

**DUTCH PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE CONDITIO SINE QUA
NON FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS**

**Message of H.E. President Sukarno on the
Installation Ceremony of the newly
appointed Army Chief of Staff, two
Ambassadors and one Minister
at the Negara Palace
on June 23, 1962.**

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**DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA**

MESSAGE OF H.E. PRESIDENT SUKARNO ON THE INSTALLATION
CEREMONY OF THE NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF OF
STAFF, TWO AMBASSADORS AND ONE MINISTER AT
THE NEGARA PALACE ON JUNE 23, 1962.

Brothers and Sisters, and Mr. Jani, Mr. Maengkom, Mr. Sudjono, and Mr. Busono Darusman in particular.

Brothers and Sisters, you have witnessed the taking of the oath of Mr. Jani who has become Chief of Staff of the Army, and Mr. Maengkom, Ambassador Extraordinary to Poland; Mr. Sudjono, Ambassador Extraordinary to Ghana; and Mr. Busono Darusman, Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria.

I feel obliged to give some explanation on the results of what is called the "integration" of our Armed Services. In this connection, I have decided — as you have just read or heard reading out — to relieve General Abdul Harris Nasution with my heartfelt thanks for all his merits devoted to our Country and Nation, from his function as Chief of Staff of the Army and have appointed General Nasution to become Chief of Staff of the Armed Services.

All of you know that our Armed Services consist of 4 services: the Army, the Navy, the Airforce and the State Police. In order to integrate these four services, I have appointed a Chief of Staff of the Armed Services and I consider General Nasution capable to become the Chief of Staff of these Armed Services. I relieve him of his function as Chief of Staff of the Army and appoint him as Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. Besides, General Nasution will of course retain his function as Deputy First Minister in the field of Security and Defence.

and also his post as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian.

Major General Jani whom I am now going to install as Chief of Staff of the Army, ex officio, will therefore also become a minister in the Kerdja Cabinet while apart from that Minister Jani in his capacity of Major General Jani remains to be the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian. Thus, you will get a picture of the composition of the top leadership of our Armed Services, and the way in which our Armed Services are mobilised especially in connection with the struggle to liberate West Irian.

I herewith announce that from this moment on the Chief of Staff of the Army I will give the function of Commander-in-Chief of the Army; the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and the Chief of Staff of the Airforce, Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce. And so will the Chief of Staff of the State Police become Commander-in-Chief of the State Police.

Therefore Brothers and Sisters, I am very happy today being able to install Major General Jani as the new Chief of the Army, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. And I am happy too that simultaneously I can install two Ambassadors Extraordinary and one Minister Plenipotentiary.

All of you will be fully aware that at the moment we have reached one of the culminating points of our Revolution, not only as regards the implementation of whatever falling within the scope of the Mandate of the People's Sufferings, but also in the case of liberating West Irian. And in this struggle to liberate West Irian, we are fighting in a simultaneous way as I have pictured that our Revolution is a simultaneous Revolution, and therefore our fight to liberate West Irian from the claws of Dutch Imperialism should also be executed in a simultaneous way. Diplomatic efforts and the People's Tri-Command should especially be carried out simultaneously. Both we must implement as efficient as possible and with the maximum effect. Therefore

the four of you standing in front of me, you will understand that from this moment on you are expected to exert your utmost energies to the simultaneous struggle to liberate West Irian.

From Major General Jani we expect so especially in the military field and from Mr. Maengkom, Sudjono and Busono Darusman, especially in the field of diplomacy. Besides these four gentlemen, it is but natural that I expect the whole people in general, and all our functionaries in particular, to also contribute their maximum energies and efforts to the struggle for the liberation of West Irian. You know that our struggle to liberate West Irian, at this moment, as I said just now indeed has reached a crucial stage. This also is the case as regards the field of diplomacy. You know, that in the diplomatic field we have firmly and clearly stated, that besides our unanimous determination to liberate West Irian within this year, before cock-crow on the first of January 1963, we are prepared, I even stated, we very much desire to liberate West Irian from Dutch imperialism by peaceful means. We still prefer the peaceful way and feel more happy if West Irian could be liberated peacefully. But on the other hand, we have already positively stated, that within the year 1962, before the 31st of December, West Irian shall be restored within the territory under the authority of the Republic of Indonesia, and we will fight with whatever means to return West Irian under the authority of the Republic of Indonesia in this very year.

Meanwhile we have made known that we want to settle this problem peacefully, are prepared to negotiate with the Dutch, and solve this West Irian dispute through negotiations with the Dutch.

While stating so repeatedly, we have as yet not received any positive and official statement from the Dutch about their willingness to solve the issue of and the struggle to liberate West Irian on the basis of the proposals made by Mr. Bunker the content of which all of us already know.

As soon as the Bunker proposals were published, we firmly stated publicly that we were willing to negotiate with the Dutch on the basis of the Bunker proposals, that we readily accept the principles of the Bunker proposals and were prepared to negotiate with the Dutch on the basis of the principles of the Bunker proposals. But all of you, and the entire Indonesian people also know that it were the Dutch who showed uncertainty and hesitancy as to the matter up till this day.

I repeat, up till this very day, this very hour, this very morning. In fact we, the Indonesians, do not exactly know as to whether the Dutch really want to solve the West Irian issue on the basis of the principles as forwarded by Mr. Bunker. What are the Bunker principles like, Brothers and Sisters.

Please do make notes.

According to us, the Bunker proposals involve two principles. First, the transfer of administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia. Second, following the transfer of administration from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia, opportunity would be given to the West Irianese people to determine for themselves as to whether they want to remain within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia or otherwise. This is what we mean with accepting the Bunker principles. Transfer of administration to the Republic of Indonesia first and only after the administration has been handed over to the Republic of Indonesia, at a time fixed later, opportunity will be given to the people of West Irian to determine their final wish.

Well, I repeat, up till this hour, this morning, this date, we in fact do not clearly know whether the Dutch have really accepted the Bunker principles, although H.E. Mr. U Thant has let me know, that H.E. Mr. U Thant does not see any difference between the Indonesian and the Dutch views. However, this has not been confirmed by the Dutch, on the contrary, in spite of what has been stated by U Thant — U Thant stated, that there

was no difference between both the Dutch and the Indonesian standpoints — different voices have been heard in the Hague, so that it still puzzles us what actually is the meaning of the Dutch by saying that they have accepted the Bunker proposals. Does it mean that the Dutch are prepared to transfer the administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, yes or not? If it does mean so, and thereafter opportunity would be given to the people of West Irian to determine their own destination, if this is the real meaning, then Indonesia is prepared to negotiate with the Dutch. As long as such a statement has not been made, we do not want to negotiate! This I have already stated in Medan the other day. I firmly stated, that if the Dutch continue to send their reinforcements to West Irian, we will not negotiate with the Dutch.

So, this then Brothers and Sisters, is our stand at the moment. Well, my friends the two Ambassadors Extraordinary, one Minister Plenipotentiary, and the new Chief of Staff of the Army, let all of us fight within the picture I have depicted. Mr. U Thant has invited me to immediately send a delegation to resume talks with the Dutch. I was thinking, yes, supposed that at this stage, I send a delegation, based on the statement of H.E. U Thant, that there is no difference between the Dutch and the Indonesian stands, yet that delegation I will give the assignment to submit at its first meeting with the Dutch, one plain question: Are the Dutch willing to transfer the Administration of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia or not? One plain question which I have repeated over and over and which should be answered by the Dutch at the very moment too. If on the question put forward by the delegation I will send as to whether the Dutch are willing to transfer the administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch delegation there at the very moment replies: "Yes, we are willing to transfer the administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia", only then, are we prepared to negotiate with the Dutch. Because I have stated repeatedly that what we want to

talk about is the way of transferring the Administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia. But suppose our Delegation at its first meeting with the Dutch delegation on the question as to whether the Dutch are willing or not to transfer the administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch talk round and round the subject or may even say; "Yes, wait a moment, wait a moment," then the delegation I am to send in case it receives such a reply, I will give the order to leave the conference hall instantly and go back to Indonesia. Thus it has no sense at all Brothers and Sisters.

I think it therefore better and more proper to only send a one-man delegation, or one delegate to negotiate with the Dutch after the Dutch themselves have publicly admitted their willingness to accept the Bunker proposals in the sense of transferring the administration over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, and but thereafter executing what they call selfdetermination for the people of West Irian.

Thus is my statement, clear and positive.

Brothers and Sisters, thus is the position of our struggle at the moment. Meanwhile, as I have stated again and again the People's Tri-Command shall go on, and we will-as I expect-do our utmost, in order that the People's Tri-Command may indeed go on, or as I have put it to one of the ambassadors here, that the People's Tri-Command may run like a rolling snowball so that before cock-crow on the first of January 1963, West Irian shall have already come back to the fold of the Republic of Indonesia.

General Jani, do work as hard as you can in that field.

And you Mr. Maengkom, Mr. Sudjono, and Mr. Darusman, in your capacity of Ambassadors Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary do work also as hard as possible. I will pray to God Almighty, that all of you may receive His guidance and protection.

Thank you.



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