subthesis Towards Bachelor of Asian Studies (Indonesian) (Hons), ANU, 1996, p72.

attention, are the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre and the 134-day hostage incident in Mapnduma, Papua in 1995. In these cases, rather than cover up the occurrence of these incidents, the regime represented them on their own terms within the discourse on separatists. In the case of the Santa Cruz massacre, the incident was criminalised, while an inquiry was launched and senior officers removed from their commands to emphasise that the state had dealt with the incident. News reports at the time, reporting government statements, and some subsequent accounts, depicted the influence as a case of foreign engineering to entrap the military. Whereas the hostage incident became a stage for Prabowo, Soeharto's ambitious son-in-law, to demonstrate the proficiency of his elite Kopassus unit.

Such activities often attracted significant coverage in the international media, some of which could be expected to circulate back to Indonesia. The media periodically carried statements that attempted to undermine the credibility of these reports.

National press reports, he continued, were very important to balance the reportage of the foreign press, which tended to dramatise the riots in East Timor, thus resulting in an impression inside Indonesia that facts were being covered up.¹⁹³

The integrity of international organisations was also questioned; for instance, this attack on Amnesty International:

¹⁹³ *Kompas*, 'Instruksi Presiden Soeharto tentang Insiden Timtim: Penanganan Dilakukan dengan Cermat dan Dikoordinasikan Sebaik-baiknya', 18 November 1991, p1. [*Laporan pers nasional itu, lanjutnya,*

When asked whether Amnesty International should be viewed as a sensational organisation, Ambassador Marpaung stressed that on several points the Amnesty International report was not balanced ... resultantly the seriousness of Amnesty was doubtful.¹⁹⁴

Conversely, these statements by implication asserted that those statements within the discourse on separatism were *the* truth.

In conclusion, many of the historical conditions that supported the existence of this discourse related to the power to represent exercised by the New Order regime. This is not to suggest that all texts within the discourse were produced by the regime, or that those who wrote about separatists were its willing lackeys. However, the control that the New Order was able to exercise over the availability of information, and the effects of other elements of the regime's project of ideological dominance, influenced the sorts of questions that were likely to be asked about separatists, even by the regime itself. Obviously, critical scholarship was still conducted. However, where dissent occurred, the regime was able to apply more direct mechanisms of control to ensure that this dissent received minimal media coverage, was expressed in cultural terms and was very risky for those who chose to undertake it. In addition, the position of the dissenter could itself be ambiguous, as a part of the Indonesian audience of the discourse.

sangat penting untuk mengimbangi pemberitaan pers asing yang cenderung mendramatisasi kerusuhan di Timtim, sehingga ada kesan di dalam negeri bahwa ada fakta-fakta yang ditutup-tutupi.]

¹⁹⁴ *Sinar Harapan*, 'Laporan Amnesty Internasional ttg Timtim Dianggap Bohong di Australia', 1 July 1985, p1. [Ditanya apakah Amnesty Internasional dipandang sebagai suatu organisasi yang bersifat sensasional, Dubes Marpaung menegaskan laporan Amnesty International dalam beberapa hal tidak berimbang ... sehingga disangsikan kesungguhan Amnesty.]

However, despite the many effects of its project of domination and the physical coercive aspects of its governance, the Soeharto regime was toppled in May 1998, following three months of sustained student demonstrations. Following the president's resignation, some Indonesians have attempted to dismantle many of the hegemonic discourses of the New Order. Chapter 3 will now examine how this process applies to the discourse on separatists.

Chapter 3: After Soeharto

Soeharto's resignation was followed almost instantly by a re-evaluation of many of the hegemonic discourses and political structures of the New Order regime. The question of centre-periphery relations has not escaped this process, and this has resulted in an explosion in the amount written about Aceh, East Timor and to a lesser extent Papua, and in turn about the separatist movements active in these territories. This huge increase applies particularly to media coverage, but also books and pamphlets. Pressures for reform have also manifested themselves in government policy. Under the transitional Habibie government, Aceh's status as a Military Operations Area (DOM) was revoked on 7 August 1998¹⁹⁵; autonomy, and then a second option of a process leading to independence were offered to the East Timorese and a referendum held, although Habibie refused to entertain demands for independence of Papua. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's fourth president, policy has vacillated. On the one hand, Wahid has apologised to East Timorese for human rights abuses, and has broached the possibility of holding a referendum in Aceh, while also allowing a Papua congress to be held from 29 May - 3 June 2000. His government also signed a memorandum of understanding with GAM in Geneva on 12 May 2000¹⁹⁶. But conversely, he then retreated from statement that a referendum could be held, and his government has approached the results of the Papua congress in the style of the New Order bureaucracy¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁵ *Kompas*, 'Dicabut, Status "DOM" Aceh', 8 August 1998.

¹⁹⁶ *Kompas Online*, 'Government and GAM Sign Note of Humanitarian Understanding', 13 May 2000.

¹⁹⁷ See, for example, *detik.com*, 'Disusupi Negara Asing: Pemerintah Kecam Kongres Papua', [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2000/05/31/2000531-132309.shtml].

Also significant for our discussion of the discourse on separatists is the greater provision for freedom of speech and expression. This freedom is not absolute, as some observers have exuberantly stated, but it is extensive. This has allowed for a greater range of often contradictory statements to be made about separatists. Significantly, interviews with separatists and quotes from separatists in media articles are no longer taboo (indeed in an interview concerning Aceh, *D&R* juxtaposed responses from a military officer and a GAM member¹⁹⁸). One way of considering the discourse on separatists after Soeharto's resignation is not to say that it has become more diverse, but rather to conceive of a number of discourses on separatists in contestation for dominance. This has been accompanied by the emergence of more plural movements voicing separatists demands¹⁹⁹. Within each of these discursive formations, the truth claims of the competing discourses may remain non-sensical. It is worth noting that a more open contestation between discourses not mean that these discourses are on even footing.

A comprehensive discussion of the immense amount of material that has been produced in the two and a half years since Soeharto resigned is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, and probably beyond the scope of any one individual. Each day a new development occurs, or a statement is made that is worthy of attention. Instead, returning to my starting point for this thesis - the reaction of sections of the Indonesian public to the East Timor ballot - I intend to outline how much of the re-evaluation of the problem of Aceh, East Timor and Papua after May 1998 has been ambiguous in its effect on separatists. In fact, I will contend that many of these new texts, particularly national

¹⁹⁸ See *D&R*, 'GAM dan TNI tentang Aceh Merdeka', 7-12 June 1999, p52.

¹⁹⁹ Although to maintain a sharper focus, this paper will not discuss these new movements in any detail.

media reports, do not challenge many of the devices of the New Order discourse on separatists and separatism. However, to deny that significantly different statements are being made about separatists would be a contrivance; as such, I will also briefly trace some of these new statements. This chapter is less detailed than Chapter 1: I have tried to avoid rehashing the detail of this previous discussion, as many of the devices below continue to operate in a similar manner.

Persistence of New Order Discursive Devices

The strong pressures for reform in Indonesia after Soeharto's resignation have led to a perceived dichotomy in Indonesian politics, between '*unsur-unsur pro status quo*' (pro status quo elements) and those who support reform. The military, corrupt officials and politicians, and more or less anyone opposed to any of the various agendas of those who pursue reform have been lumped into the pro-status quo group. It is perhaps not particularly surprising that some of the discursive devices from the New Order persist in statements made by those who would be grouped among the supporters of the status quo. While I will make some mention of these figures in the following discussion, I wish to focus more on instances where the re-evaluation of the problems of Aceh, East Timor and Papua have not challenged the discourse on separatists that dominated under the New Order. To keep the discussion relatively brief, I will focus on the use of several tags discussed in Chapter 1 as familiar categories, namely GPK, foreign puppets and a 'new' category, '*provokator*' (agent provocateur). I will also look at the question of human rights, as, particularly for Aceh, it is from this standpoint that much of the new material has been written.

GPK

The use of GPK has declined, but not ceased, after Soeharto's resignation. It is not uncommon for Fretilin, GAM and OPM to be discussed without the use of GPK at all, and those who continue to use GPK to describe contemporary events are typically military officers and government officials who served during the Soeharto regime. However, there are several points that warrant discussion before GPK is consigned to history.

The most common context within which GPK has been used after Soeharto's resignation is when authors are criticising the use of the term during the New Order regime's rule. A notable example was General Wiranto's instruction at the time of the revocation of Aceh's DOM status that the armed forces no longer use 'GPK Aceh'; Al-Chaidar echoed this demand²⁰⁰.

"I am not willing for a small group of unsavoury GPK to bear the name Aceh, which is so great and revered. GPK must now be called wild chaos-causing mob (GPL) or GPK with the name of their leader," stressed Wiranto, who was again greeted with thunderous applause.²⁰¹

Other accounts problematise the use of GPK during the New Order as a tag with which to intimidate anyone and everyone in Papua, East Timor and Aceh. These statements do perhaps limit the use of GPK, however, their effect on separatists is not necessarily

²⁰⁰ Al-Chaidar et al, *Aceh Bersimbah Darah*, Pustaka Al-Kautsar, Jakarta, 1998, p75.

²⁰¹ *Kompas*, 'Dicabut, Status "DOM" Aceh' 8 August 1998. ["Saya tidak rela sekelompok kecil GPK yang tidak baik tersebut membawa nama Aceh yang demikian agung dan mulia. GPK saat ini harus disebut gerakan pengacau liar (GPL) atau GPK lain sesuai nama pemimpinnya," tegas Wiranto, yang kembali disambut gemuruh tepuk tangan.]

positive. The problem is that in criticising the use of GPK to criminalise dissatisfied or dissenting groups in these three territories, many texts do not undermine the logic that this tag is still appropriate for separatists. Wiranto's statement quoted above is a particularly pronounced example of this, I have provided two further examples to clarify this phenomenon:

His field observations indicate that those called GPK (security disturbing mob) Aceh by the security forces were basically the common people, who had no intention of revolting against the government, let alone seceding from Indonesia.²⁰²

The people who demanded justice, greater participation and involvement in the political process, or who refused repression and human rights abuses were labeled GPK (security disturbing mob) by the army, or GPL (wild chaos-causing mob), or "anti-integration" for the East Timorese who rejected Indonesian occupation.

Ironically, the Habibie regime has continued these subjective state perspectives The government treats members of society who demand justice as criminal offenders.²⁰³

I have included the second quote as a far less pronounced example than the first: the author implicitly includes separatists within the group of people who have been wronged

²⁰² *Kompas*, 'Sujud Syukur atas pencabutan "DOM"', 10 August 1998. [Pemantauannya di lapangan menunjukkan bahwa yang disebut GPK (gerakan pengacau keamanan) Aceh oleh aparat keamanan pada dasarnya adalah rakyat biasa, yang sama sekali tidak berkehendak memberontak pada pemerintah, apalagi memisahkan diri dari RI.]

²⁰³ Syamsudin Haris, 'Demokrasi, Otonomi daerah dan Integrasi Nasional' in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?*, Erlangga, Jakarta, 1999, p304. [Rakyat yang menuntut keadilan, keterlibatan dan partisipasi lebih luas dalam proses politik, atau menolak represi dan tindak pelanggaran HAM oleh tentara dicap sebagai GPK (gerakan pengacau keamanan), GPL (gerakan pengacau liar), atau "anti integrasi" bagi rakyat Timor Timur yang menolak pendudukan oleh Indonesia. Ironisnya, perspektif subyektif negara seperti itu masih dilanjutkan oleh rezim Habibie dewasa ini Pemerintah malah memperlakukan anggota masyarakat yang menuntut keadilan sebagai pelaku tindak kriminal.]

by being considered criminal, however he is only able to do this by expressing their aspirations in non-separatist terms.

A similar phenomenon applies to texts that criticise the use of GPK as an excuse for the military to repress whoever they chose. The continual examples of people who are not members of these movements being killed or tortured during the New Order often do nothing to undermine the "truth" that the use of fatal force against these movements is justified. At the same time, military figures have continued to make statements that explicitly emphasise that military action must be taken. The Aceh Region Police Chief explained that his police were unable to use force because they might also injure civilians [who, unlike the guerrillas are not legitimate targets]; the second example below is even more direct.

"They carry out provocation, creating the impression that the people are protecting them. When we pursue them with some force, they herd people to make a shield. As a consequence, when an incident occurs, it is the people who fall victim."²⁰⁴

"If they have declared independence, and said that this government is their government, that they have leaders and strength, then we must completely eradicate them," said [Head of TNI Information Centre] Sudrajat.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kapolda Aceh: Sulit Memisahkan Anggota GAM dari Masyarakat', 31 October 1999. ["Mereka melakukan provokasi, sehingga terkesan rakyat melindungi mereka. Ketika kita memburu dengan sedikit keras, rakyat yang digiring untuk menjadi tameng. Akibatnya, ketika terjadi insiden, rakyatlah yang justru menjadi korban,"]

²⁰⁵ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kapuspen: TNI akan Sikat Habis Separatisme', 2 December 1999. ["Kalau mereka sudah menyatakan merdeka, dan sudah mengatakan pemerintahnya itu pemerintah mereka, ada pemimpinnya dan kekuatannya, maka itu harus kita sikat habis," kata Sudrajat.]

Foreign Pawns

Possibly as a result of the economic crisis, which led to IMF intervention in Indonesia, there has been a renewed suspicion of foreign involvement in separatist activity in Indonesia. Often, this suspicion is voiced in the form of a fully-fledged international conspiracy to dismantle Indonesia. The foreign parties responsible are often left unnamed, but when they are specified, the parties fingered include the USA²⁰⁶, Australia²⁰⁷, the UK²⁰⁸, the Netherlands, but also Malaysia and Singapore²⁰⁹, Osama Bin Laden, Libya²¹⁰, the Taliban and the Patani Freedom Movement²¹¹. These suspicions have also probably been heightened by the role of the United Nations and international community, through Unamet, Interfet and Untaet²¹², in the East Timor referendum.

Those alleging foreign involvement are also diverse, and include prominent politicians such as Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid and Alwi Shihab; various military sources; activists; academics and other authors of books on the territories involved; and journalists. Often, the allegations of foreign involvement do not directly mention separatists, but through their assertion that Indonesia is being forced to accept separatists

²⁰⁶ For example Dhuroruddin Mashad and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, '*Berbagai Faktor Separatisme di Irian Jaya*', in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?*, Erlangga, Jakarta, 1999, p215-6.

²⁰⁷ Particularly with reference to the East Timor ballot.

²⁰⁸ For example *Gatra*, '*Awas, perang saudara...*' (42) 4 September 1999, p66.

²⁰⁹ Al-Chaidar, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, Madani Press, Jakarta, 1999, p202.

²¹⁰ There are many references to Libya. Just a couple of examples are Al-Chaidar, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, p182-3; Syamsumar Dam and Erni Budiwanti, '*Aceh, Otonomi atau Merdeka*' in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?*, p57.

²¹¹ Al-Chaidar, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, p200 (quoting Dewi Fortuna Anwar, foreign affairs adviser to former President B.J. Habibie).

²¹² Unamet (United Nations Mission in East Timor) - the UN body that administered the Timor ballot; Interfet (International Forces - East Timor) - Peacekeeping force that preceded the subsequent UN peacekeepers; Untaet (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) - UN body that oversees the transition to independence.

solutions as a *fait accompli*, undermine the need to consider separatist demands as legitimate, as discussed in Chapter 1.

This question of foreign interference and intervention is particularly interesting in the light of East Timor's secession from Indonesia. One of the key differences between East Timor, Aceh and Papua is the constant international support and attention that East Timor received²¹³. Thus, although international support may be necessary for a successful separatist campaign and forms an element of the strategy of separatists, it is also a core element of the discrediting depiction of them.

Provokator

During the New Order, the government propagated the idea of nameless groups, organisations and individuals being behind incidents of unrest. Riots were often attributed to unknown groups of people, usually not locals, or to '*dalang*' (puppetmaster). Following the demise of the New Order, the term '*dalang*' was displaced by two terms: '*provokator*' (agent provocateur) and '*pihak ketiga*' (third party), each of which became particularly prominent during 1998. The marked increase in their use related to violence at student protests, riots in Jakarta and elsewhere, and also the Banyuwangi killings in East Java. These two related terms have since gained wide currency in the explanation of many incidents of unrest throughout Indonesia, often with the insinuation that pro-Soeharto elements are attempting to undermine the new regime. The notion of '*provokator*' has also allowed the government and military to absolve themselves of responsibility for

repressive violence. It is not surprising that these terms have come to be used in reference to the problem of separatists as well.

My cautious impression is that the use of '*provokator*' and '*pihak ketiga*' in the context of separatism arose, or at least became much more prominent, only in late 1998 and then subsequently continued throughout 1999 and beyond. The term has been used by politicians, military figures, human rights groups and by separatists themselves. It is used in relation to all of Papua, East Timor and Aceh, although its use may be more prominent in reference to Aceh. Some examples are provided below²¹⁴:

Ibrahim also indicated that various riots in Aceh have involved certain parties who want to destroy the image of GAM and ABRI.²¹⁵

The Regional Police Chief's statement concurs with the statement of the National Commission on Human Rights, made some time ago in Jakarta, that there is the force of an invisible hand in Aceh, namely a third party who are disturbing the situation in the region and making it worse.²¹⁶

²¹³ This difference is highlighted in the contestation between these territories for attention and a resolution; for example, Al-Chaidar asserts that the UN will not take an interest in Aceh because it is a majority Islam territory. (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, p199)

²¹⁴ See also *Kompas*, 'Kapolda: Banyak Preman Medan Menyamar Jadi Anggota GAM', 24 December 1999; *Suara Pembaruan*, '13 Warga Sipil Terbunuh di Timtim', 12 April 1999; Al Chaidar, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, p193, 200.

²¹⁵ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'TNI Tak Lemah Tangani GAM', 14 May 1999. [*Ibrahim juga menengarai berbagai kerusuhan di Aceh telah melibatkan pihak-pihak tertentu yang ingin merusak citra ABRI dan GAM.*]

²¹⁶ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Kapolda Aceh: Ada Pihak Lain yang Mengobok-obok Aceh' 26 August 1999. [*Penegasan Kapolda ini senada dengan apa yang pernah dikatakan Komnas Ham, beberapa waktu lalu di Jakarta, bahwa ada kekuatan invisible hand di Aceh, yaitu pihak ketiga yang mengacaukan situasi di daerah itu menjadi lebih buruk.*]

"As such, I appeal to all of the West Papuan people to not take violent actions which will disadvantage their own society, and to remain vigilant against the interference of a third party," he [Moses Weror, Head of the OPM Revolutionary Council] said.²¹⁷

Speaking about the provocateurs who are suspected to have also infiltrated Sumatra, the Regional Military Commander felt that the issue should not be built up too much. "Provocateurs need not come from one area to another. Local inhabitants can also become provocateurs."²¹⁸

Once again without considering whether or not there are third parties in operation, these terms have various effects in the context of discourses on separatists. From the point of view of its use by separatists themselves, it is an important device to absolve themselves of violence that they may not have committed. However, conversely, whether an action or individual is a separatist or a provocateur is determined by military investigation, allowing the military to continue to arbitrarily criminalise dissent. It also allows the military to explain away violent acts that they commit, as perpetrated or incited by provocateurs and third parties. The impression that third parties are at large also makes separatist activity seem unwise, as it is open to exploitation and manipulation by these provocateurs - a similar line of argument was used in reference to mass mobilisation by the student movement.

²¹⁷ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pengibaran Bendera Papua Barat Didukung Luar Negeri', 23 November 1999. ["Oleh karena itu, saya mengharapkan pada seluruh rakyat Papua Barat agar tidak melakukan aksi-aksi kekerasan yang akan merugikan masyarakat itu sendiri, serta tetap mewaspadaai adanya campur tangan pihak ketiga," katanya.]

²¹⁸ *Republika*, 'Pangdam Bukit Barisan: Aceh Masih Perlu Penanganan Serius', 25 February 1999, p3. [Mengenai masalah provokator yang diduga menyusup pula ke Sumatera, menurut Pangdam jangan terlalu dibesar-besarkan. "Provokator itu tidak harus dari suatu daerah ke daerah lain. Penduduk lokal saja bisa jadi provokator,"]

Human Rights

One of the core areas of attention of the reform process has been human rights abuses committed during the New Order. Numerous NGOs have been established to deal with this problem; a number of them deal specifically with Aceh, East Timor and Papua respectively. The concern about human rights has focused great attention on these territories²¹⁹, and prompted stern criticism of the Soeharto government and the military. These human rights abuses are often identified as a legitimate gripe on the part of the local societies, and as the cause of the demands for secession from these territories²²⁰.

Although human rights NGOs have for example been active in supporting a referendum in Aceh, the attention to human rights has not necessarily meant that supports for separatists has increased. Many groups perceive the movements considered, each of which has armed wings, as part of the problem²²¹, and highlight the human rights abuses committed by or related to these movements; some texts produced as a part of this attention to human rights have assumed the depiction of separatists from the New Order largely unchanged²²².

²¹⁹ The first flood of media reports about Aceh in 1998 concerned human rights abuses committed during the ten years that Aceh was under Military Operations Area status (1989-1998); perhaps lesser scrutiny has been afforded within Indonesia to East Timor and Papua.

²²⁰ See, for example, Dhuroruddin Mashad and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 'Berbagai Faktor Separatisme di Irian Jaya', in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?*, p192; Paul Tickell, 'Old Language, new Politics: Indonesia/n and its Discontents' in *Rethinking Indonesia*, Crawford House, forthcoming.

²²¹ For example, *Simak dan selamatkan Aceh* p40; *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Marzuki: Akhiri, Persepsi GAM sebagai Simbol Perlawanan Rakyat Aceh', 21 December 1999; Dhuroruddin Mashad and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti 'Berbagai Faktor Separatisme di Irian Jaya', in *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?, kasus Aceh, Riau, Irian Jaya dan Timor Timur*, p197.

²²² A good example of a text that challenges human rights abuses, but leaves New Order assertions about separatists unchallenged is *Aceh Bersimbah Darah*, compiled by Al-Chaidar et al in late 1998. Much of this text is devoted to detailing human rights abuses, however, several sections are devoted to a discussion of separatists (who are almost without exception referred to as GPK), particularly 'Mengapa Aceh Dicurigai sebagai Kaum Separatis?'. The authors characterise GPK as separate from society (p71, 75), and appeal for them to take part in productive development (p75); stress that they need to be made aware (*disadarkan*) to

At this point, I must stress that I am not advocating an idealised image of these movements. They have and in some cases continue to commit abuses of human rights, and in some instances, have admitted as much²²³. However, in attempting to explain why one set of pressures - the criticism of the government and military over their human rights abuses in Aceh, Papua and East Timor - do not necessarily lead to another, it is important to consider the function that these accounts of separatist atrocities may have within the contemporary Indonesian context. Much of the discussion of these territories has taken place within a defensive context - the Indonesian military has tried to defend its role in the territories, while sections of the Indonesian public have felt cornered by accounts that the international media largely ignores violence by separatists (which it does) and relentlessly criticises Indonesia. Within this context, examples of violence by these movements are particularly attractive a powerful tool to assert that this stream of criticism is a fallacy.

A final point to note is that it is of course entirely possible to approach the problem of human rights abuses without questioning the discourse of national unity, a brief account of which is provided in the appendix to this thesis. Remembering that human rights abuses committed during the New Order are often depicted as the cause of demands for secession, a logical consequence has been that if the human rights abuses can be dealt

return to the true path (p76); contends that those people who support them have not received true information (p70), and must also be made aware (p223); and, in addition to '*pembinaan*' (guidance) of the GPK (p250), identify correctable mistakes in development as the basis of the problem of revolt (p231, 250); the revolt and separatism are however nonsense (p233). They reiterate word for word Wiranto's order that GPK Aceh no longer be used, and also include the challenge to GPK in that it has been used incorrectly as an arbitrary instrument of repression.

with, the demands for secession need not seriously be entertained. Addressing this problem of human rights may then delay or even remove the need to address the problem of separatist intentions. This quote from Amien Rais, who has vocally opposed independence for the three territories considered, is a good example of the role that this discourse of national unity may play.

The MPR Chairperson Amien Rais stated, It would be very difficult to meet the demands of societies in Aceh and Papua to establish independent states, as Indonesia remained firm in its commitment to guard the wholeness of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the 1928 Youth Oath and the Indonesian Declaration of Independence 54 years ago.

Despite this, the government had to seriously address the demands for independence from Aceh and Papua by way of finding the best solution whereby Aceh and Papua would not secede from the unitary state of Indonesia.²²⁴

New Themes

To this point, I have discussed the way in which sections of the new writings on Aceh, Papua and East Timor do not undermine the New Order discourse on separatists, and may in fact use this and other discourses as basic truths in considering these territories. However, texts have also been produced which are 'new', in that they represent a

²²³ For example, Sydney Morning Herald, 'Fretilin admits its bloody past to ensure East Timor's future' May 2000.

²²⁴ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Amien Rais: Sulit Memenuhi Tuntutan Kemerdekaan Aceh dan Irian Jaya', 30 November 1999. [Ketua MPR Amien Rais menegaskan, tuntutan masyarakat Aceh dan Irian Jaya untuk mendirikan negara merdeka sangat sulit dipenuhi, karena Indonesia tetap memiliki komitmen teguh, menjaga keutuhan negara kesatuan RI sesuai Sumpah Pemuda 28 Oktober 1928 dan Proklamasi Kemerdekaan RI 54 tahun silam. Namun demikian, tuntutan kemerdekaan di Aceh dan Irian Jaya itu harus tetap ditanggapi secara serius oleh pemerintah dengan mencari solusi terbaik yang memungkinkan Aceh dan Irian Jaya tidak lepas dari negara kesatuan RI.]

discontinuity with what has previously been say-able within Indonesia. These new texts include both books and media reports²²⁵.

Indonesian translations of texts previously published in English outside Indonesia are one form of new material. Two examples, both about East Timor, are *Perang Tersembunyi*²²⁶ and *Funu: Perjuangan Timor Lorosae Belum Selesai*²²⁷. The second text is perhaps particularly notable, as it was written by Ramos Horta, who has been a particular target of depiction as a hypocrite and a terrorist, especially after receiving the Nobel Peace prize in 1996. A cautious impression is that media reports may also be more willing to refer to foreign published material than they were previously.

Another source of texts that constitute a definite break with the New Order discourse on separatists is Solidamor, a non-government organisation established in solidarity with East Timor. They have organised discussions, and published books such as *Xanana Gusmao: Timor Leste Merdeka Indonesia Bebas*. They can also be considered partly responsible for an 'human interest' article in *Suara Pembaruan* detailing a trip to meet Falantil guerillas²²⁸.

The publication of books written by Ramos Horta and containing the writing of Xanana Gusmao is indicative of perhaps the most significant new development, that of the

²²⁵ There is also a significant amount of material on the internet and circulated via email groups, however, I will devote little attention to this material, for reasons outlined in Chapter 2.

²²⁶ This is a translation of John G. Taylor, *Indonesia's forgotten war : the hidden history of East Timor*, Pluto Press, NSW, 1991. Unfortunately I was not able to locate a copy of this translation in Australia.

²²⁷ Jose Ramos Horta, *Funu: Perjuangan Timor Lorosae Belum Selesai*, Solidamor, Jakarta, 1998.

emergence of separatist voices. A book written by Hasan Tiro detailing his vision of federal democracy for Indonesia has also been republished subsequent to Soeharto's resignation²²⁹. Perhaps more significantly, separatist opinions now constitute legitimate news items, even if they occupy far less column space than other forms of news and opinion. These opinions are often strikingly at odds with Indonesian policy and indeed Indonesian versions of history. A detailed study of the content of these separatists' statements and the alternative history they promote would be of great interest; unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this particular paper²³⁰.

Another text which marks a significant departure from the previous discourse on separatists and its devices is the chapter '*Dilema Penyelesaian Kasus Timor Timur*', included in the volume *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?*. Written before the East Timor plebiscite but published after the ballot had been held, this text refers to separatists in completely neutral terms and canvasses their opinions. This in itself is a significant break with previous texts. The chapter also seeks to dismantle the conceptions upon which the New Order depiction of East Timor were founded, such as the use of communism as a strategic justification, and the basis of Indonesia's claims to sovereignty over the territory, such as the Balibo declaration, the government's ritualised use of separatists and the duality of government statements on the territory.

²²⁸ *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Pengalaman Bersama Gerilyawan Timtim', 20 February 1999. The article appears to be an edited version of an article written by Roy Pakpahan and published on the Solidamor website.

Pakpahan is both a *Suara Pembaruan* journalist and Solidamor activist.

²²⁹ Hasan Tiro, *Demokrasi untuk Indonesia*, Teplok Press, Jakarta, 1999 (2nd edition).

²³⁰ For a brief discussion of what GAM figures have said, see Paul Tickell, 'Old Language, New Politics: Indonesia/n and its Discontents'. Ed Aspinall has also researched Acehese nationalism.

Most of these examples are about East Timor. It is difficult to gauge whether this is indicative of a greater discursive shift in Indonesia in relation to this territory without the opportunity to conduct fieldwork²³¹.

This chapter then, has attempted to demonstrate the way in which pressures for reform have not necessarily equated to a re-appraisal of the problem of separatists, and more generally, separatism. In part, this is definitely attributable to the continuing validity of the discourse of national unity, which may in fact have been strengthened by the secession of East Timor. Also, in the absence of direct contact between separatists and Indonesian authors and journalists, some of the depictions of separatists constructed during the New Order have persisted.

Although any attempt to outline one general approach to the problem of separatists will no doubt collapse under the weight of specific examples, the following may be a rough summary of a common position on the problem. Papua and Aceh have a justified grievance, due to military excesses and economic exploitation. This in turn provides more latitude for a re-evaluation of the New order discourse on separatists. However, beyond East Timor, Indonesia's national unity is final, whether or not the majority of people in Aceh or Papua support independence or separatist movements. This allows a partial tolerance of separatist movements - their members should be given an amnesty, and they are tolerable in as far as they pursue human rights or other non-political ends, however, their demand for independence can never be agreed to, and they would do well to drop it

²³¹ As opposed to say, an accident of availability of materials in Australia or the focus of research.

in favour of solving the 'real' problems that these territories face, and addressing their 'real' non-political grievances, which they express in the form of separatists statements.

There are of course much 'harder line' positions on separatists, such as those that continue to be voiced in particular by some military officers. Equally, there is undoubtedly a small number of Indonesians who are able to express their voices in public, be it through access to media, discussions or the opportunity to produce published material, who are working to dismantle the New Order period discourse on separatists and the history of these territories more generally. Members of separatist movements are also increasingly able to make public statements within Indonesia that may also be at odds with accepted histories and policy positions.

As a final note, I feel I should reiterate a particular shortcoming of the approach of this chapter, and a new development that I have not adequately charted. By focusing on the way in which new texts have not necessarily dismantled the discourse on separatists, this chapter has perhaps granted undue attention purely to three of the prominent separatist movements active during the rule of the New Order regime. In part I have chosen this approach to try to keep the focus of this thesis compact. However, as briefly touched upon above, the greater freedom of expression has allowed the development of non-clandestine groups who are voicing demands for secession from Indonesia. While I have noted that several authors favour these new groups in comparison to the older movements, I have not discussed how these newer groups view GAM, Fretilin and the

OPM. This would require some fieldwork, and would be an interesting topic for further study.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted a history of the present. More specifically, it has examined the discursive background to present Indonesian attitudes on separatists. The discourse on separatists examined in this paper is not *the* cause of the present attitudes, but it enables a particular way of thinking about separatists and separatism. Other discourses also provide an important background to present attitudes; for instance, discourses of national unity, nationalism and development. However, these discourses are largely beyond the scope of this paper. This discourse on separatists helps to explain the persistence of at best ambivalent attitudes to separatists, despite what the supposed ideological bankruptcy of the Soeharto regime.

The authoritarian rule of the New Order, and the discursive hegemony of the regime, were historical conditions for the dominance of this discourse prior to Soeharto's resignation. During the New Order, this discourse on separatists cast separatists as deviants in a normative manner, where the implied norm was the loyal Indonesian citizen. It also undermined separatists' significance and credibility in several related ways. Separatists were constantly depicted as only the remnants of movements similar to other challenges that had already been dealt with. Often, authors questioned whether they really wanted to secede, without making reference to the separatists themselves. These curious deviants, who were alienated from the common sense that East Timor, Aceh and Papua are natural parts of Indonesia, could then be conceived of by reconciling them with the familiar categories of GPK, communists and foreign pawns.

This discourse on separatists could count as true for several reasons. The discourse on separatists was reinforced by other discourses within the New Order's project of discursive hegemony, such as the discourse of development, as well as the nationalist notion of Indonesia as an inheritance. These discourses othered all the people of these peripheral territories, not just separatists. This othering was strengthened by geographical difference, and the power to represent that this apportioned to the government and military. Despite this power to represent, the discourse on separatists should not uniformly be viewed as an act of manipulation and concealment by the regime and its lackeys. Heryanto cautions against a clear delimitation of the subject and object of power. As the discourse on separatists enabled the production of an increasing number of texts, its depictions of separatists may have seemed real even to the regime itself.

During the New Order, dissent against this discourse on separatists was conducted from a position of weakness, and from an ambiguous position. The dissenters were often Indonesians (as opposed to say East Timorese, Acehnese and Papuans), and so were not the objects of the discourse in the same way as they could be in the case of the latent communist threat, for example. Challenges to the discourse included activist activities, particularly in the 1990s; culturally phrased criticism, such as the *Saksi Mata* collection of short stories; materials circulated on the internet; and activities that necessitated media coverage. However, the dominance of the discourse on separatists meant that this dissent could often be ignored, or represented in terms other than its own.

Soeharto's resignation allowed a process of dismantling hegemonic discourses to be accelerated and conducted openly and publicly. This process did not exclude a re-evaluation of territories such as Aceh, Papua and East Timor, where endemic armed conflict has occurred. Although there are more plural discourses on separatists following Soeharto's resignation, the discourse on separatists that was dominant during the New Order still persists. Chapter 3 discussed examples of how challenges to the truths on these territories have often not undermined the devices of the discourse on separatists, and may even in some instances strengthen them. The othering of the peoples of these territories also continues to weaken the impetus for reform on these territories' own terms.

'New' texts, which constitute a definite break from the previous discourse, have been produced. These new texts, and the new themes within them, are in part attributable to the emergence of separatist voices, but some Indonesians are also re-appraising the truth about separatists.

It is tempting then to ask what implications this background may have for future change. However, I believe genuine caution must be exercised in making any 'prophecies'. I do not pretend that this discourse on separatists sews up the picture on Indonesian reactions to separatists and more generally to the question of Aceh, Papua and East Timor's place within Indonesia. It is quite probable that separatist movements will continue to diversify, and that the discourses on separatists will continue to become more plural. What implications this may have for the resolution of the problems of Aceh and Papua is impossible to say.

Appendix: Discourse of National Unity

This paper has made frequent, implicit reference to a discourse on national unity, under which demands for secession from any part of Indonesia are non-sensical. Space is insufficient to adequately discuss this discourse here. However, to provide necessary background, this appendix will briefly discuss this discourse of national unity with particular reference to Papua, East Timor and Aceh. Three core elements of this discourse will be discussed - reasons of history, pragmatic reasons and the idea that unity under Indonesia is a popular desire.

History

Anderson lists the 'subjective antiquity' of the nation in the eyes of nationalists²³² as one of the paradoxes of modern nationalism. The notion of a continuity between former kingdoms, such as Mataram, Sriwijaya and Majapahit, and contemporary Indonesia was (is) employed in the context of all of Aceh, Papua and East Timor. Another important historical reason is common colonialism. This was one of the strongest reason promoted during the conflict with the Dutch (and some Papuans) over Papuan sovereignty: President Sukarno repeatedly stated that Indonesia consists of all the former colonised territories of the Dutch.

And what is it that is called the motherland of Indonesia? The motherland of Indonesia is the entirety of the territory previously colonised by the Dutch, which was previously known as the Dutch East Indies. That is the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Truly I say to you, that is the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.²³³

At the time Papua was at the time considered the last piece of territory to be added to the republic²³⁴; the only hint of ambition to add further territory was a reference to 'North Kalimantan' (modern day Malaysia)²³⁵. Approximately a decade later, East Timor presented a different problem. East Timor was been colonised by the Portuguese, not the Dutch, and Indonesia showed particular interest in the territory prior to the political upheaval in Portugal in 1974 that sparked a process of decolonisation. Then State Secretary Sudharmono however refuted the claim that Indonesia was only the former colonised territories of the Dutch.

Just try to find where in the constitution it mentions that the Republic of Indonesia is the former Dutch East Indies!²³⁶

Thus colonisation became a force that divided a previously united nation, rather than playing any formative role. The idea that East Timor had once been apart of Indonesia is strengthened with the use of the word '*kembali*' (return, again)²³⁷.

²³² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, New York, 1991 (2nd edition), p5. For an example of the approach of Indonesia stretching back to these former kingdoms, see P.J. Suwarno (ed) *Negara dan Nasionalisme Indonesia*, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1995.

²³³ *Ibid*, p50. [*Dan apa yang dinamakan tanah air Indonesia? Yang dinamakan tanah air Indonesia ialah segenap wilayah yang dulu dijajah oleh pihak Belanda, yang dulu dinamakan Hindia Belanda, yang dulu dinamakan Nederlands Indie. Itulah wilayah Republik Indonesia. Dengan benar kataku, itulah wilayah Republik Indonesia.*]

²³⁴ *Ibid*, p36, 55, 166.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, p43.

Both Papua and East Timor became parts of Indonesia well after 1945, when an independent Indonesian nation was initially declared. Conversely, the most frequent 'historical evidence' of Aceh's place in Indonesia is its contribution to the independence revolution. Sukarno named the territory a '*daerah modal*' (asset region). Almost all texts also mention Seulawah I, a Dakota aeroplane donated by Aceh to trade cloves to finance the independence guerrillas. Both of these facts are frequently highlighted to strengthen claims that the people of Aceh could not possibly *really* want to secede from Indonesia.

All of these historical reasons depict the configuration of Indonesia at the time of their utterance as a restoration of what Indonesia always was. A final historical reason are various pieces of legislation, but particularly the virtually unchangeable 1945 Constitution, which are depicted as setting down a non-negotiable form of Indonesia²³⁸.

Popular Desire

Integrasi, an almanac that I discussed in some detail in Chapter 1, devotes significant energy to outlining the

²³⁶ Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p685. [*Coba cari, apa ada dalam konstitusi bahwa negara RI disebutkan sebagai bekas Hindia Belanda!*]

²³⁷ For example, 'Through these Indonesian songs, it was as if they [the East Timorese] had *re-discovered* their national identity.' (my emphasis) [*Melalui lagu-lagu Indonesia itu, seolah-olah mereka dapat menemukan identitas nasionalnya kembali.*] (Soekanto, *Integrasi*, p107)

²³⁸ See, for example, *Suara Pembaruan*, 'Amien Rais: Sulit Memenuhi Tuntutan Kemerdekaan Aceh dan Irja', 30 November 1999. Anderson's notion of Indonesia as an inheritance is also relevant. See Chapter 2.

historical, geographical, ethnological and genealogical realities, and ... the aspirations of the East Timorese who possess the same patriotic sentiments and aspirations as the Indonesian people.²³⁹

This idea of the people truly wanting to be a part of Indonesia is important for all three of these territories. As touched upon in Chapter 1, the most important piece of "proof" for Papua is the 1969 Act of Free Choice, while the Balibo Declaration assumes similar importance for East Timor. The vocabulary item '*saudara*' (literally 'brothers'), and the idea of common blood, are also indicators of popular desire to be Indonesian. However, this idea of popular desire en masse becomes less significant when reversed. One author in the 1980s rebukes the idea of ethnic solidarity between Papuans and Papua New Guineans²⁴⁰. There was also some debate as to whether the MPR would have to accept the result of the East Timor ballot. Some authors have questioned whether a majority vote in any Aceh referendum would force Indonesia to grant independence.

Pragmatism

A third core element of this discourse is that of pragmatic assertions of national unity. Indonesian diplomats asserted in the 1970s that Indonesian sovereignty was the only realistic choice for East Timor, and that Indonesia was taking a responsibility over East Timor that no other country or organisation was willing to. This approach has continued since, and is linked to comparisons, both for Papua and East Timor, of the lack of

²³⁹ Ibid, p101. [*hakekat historis, geografis, ethnologis dan genealogis, serta ... aspirasi rakyat Timor Timur yang mempunyai sentimen patriotisme dan cita-cita sama dengan rakyat Indonesia.*]

²⁴⁰ *Kompas*, 'Penyelesaian Pelintas Batas RI-PNG' 17 November 1984, p4.

[*Kalau ada kesempatan pemerintah PNG harus diberi tahu, bahwa sesudah Revolusi Perancis 1789, kesamaan warna kulit maupun rambut, kesamaan bahasa, kesamaan kebudayaan dan bahkan juga*

development pursued by the colonial regime compared to Indonesian achievements. Amien Rais has been one vocal exponent of pragmatic reasons for unity following Soeharto's resignation. This pragmatic unity places these territories within Indonesia but in a permanent position of subordination, and as mentioned in Chapter 1, resembles statements made by British colonists in the early 20th century.

A final important element of this discourse is the notion that national unity, although fixed, requires constant maintenance and vigilance. This is achieved through constantly emphasising the threats of disintegration and balcanisation. This constant threat of disintegration facilitates swift and forceful state action against anyone who challenges national unity.

To summarise then, under this discourse of national unity, East Timor, Aceh and Papua are natural parts of Indonesia, for a number of reasons. Geographical, cultural and blood ties bind the nation, while a stylised history of common sovereignty and colonisation provides further cement. Their place in Indonesia is permanent: the people of these territories have made it clear that they want to be Indonesians, and in any case their place within Indonesia is regulated by the constitution and specific laws. Although this place is permanent, it requires constant vigilance, and necessitates action against those who challenge it. The discourse's strategies in asserting national unity are variable, as we saw in the varying use of colonialism and popular desire.

kesamaan agama, sudah tidak terlalu relevan lagi bagi nasionalisme yang mendasari sebagian besar negara yang ada di akhir abad ke-20 sekarang.]

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